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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated the characteristics of childhood memories that remain 
accessible over the whole life span. On the assumption that one of the primary 
purposes of autobiographical memory is its adaptive function, it was hypothesised 
that, in order to fulfil this function, autobiographical memories must include an 
affective component. That is, each memory will consist of a record of an 
experienced event together with the accompanying emotion so as to mediate an 
appropriate behavioural response in similar future circumstances. For the same 
reason, it was also predicted that, as a person grows older, selected childhood 
memories will still retain their emotionality, vividness and personal importance. A 
detailed analysis of the nature of childhood memories was undertaken and evidence 
to support these hypotheses was sought in three separate studies. 
In Study 1, a structured interview was used and 109 people aged between 21 and 
91 years were asked to free recall memories drawn from within three - year periods 
of childhood from birth to 18 years. Subjects' ratings were used to explore the 
characteristics of these memories and the effects of arge encoding subject age and 
subject gender were systematically examined. In contrast with previous research, 
it was found that 83 % of subjects could recall memories from below three years of 
age. Uniformly high ratings of emotionality showed that the affective component, 
as predicted, was high across all encoding. ages and showed no decline with subject 
age. Ratings of clarity and realism were also unaffected by subject age. The 
incidence and vividness of sensory imagery increased with age of encoding, but, 
again, did not decline with subject age. Although most vivid memories involved 
imagery, 151v% of subjects sometimes claimed to recall vividly without imagin`. 
XIII 
These findings suggest that the affective component may have been contributing to 
overall vividness. 
Study 2 using, cued recall, compared latency of response for emotion cued words 
i 
and object cued words and also used ratings to examine the characteristics of the 
retrieved memories. Memories were retrieved Faster to object cues but these 
memories were still rated high in emotionality. Memories retrieved to emotion 
cues, although slower to access, were rated as more important, more emotional, 
more unusual and more frequently recalled. Cue type was therefore shown to be a 
powerful factor in determining accessibility, overriding other memory 
characteristics. 
Although in Studies I and 2 subjects selected their own memories, Study 3 tested 
the retention of details of early experience of school life as designated by the 
researcher. It was found that detailed memories could still be recalled even in old 
a`e and that the rate of forgetting declined steadily with arge This evidence of 
persisting retention of early childhood experience is consistent with the view that 
such memories serve a functional role in that they are an integral part of the 
3 individual's self history and developing self concept. 
The research provides a substantial body of data detailing, the topics recalled From 
different periods of childhood and the nature of the memories and charts the 
remarkable stability of these memories across the life span. 
xiv 
CHAPTER I 




The research presented in this thesis aims to identify determinants that facilitate the 
recall of childhood memories in adult life. Relevant literature oilers many 
explanations why childhood experiences are often forgotten (see chapter 2.6 for a 
review of Childhood Amnesia). However, little or no research has focused on why 
certain events, even from very early childhood, are sometimes remembered with 
astonishing vividness over a lifetime. This thesis examines a large sample of 
childhood memories and analyses their content and nature in order to infer what 
properties enable early memories to survive, apparently intact, over a life-span that 
may stretch into extreme old age. 
The approach adopted in this thesis rests on two basic assumptions. The first is 
that autobiographical memory has adaptive value. This assumption is supported by 
consideration of the functions of autobiographical memory in section 1.4.2 and is 
integral to Johnson's MEM1 model described in section 1.2.6. 
How, one might ask, can one test the validity of an assumption of adaptive value if 
3 the truth can only become evident in later generations. Fortunately, we need not 
look to the uncertain future, but can draw inferences from the established past. 
Darwinian theory requires that any adaptive attribute of a living species Wulst have 
been present in its earlier prototypes. Memory of experienced events can be seen 
to ante-date even the evolution of brains. Insects such as ants and bees have no 
brains, only ganglia linked to motor systems, yet they are adept at remembering, 
where they found food and at finding their way 'home'. So, in accord with the 
inductive approach of Charles Darwin (1858) shared, inter alia, by Bruce (1985), 
Dawkins (1983,1989) and the present writer, this research accepts that the most 
1) 
important function of autobiographical memory is its adaptive value. Otherwise it 
could not be with us in its present highly developed form after millions of years of 
phylogenetic mutation and evolution. It should be noted that this argument, while 
in accord with both of Mendel's laws of heredity, does not involve acceptance of 
the fallacy propounded by Lamarck (1809) and more recently by the Russian 
Lysenko (1949), namely that acquired characteristics can be transferred to future 
generations. 
The adaptive function of the autobiographical memory is due solely to the fact that 
learning from personal experience, i. e. remembering what proves harmful and what 
is beneficial is likely to prolong the lives of individuals who possess this attribute. 
They will thus have greater opportunity to pass on their ability genetically to future 
generations, until the adaptive advantage becomes shared by virtually the whole 
species. Belief in the adaptive function of autobiographical memory is basic to the 
perspective adopted here. 
The second assumption is that autobiographical memory always contains an affect 
component. This can be regarded as a prediction arising from the assumption of 
adaptive value. For unless the experiencer remembers not only the content of 
'what happened', but also the affect of the memory, that is what is felt about it, 
recall of the memory could provide no adaptive `uidance. as to whether to 
encourage or avoid such an event in the future. Consequently, it is hypothesised 
that when an event is recalled, the two components 'fact and'aflect' will be clearly 
apparent in childhood memories, and that affect will be a particularly important 
determinant of childhood memories. 
Apart from these broad hypotheses, the approach used in this research is essentially 
exploratory, as befits the precept of David Rubin (1986 p5) who wrote: 
"One of the most encoura`ing indications that real progress is being made in 
autobiographical memory is the willingness of psychologists to delay committing, 
themselves to particular theories and detailed hypotheses until phenomena worth 
their theorising have been more frilly described. " 
The research reported here includes a detailed analysis of childhood memories. 
The characteristics that emerge throw light on the determinants by showing what 
properties are associated with life long retention of childhood memories. The 
analysis addressed the following questions: 
i) How young, does autobiographical memory start? 
ii) What sort of events are remembered? 
iii) How vivid are childhood memories? 
iv) Which senses are involved? 
v) How did people feel at the event and at recall? 
vi) What triggers childhood memories? 
vii) What is the personal meaning of what is recalled? 
However, the exploratory approach used in these studies to identify the 
determinants of childhood memory is guided by the rich and growing, body of 
knowledge about adult autobiographical memory, the salient features of which are 
outlined in sections 1.2 - 1.7 
4 
1.2 Different Kinds Of Memory 
It is useful to review the difTerent kinds of memories ordinarily used in daily life, in 
order to position autobiographical memory within the general framework. Or, 
more accurately, to position differentiated types of memory within the broad 
framework of autobiographical memory, since remembering, experiences from one's 
past will encompass instances, singly or in combination, of every type of memory 
system. 
The question of how many functionally different kinds of memory are in ordinary 
use has been addressed since the last century by such researchers as Ribot (1884), 
Galton (1883), James (1890), Freud (1915) and many others. However, rather 
than trace consensus and differences over past years, let us turn at once to two 
influential contemporary views, those of Tulving (1985) and Johnson (1983, 
1986). 
Tulving proposes five criteria by which to distinguish separate memory systems. 
1. Different memory systems have different functions and handle different 
types of information. 
2. Different systems may employ different processes but need not necessarily 
do so. 
3. Different systems operate in dir erent brain structures or mechanisms. 
4. Different systems have developed at different evolutionary stakes. 
5. Different systems may have different forms of representation. 
Using these criteria Tulving lists five separate but interacting kinds of memory 
which lie names, defines and describes as follows: 
(Each of these systems includes multiple sub-systems which lie does not identi(y) 
5 
1. Procc'clnrUl At? IflOrl' 
"Learned connection between stimuli and responses. " (Tulving 1985 p. 387) In 
other words, to borrow a Piagetian term, the 'internalising' of motor skills to the 
point where their performance demands little or no conscious thought. 
Steven Rose (1992) suggests this was the earliest form of memory to evolve 
among living creatures. Adaptively, this is inferred from the fact that learning the 
motor skills needed to cope with the environment is a sine qua non of survival. 
This adaptive need is reflected in the fact that the earliest memory to develop in a 
human infant is motor control (see section 2.2. I ). In the adult recall of childhood 
memories, procedural memory will inevitably be playing a part, for even the 
simplest bodily activity once had to be learnt. However, the role of procedural 
memory in autobiographical recall will almost certainly be unconscious. For, as 
Tulving puts it "The greater the skill the more automatic is its doing. " We may 
remember riding a bicycle but not consciously recall the motor activities involved. 
Procedural memory is very retentive and is relatively resistant to ageing and 
trauma. (Parkin, 1987). Once learnt, a motor skill may stay unused for years 
without being forgotten. This, too, conforms to adaptive necessity, for in an 
emergency it might well be too late to start, relearning, a forgotten skill. 
2. The I'ercepIucil Re'l're. sentafive Si team 
This is the process for the recognition of objects and actions. It relates current 
sensory input to previous experience. The adaptive value of this function needs no 
elaboration. Nor does the fact that without recognition of the features and nature 
of an event it could not take its place in autobiographical memory. Thus, the 
6 
perceptual representative system is an essential participant in the encoding of 
childhood memories, but as with procedural memory, it is usually taken for granted 
and its role passes unnoticed. 
3. Sport Term 11 femur v 
r 
Today this is often defined as 'working memory', for it is here that conscious 
mental processing is carried out. 
Working memory is characterised by a short retention span, just long; enough to 
3 
transfer appropriate information to long-term memory, or if inappropriate, quickly 
to forget and 'clear the slate' to make room for the next input. An example is sub- 
totals when adding a column of figures. Adaptively, the ability to forget what is no 
longer meaningful is crucial, for faced with sudden danger, it could be fatal if the 
mind were still occupied by previous information. In terns of autobiographical 
memory, working memory is the interface between input and long-term memory 
store. It is the instrument of encoding. 
These functional attributes relate to an assumption of sequential stages of 
processing like that of the Atkinson-Shiflrin model (1971) (see fig. 1.2.1). 
-l. 
Semantic Af'nio/'1' 
This is Tulving's name for propositional knowledge of the world that is 
independent of the rememberer and of temporal and spatial context. For example, 
the battle of Hastings was fought in 1066, canaries have wings, Walton }lall is 
located in Milton Keynes. General knowledge of this kind can be aquired from 
instruction or by generalisation from repeated experiences. 
7 
An important attribute of semantic memory is its ability to provide information and 
understanding about phenomena beyond the relatively limited data bank of 
personal experience. Its essential contribution to autobiographical memory is that 
it facilitates recognition and understanding of the nature and probable consequence 
of phenomena when observed and interpretation of current experiences. 
S. I; hi. cýýclic" Atemoi: 1- 
This has been defined as the conscious recollection of personally experienced 
events. Adaptively, this process is vital, since it alone enables learning from 
experience. Episodic memory is the broad category which includes 
autobiographical memory. Tulvin` (1983) made no distinction between the two, 
though in his 1985 paper he does so, anticipating some of the distinguishing 
refinements made by other researchers since (e. g. Conway 1990, Nelson 1991, 
Baddeley 1991). 
<. A ! iilliple A'hu Ab chilar A lc'1 uo :' (A lEA t) 
In NIEM, Johnson (1985) presents a radically different approach from that of 
Tulving. Her MEN't proposes a single, all-embracing system with three major sub- 
systems that serve, by selective interaction, to provide meaningful recall of the 
extremely wide diversity of life experiences. The three major sub-systems within 
MEhi are, 
1. The sensory record; exogenous sensory input. 
2. The perceptual record; the combination of sensory elements 
and stored knowledge that enables identification and gives 
meaning to what is perceived. 
3. The reflection record, i. e. the product of internally created 
stimuli; thoughts that evaluate semantic and emotional 
8 
associations with information already stored in loin, -term 
memory. 
The experience of remembering, is drawn from the particular blend of information 
from each of these sub-systems that reaches awareness. Access to a single 
memory is possible through any one, or combination, of sub-systems. MEN( 
denies the sequential stages of processing from an initial sensory buffer store 
through working memory to LTIM, as in Atkinson-Schiffrin model. According to 
MEMi all entries are simultaneous and permanent, including those classed in other 
models as transient if not transferred quickly enough from buffer store or short- 
term memory. 
MEM differentiates between personal, i. e. autobiographical memory and other 
episodic recall. Whereas less personal episodic memories are created by all the 
sub-systems, personal memories are far more'likely to include major contributions 
from the reflection system. 
The evaluative function of the reflection system provides guidance for the future 
and so lends particular adaptive value to autobiographical memory. To emphasise 
the role of personal interpretation, Johnson writes: "We do not remember what we 
saw but what we thought. " This view is particularly relevant to the adult recall of 
childhood memories, since the passage of time and many mental rehearsals will 
ensure that the perceptual information about the event will have become 
thoroughly suftüsed with evaluative thoughts and feelings about what happened. 
MEM, in common with other constructivist models, holds that there is not a single 
engram for an experienced event, but a multiplicity of entries, including those that 
are subjectively generated from within the reflection sub-system. According to 
9 
MEM, within an appropriately cued personal memory, information is activated 
from all the sub-systems, but information from the dominant reflection system is 
likely, at least partially, to inhibit information from the perceptual system. 
Evidence that such inhibition need only be partial is provided within the present 
research by the finding that, as predicted by Brewer (I9Sb) most autobiographical 
memories are imaged visually. Conversely, cases of total inhibition may explain 
why as many as 15% of the subjects in the present study claim sometimes to 
experience vivid recall with little or no visual or other imaging. . 
Conceptual differences between types of memory systems are to some extent 
confirmed by neuropsychological evidence (Parkin, 1997), but this lies outside the 
scope of the present thesis. 
When first published (1983,1985) Tulving's and Johnson's proposals may have 
seemed irreconcilable. But by 1991, Tulving appeared to share at least some of 
Johnson's constructivist views when he wrote (p. 25) that he now believed there is 
no single engrain for a recalled event, but rather that memory consists of "a 
number of different brain / behaviour / cognition systems and processes that 
through co-operation and interaction with one another, make it possible for their 
possessor to benefit from past experience and thereby promote survival. " 
Table 1.2.1 and fig 1.2.2 summarise the Tulvin;, and Johnson models. These 
models provide a theoretical framework within which the present studies of 
childhood memories can be readily accommodated. 
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Fig 1.2.1 The Sequential Atkinson-Shiffrin Model 
Sensory buffer Workin, Loni, term 
store memory Memory 
Retention time: Retention time: Retention 
secs mins indefinite 
Table 1.2.1 The Tulving Model - Long-term Memory 
Memory System Functional Domain 
Procedural Bodily actions and acquired motor skills 
Perceptual Representation Sensory input and its interpretation 
according to previous experience 
Short term memory Mental processing of input for transfer to 
LTA(. if appropriate 
Semantic Knowledge of the world independent of 
specific personal experience 
Episodic Recall of personally experienced past 
events 
AMMODIOgra ideal i'VIC1110l'y 
A self-centred sub-section of the episodic 
system 
Fig 1.2.2 Johnson's Model - M. E. M. 
Inter-Active Sub-Systems 
At i ; Ii of the 
sub-systems. At recall, the nature and strength of activation within each of the 
sub-systems will determine the memory at the focus of attention. 
I; - 
1.3 What Is Autobiographical Memory? 
At its most basic level, autobiographical memory could be defined as a sub-section 
of Episodic memory that recalls episodes or events from the rememberer's past. 
However, within this widely accepted generalisation, there are many distinctions 
that different researchers have selectively emphasised. For example, Baddeley 
(1991) affirms that, for him, the episodic element is not an essential ingredient. Nis 
critical criterion is that "the memory must directly involve the rememberer in its 
content. " Consequently, he writes (p. 20) "I would also regard such well known 
facts about oneself as one's name and the names of teachers who taught you at 
school as being examples of autobiographical memory....... Viewed in this way, 
autobiographical memory is not a special system, but rather refers to the use of 
general memory processes to store and retrieve information about the 
renmemberer. " 
Other researchers, while not denying that autobiographical memories use general 
memory processes, find it meaningful to particularise the term autobiographical to 
the recall of active or passive participation of the self in an event. For instance, 
Conway (1990) distinguishes between 'knowledge of autobiographical fact', e. g. 
the address of the house where you live, as distinct from 'autobiographical 
memory', like remembering how you first moved into that house. 
Sometimes the distinction may owe more to personal meaning related to context 
than to the extent of participation in an event. For instance, "[ left the keys on the 
hall table, " may be no more than knowledge of biographical fact within a context 
of "where are the keys? " Yet in a scenario where someone is irrevocably severing 
a relationship and 'walking out for ever' on their partner this episode might be a 
tý 
powerful autobiographical memory - putting the final fiºIlstop to the end of a life 
chapter. The strength of the distinction here aims to emphasise a factor that is 
increasingly being regarded by researchers as a crucially important determinant of 
autobiographical memory, namely the degree of self involvement or personal 
meaning of an event for the rememberer. 
David Rubin, in his Inlrochwlio,, lo Aiilohiogizul)hirul Alckmorty (1986 p. 7) writes: 
"Autobiographical memory is about the self, the source of information about our 
lives from which we are likely to make judgements about our own and to some 
extent others' behaviour. " Few today would disagree. Cohen (1996 p. 156) defines 
autobiographical memory as "How we remember the events and experiences that 
form our personal history. " Nelson (1991) endorses the concept of self 
involvement and links it inseparably to affect. She writes "All experience that 
involves awareness of oneself will have two aspects of remembering, the recall of 
'what happened' and 'what I felt about it'. " Nelson's words suggest that. since all 
autobiographical memory is experienced by a self, it is bound to have affect 
content, without which it should be relegated to such episodic categories as 
historical knowledge of autobiographical facts, as suggested by Conway. 
Nelson's view is shared by the present writer. Hence, despite common practice in 
the past, the term autobiographical and episodic, as used in this thesis, are not 
interchangeable and the thesis is concerned with autobiographical memories not 
with autobiographical facts. As hypothesised in the Introduction (I .I) 
autobiographical memory could not serve its adaptive purpose if affect did not 
prompt us to discriminate which experiences are to he sought and which avoided. 
Consequently, it is predicted that, as proposed by Nelson, an affective component 
will be found in the free recall of autobiographical memories. This hypothesis is 
14 
consistent with views expressed by Bartlett (19 2). He affirmed that it is primarily 
the recognition of the subjective feelings attached to a particular memory that 
enable the recall and imaging of its objective elements. Of course, afFect can also 
be, and often is, evoked by items of semantic or general knowledge of the world, 
r` 
but these are not specific to a particular personal experience. IF they were they 
would be autobiographical. 
15 
1.4 Properties Of Autobiographical Memories 
1.4.1 777' Role Of , Se ff 
The self concept is central to autobiographical memory. For, as Johnson (1985) 
r 
has pointed out we remember not what we saw but what we thought; what our 
particular self understood and felt about the experience. Conversely, it is, at least 
in part, the recall of life experience that makes us what we are. 
Fitzgerald (1991 p. 99) proposed that the self concept owes much to the self 
narrative of past personal experiences. Self narrative, he writes, is a process of life 
review, often encountered in successful mein,. Like Neisser (1959), Fitzgerald 
points out that to understand the role of self concept, it is important to take into 
account its multifaceted nature. These different aspects of the self have been 
described by both Brewer and Neisser. 
Brewer (1986 p. 26) describes the self as composed of an experiencing ego, a self- 
schema and an associated set of personal memories and autobiographical facts. 
Neisser (1939) identifies and describes five aspects of self that can play a part in 
autobiographical memory: 
1. Ecological self: the centre of physical perspective 
2. Impersonal self the species-specific, interpersonal communicator 
,. Private self: our own feelings and beliefs. Our ultimately private emotions 
which are possibly beyond verbal descriptions. The private self involves 
awareness that these feelings are uniquely ours. 
4. Conceptual self. sensitive to culture-specific beliefs - to possible 
differences between "What I feel" and "What I ought to feel. " Tension 
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caused by such divergence may be resolved by distorting memory to 
conform to an acceptable norm. 
5. Whole self: the holistic view ofan event experienced by an individual by an 
anialgain of the above four aspects. 
z 
These different aspects of the self will be differentially active according to the 
individual's make-up and to their perceived relevance to the external event. The 
almagam will, thus, be central to the autobiographical memory, particularly to its 
affective component. The involvement of Neisser's ditTerent aspects of the self is 
discernible in the detailed analysis of childhood memories carried out in the studies 
described in chapters 4,5 and 6. 
1.4.2 IF, mrlion. c Of Au lobiogriuhhiccrl Rlenwi vv 
An understanding of the functions of autobio, raphical memory will necessarily 
throw light on what determines the retention of childhood memories. In an 
attempt to find out how a sample of subjects actually did use their recollections of 
past events, Hyman & Faires (1991) conducted two studies. The first used free 
recall of memories that often came to mind and categorised the uses to which they 
were put. The second study repeated the categorisation, but from memories 
evoked by cue words. 
Ten categories were produced. The five most common, in rank order, were 
labelled: 
I. "i41y experience with x" - narrative about a personal experience concerning 
some topic. 
2. "Point illustration" - making a point in discussion or giving advice. 
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3. "Self description" - used when talking, about the subject's self rather than 
some external topic. 
4. "What's up? " - expressing, concern about some current event in one's life. 
5. "Daydreaming" - associative reminiscence, 
i 
Less frequent functions were: problem discussions, entertainment, testifying and 
reminiscing. 
It is interesting that the 'directive function', guiding, behaviour as predicted by 
Schank (1986) did not emerge in either of the above two studies. Also, the 
relative rank orders of reminiscing and daydreaming, would probably be much 
higher in an older subject sample (McCormack 1979, Coleman 1986). 
Different researchers have accorded primacy to different functions. Yet there is a 
good deal of common ground. Schank (1986) has argued that most knowledge is 
stored as personal memories, and that these play a crucial role in guiding 
behaviour. At a fundamental level, this supports the view hypothesised earlier that 
learning from experience is essential to survival. But Schank here is probably 
referring to guiding social and problem solving behaviour in the shorter term of 
daily life. 
Robinson and Swanson (1990) suggest four functions: 
1. Interpretation of others' actions 
2. Maintenance of relationships 
3. Mood regulation 
4. Self definition 
is 
Barclay and Smith (1991 p. 78) write: "Autobiographical memories give us a sense 
of intellectual and emotional coherence and comfort and establish and maintain 
intimacies through joint reconstructions of the past. (The latter function is, of 
course, absent in silent recall). Lowenthal (1985 p, 210) holds that "The prime 
e 
function of memory ....... 
is not to preserve the past but to adapt it so as to enrich 
and manipulate the present. " A similar point is made by Barclay and Smith (1991, 
p. 80) who say "Autobiographical memories serve an adaptive function, just like 
other memory. However, for a memory to be autobiographical it must acquire 
certain kinds of meanings, especially meanings associated with feelings of 
connectiveness, mutuality ... stated differently, memories 
become autobiographical 
in their use, coupled with associated affect that indexes them as personally 
relevant. " The extent to which we are what we remember is forcibly made by Rose 
(1992) when he points out you can lose an arm or a leg or have a major transplant 
and still keep your identity, but lose your memory, and even to yourself, you are no 
longer YOU. 
There is much consensus that autobiographical memories are more than the recall 
by an ego of self-referenced information, functionally they are an integral part of 
the self and result (Bartlett 1932) "from a process of cognitive justification of 
feelings within a reconstructed instead of a reproduced past. " Bartlett (l9 32 
p. 206-207) reports that when a subject is asked to recall a witnessed event, the 
first thing recalled is usually the 'attitude' towards the experience, and only then are 
objective elements marshalled to justify the attitude. Recent evidence supporting 
Bartlett's finding is provided by Miller et al (1990) who examined personal story 
telling by children aged 21/2 and S. The children's co-narrations are defined as an 
episode of talk involving 2 or more utterances addressed to an interlocutor and 
describing a particular past event in which the child portrayed him I herself as a 
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protagonist. Analysis of the conversations, recorded in the childrens' own homes, 
showed consistent inclusion of self information and self appraisals associated with 
events. Miller et al concluded that co-narrated personal story-telling is a common 
means by which children, together with family members, experience and re- 
experience self relation to others Thus, co-narration serves the important function 
of enabling children as young as 2 or 2'/2 to start developing their self-concept and 
personal culture and to acquire narrative and conversational skills (Bruner 1987, 
Fivusli and Reese 1991). 
v 
Barclay and Smith (1991 p. 90) concluded that "autobiographical remembering is 
an adaptive process that helps sustain a sense of personal cohesion (mental health) 
and connectedness with others. " They added that, jointly, these Functions position 
the self within the wider social culture of one's community. 
It would appear that there is much in the findings of many researchers that relate 
positively to the two main hypotheses of this thesis, namely that adaptive value and 
affective content determine the remembering of our past. Anion; the researchers 
quoted, there is frequent reference to adaptive function, and a general consensus 
71, that the self is central to what is autobiographically remembered. The sell-concept 
is seen as inseparably linked to the personal meaning of what is experienced and 
recalled. Personal meaning is the holistic view of an event as uniquely experienced 
by what Neisser (1939), calls the "whole self. " Personal meanings are basic in the 
recall of one's life-history, and in the moulding, of one's own personality and 
behavioural responses that distinguish one's own personal culture. Personal 
meanings of events will always have affect content. (Nelson 1991, Bartlett 1932, 
Johnson 1935, Robinson 1980, Conway 1991, Neisser 1989). 
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Fig. 1.4.2.1 The Adaptive Functions Of Autobiographical Memory Within 
The General Memory System 
Loni, -Term Function 
Species Survival 
Lille-Span Functions 
Interchan, x of information 
Development of a self-concept 
and personal culture 




Creating and maintaining 
relationships through shared 
experience 
Guiding social behaviour 
Relating affect to experience 
Reminiscence and life-review 
Mood remilation 
Note: No rank order is implied in the listing of life-span functions. 
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1.4.3 R . 'ccu, slniclion 
or (' 'ie. c? 
Although an autobiographical memory is usually regarded by the renicmberer as 
being 'recalled', it is often demonstrably the reconstruction ofan event rather than a 
reproduction or play-back of what was originally seen. Nigro and Neisser (198; ) 
point out that reconstruction must have occurred in those cases here 
rememberers say they can see themselves in their mind's eye taking part in the 
event recalled. 
Conway (1991 p. 169) proposes "that autobiographical memories are not pre- 
stored in memory in the form of more or less discrete units, but rather that 
memories are dynamically constructed on the basis of knowledge drawn from 
different memory structures. " He posits a 'phenomenological record' of 
fragmentary knowledge of past, event-specific experiences Separately stored, is a 
body of thematic knowledge which indexes the phenomenological record. The 
final contributory determinant is the current configuration of the self which will 
decide goal structures, attitudes, beliefs and ways of processing consistent with 
personality. Thus, an autobiographical memory is reconstructed from a synthesis 
of phenomenological record, thematic knowledge and the self 
According to some researchers, generative reconstruction involves three cyclical 
phases (Williams and Hollan 1981, Norman and Bobrow 1979). The first stage 
constructs a retrieval context, the second uses the context to search long, -term 
memory, the third evaluates the output from LTMM. Successive generative 
retrievals involve cyclical repetition. 
Conway's phenomenological record is assumed to consist of a huge number of 
discrete fragments that record moment-by-nmonient conscious experience, including 
1) 1) 
affect, during an event Each traUment will record only the content of 
consciousness that persisted during, a particular moment of encoding. If the 
number of moments to be stored during a normal life-span seems too large to be 
physically possible, it should be borne in mind that the brain contains thousands of 
millions of neurones, and at least ten times as many `dial cells, so that the possible 
network of combinations, is almost infinite. To put this into quantitative 
perspective one might reflect that all that has ever been written, or ever will be, in 
English, French, German, Spanish, Italian - in short, using the Latin alphabet, uses 
combinations of, only twenty-six letters. In any case, the recording of 
phenomenological experience is far from complete. This, as cited by Conway 
(1991 p. 174) was clearly illustrated by Ribot as early as 1883, when lie wrote: 
"I recall at this moment very vividly a visit which I made a year ago to an old 
chateau in Bohemia. The visit lasted two hours. Today I go over it again 
readily in imagination. I enter by the great door, I traverse in order courts, 
corridors, halls and chapels, I see again the frescoes and the decorations, I 
find my way with ease through the labyrinth of the old castle to the moment of 
departure. But it is impossible for me to conceive of this imaginary visit as 
lasting two hours. It seems Much more brief. " 
(Ribot 1883 pp. 58-59). 
The memory is apparently an incomplete record of the original experience. 
Experimental evidence (Johnson et al 19SS, Brewer 1988, Whitton and Leonard 
1981, Ross 1984, Schank 1986) strongly suggests that the phenomenological 
record is separately stored in LTNI. This is confirmed by Cermak and O'Connor 
(1953) in their study of an amnesiac patient SS whose recall of thematic 
knowledge, as related to self, was unimpaired but who could not retrieve specific 
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autobiographical memories. They concluded that neurological impairment denied 
access to the phenomenological record. 
Another case with an interesting difference was reported by Stuss and Gusman 
(1988). Here. impairment was to the access of both phenomenological and 
thematic records. The patient could recall no information about his pre-traumatic 
past. When lie succeeded in relearning some such information it evoked no affect 
or feeling of self involvement. The fact that this patient, V. J., later fully recovered 
his memory does not alter the fact that during the phase during which he had 
relearnt to access both phenomenological and thematic information, his access to 
reacting self was still denied. Taken together, the above examples appear to 
demonstrate the separate functioning of all three components, phenomenological, 
thematic and self. Reconstruction of autobiographical memories is facilitated by 
the way the components are stored. For example, Landauer (1975) proposed the 
phenomenological input is randomly stored, with temporally contiguous records in 
closely adjoining brain locations, thus speeding the search process. 
In conclusion, the mechanism for generative reconstruction of memory outlined on 
the previous pages, accords well with the two main hypotheses of this thesis. The 
inclusion within a memory of affect as experienced by the self, is posited as one of 
the essential determinants, while the flexibility of the system contributes crucially 
to the long-term adaptive function of autobiographical memory. It is arguable. that 
reconstructed memories of the kind described above have greater functional (or 
adaptive) value than copy memories would have. Current experiences are rarely, if 
ever, exact replicas of previous experiences, so that a memory that is a copy will 
fail to match and will not be used to guide response to the new situation. 
Reconstructed memories have greater flexibility and so are more likely to apply to 
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new experiences that are similar but not identical to previous experiences. The 
absolute necessity for such flexibility is nowhere more apparent than in childhood 
memories, where cognitive and interpretative development, and new experiences 
are constantly enlarging and refining the memory store. 
1.4.4 The Role Of kniolinn to AnIobir gi-cq, hic'oI rl fenwrv 
lt is one of the main hypotheses of this thesis that autobiographical memories, 
including, those of childhood, contain an emotional / affect component that gives 
them their long-term and their life-span adaptive value. The presence of a strong 
affect component has also been found to determine the enduring quality and 
vividness of recall. This is particularly marked in the case of Flashbulb memories. 
These are exceptionally vivid memories of events that have the qualities of 
surprise, importance, personal significance and emotion. Typically, such memories 
have been reported for dramatic public events such as the assassinations of public 
fi`ures. Conway (1990 p. 83) writes: "Emotions may play a crucial role in 
Flashbulb memory and vivid memory formation. " Larsen (1991 p. 64) suggests the 
primacy of personal emotion in Flashbulb memories He proposes that the 
vividness of Flashbulb memories may derive from the strength of the individual's 
emotional arousal at the time of learning of the event, rather than upon the content 
of the event itself in other words, a crucial factor is the emotional shock to the 
remernberer's self while the content of the shocking, news acts as a context in 
which the emotion aroused took place. Such a view would explain why Flashbulb 
clarity is by no means confined to the recall of public events (Rubin & Kozin. 
1984). Private events, especially in childhood, can elicit strong emotions, too. 
Thus, in childhood, events that appear trivial by adult standards can be strongly 
emotional and have Flashbulb vividness at recall. 
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Several researchers have noted how, in real life, learning about a news-worthy, 
traumatic event often results in persistent and vivid recall not only of the event, but 
also of unrelated personal details that applied at the time, for instance, exact 
location and activity, clothing, worn etc. (Brown and Kulik 1977, Pillenier 1984, 
c 
Rubin and Kozin 1984). Simulated laboratory research has confirmed this 
(Christianson, Loftus, Hofi'inan, 199 1). 
There is thus evidence that the emotional component in autobiographical nieniory 
is facilitatory for both vividness and persistence, both of which are essential to the 
adaptive function of autobio ºraphical memory. 
26 
1.5 Organisation Of Autobiographical Memory 
Retrieval of information from long-term memory, or indeed from any kind of 
storage system, is critically dependent on how that information is organised in 
store. Thus, the organisation of autobiographical memories plays an important 
part in the retrieval of both adult and childhood memories. 
There is wide consensus among researchers today that the organisation of 
autobiographical memory is hierarchical. However, as Ribot (1882) pointed out, a 
hierarchy can be constructed out of many different categories, temporal, thematic, 
activities, locations, life chapters etc. Various researchers have focused on 
different types of hierarchical structures. 
Kolodner (1983), for instance, proposes a stricture built around event organisation 
units (E. MOPS). Reisser et at (1985) favour an activity-based model, from which 
recall is best facilitated by appropriate activity cues. ßarsalou (1988) agrees with 
neither. His model consists of both temporal and thematic categories in an 
interlocking hierarchical structure. The structure is inferred from the relative 
efficacy of different types of cues in mediating recall. He reported three studies in 
which the cue types relating to examples of free and cued recall were categorised. 
He found that extended events, rather than specific instances provided an 
hierarchical structure of levels, each focusing on different themes drawn from the 
subject's life experience. For example, the recall of 'pitching camp in the rain' 
could be a 'descendent', at four removes, of an extended event related to a life 
period, namely holidays, summertime, while a junior student at college. The 
choice of the theme at each hierarchical level is entirely idiosyncratic and might 
relate to self-imposed goal orientation. 
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Barsalou refers to his model as one of "extended event time lines" that lead from 
one hierarchical level to the one below. In this respect it is similar to Ulrich 
Neisser's model of nested memories (1935). There is also common ground 
z 
between Barsalou's model and Schank's proposal that memory structure is around 
themes (TOPs) and event characteristics (MIOPs). 
Schank and Abelson (1977) proposed that knowledge, resulting, from frequently 
repeated experiences, becomes stored as a kind of typical scenario or set of 
expectations, which they called a Script. The best known example was "Going to 
a restaurant, " and contained all the usual elements such as sitting down at table, 
studying a menu, ordering the meal, paying, the bill and leaving. Of course, scripts 
are not confined to actions and events.. They will include expectations about 
appearance and behaviour regarding actors and roles. 
It is interesting, and especially relevant to childhood memories, that the concept of 
a structure of expectations built on repeated experience is what Piaget called a 
Schema in describing, how a young, child acquires knowledge of the world. (See 
Chapter 2). The script model suggests there is no reason to expect the process of 
acquiring scripts to stop with maturity, only perhaps to diminish if, as is usual, 
increasing age brings fewer new experiences. 
Piaget recognised that a schema relating to any particular kind of experience would 
need to be enriched or adjusted in the li`ht of new input, and that if a new 
experience proved too incompatible to be accommodated within an adjusted 
existing, schema, then a new separate schema would need to be created. 
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Similarly, Schank came to realise the inadequacy of a self-contained restaurant 
script, since far from bein`, sell-contained in real He it would need to 
accommodate many other scripts relating, to different kinds of restaurants and 
different reasons for going, to them. Martin Conway (1990 p 106) enumerates 
several variants. In 1982 Schank reformulated his memory structure and extended 
it to five levels. The first of these he calls a Scene, i. e. a general description of a 
setting for a particular type of activity, e. g. a restaurant. The second level, a 
Script, represents a specific realisation of a scene, e. g. ;a particular visit to a 
restaurant. This will draw upon the third level, a general store of different scripts 
that may be appropriate to the experience. i. e. kinds of restaurants, kinds of 
occasions, social purposes, location, means of travel, etc. Each of these scripts is a 
fragmented element in the memory store, so that an autobiographical recall of a 
particular restaurant occasion is not the accessing of a discretely encoded event, 
instead, it is a dynamic reconstruction of the event from appropriate elements in 
such of the separately stored scripts as may be relevant. 
The selection of the right elements to reconstruct into a memory is helped by 
Schank's fourth and fifth levels. These are Memory Organisation Packets (M, IOPs) 
and Thematic Organisation Points (TOPs). NTOPs group to`ether features often 
found together within scenes. They can thus be used to index a search in 
applicable scripts for what might constitute a specific memory. TOPs serve to 
index abstract similarities in possibly very different experiences. By way of 
example, Schank (1982) cites how the disappointment felt by X because his wife 
would not cook his steak rare enough trigtriggered a memory of years ago in England, 
when he could not get his hair cut as short as he wanted. 
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Bartlett (19; 2) used the term Schemas to describe units of knowledge that loosely 
group together representations of past, personal experiences and resultant 
feelings... " because all that goes to building, of a schema has a chronological as 
well as a qualitative significance. v,, hat is remembered has its temporal mark, while 
the fact that it is operating with a diverse organised mass, and not with single 
undiversified events or units, gives to remembering its inevitable associative 
character. " (p. 207) Perhaps Bartlett's most lasting contribution to the 
understanding of memory was his emphasis on the dynamic nature of remembering,. 
He wrote: "Imakes are dynamic, living, constantly undergoing change under the 
persistent influence of our feelings and ideas" (p15). He had a major influence on 
the reconstructivist view of memory described in section 1.4.3. Though largely 
taken for granted today, Bartlett's view became rather obscured, first by 
mainstream focus on reductionist research programmes, and later by behaviourism. 
However, the organisation of autobiographical memory in terms of scripts and 
schemas is widely accepted today. 
Returning now to the use of cueing experiments to infer the organisation of 
autobiographical memory, Conway and Beckerian (1987) found, in a series of 
three experiments that the most successful cuein" prime for the recall of 
autobiographical memories was life-time period and not semantic category cues. 
They therefore proposed that, at one level, autobiographical memory is organised 
in "knowledge structures that represent life-time periods. " These are referred to as 
autobiographical memory packets (A-h1OPs). The primacy of 'life-period' is, of 
course, in accord with the views of the many researchers today who hold that 
autobiographical memory is about the self. 
i0 
Models of the structural organisation of autobiographical memories are, of 
necessity, inferred by relating cuein;, characteristics to ease of recall. Linton 
(1936) applied this criterion while reviewing, her own longitudinal study of daily 
diary entries. She concluded the linking factor that characterised her structure was 
"mood tone. " This echoes Bartlett's belief. Within the primacy of "mood tone, " 
Linton also found that more recent memories are stored temporally, and more 
remote ones categorically by themes. 
Thematic linkage is also likely to provide initial entry into a nested hierarchy as 
proposed by Neisser (1985). Yet thematic consistency between levels within the 
structure is unnecessary, and indeed, unlikely (as in the Barsalou model). Any 
complex event will probably generate the encoding, of several diverse aspects of the 
experience. Recall of a wedding, for instance, can involve moving among, nested 
images of what the bride looked like, the ceremony, the location, clothes worn, 
parents and particular guests, the reception afterwards, speeches, etc., any one of 
which, if suitably cued, can open the door to "moving, about" within the hierarchy. 
In conclusion, it will be seen that the models described share many characteristics 
in common. They acknowledge the self as the pivotal centre of autobiographical 
memory, they recognise the dynamic nature of the remembering process, and a 
flexibility of structure that enables modifications to be made in the light of new 
experience or change of mood. However, all these models relate primarily to 
remembering adult experience. Young children will not have had enough life 
experience to enable them to categorise events into themes, or to particularise life 
periods. These differences will be considered in Chapter 2. 
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1.6 Retrieval From Autobiographical Memory 
Inevitably, a great deal concerning, retrieval has already been included in the 
previous sections for the processes discussed are inseparably linked. So here, 
r 
where possible, discussion will be confined to theory and findings directly focused 
on retrieval strategies and cues that trigger recall. Three kinds of autobiographical 
memory will be looked at: I) Intentional remembering purposeful effort to recall 
something specific from the past; 2) Involuntary memories; those that come to 
mind tunsou, ht; 3) Reminiscences; an unrestricted free-a heeling of recall, 
voluntary but not goal-directed. 
Ini nlionul Rc', ne, nheuii Lv 
Intentional remembering occurs in response to a cue ý%hicll may be a word, a 
question or a current experience. It is quite likely that a cue will facilitate entry 
into the memory hierarchy at some point other than the apex of contextual 
generality. Consider a common example, looking at an old holiday snap album. 
The snap of'you both' basking, in the sun on that beach may well prompt memory 
to jump straight to the NMOPs stage (the seaside holiday) and then to the recall or a 
specific event. From there, memory, may or may not choose to "move about" as 
Neisser puts it among the rest of the nested associations. 
The efficacy of MPs in cueing specific recall was empirically shown by Abelson, 
Black and Reisser (1935) in two experiments. Thirty-six Yale undergraduates 
were asked to recall a personal experience that would fit a combination of two 
separate phrases. The first was a MOP of some common activity, for example 
"took a ride on a train. " The second described a general scene, such as "paid at the 
cash desk. " These were presented in alternate order. 
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Retrieval time, measured after the second phrase, was significantly faster when the 
MOP was given first. This su.... ested it is the MOP structure that provides the 
context needed for retrieval. When a general scene conies first, it is still necessary 
to reconstruct a more specific MIOP, and unless this happens to fit the second 
phrase MOP, extra search time will be required. 
In the second experiment they used three types of cues: I) MOP alone, 2) MOP 
plus scene, 3) Scene alone. The fastest response was for MOP alone. This 
confirmed that a MOP was more efficient than a scene, and that a combination of 
both merely slowed response by imposing an additional constraint. These results 
suggest that a MOP provides the optimal level of specificity for a memory cue. 
However, not all researchers have found MOPS to be most effective cues for 
retrieval. 
For instance, Linton (1975,1978,1982,1986). She recorded events in her life 
daily over a period of six years and then observed her own retrieval strategies over 
a period of twelve years She found her most successful strategy, by far, was 
"simple chronological order" (62.3(zlo success), followed by "categorical summary" 
(23.2%). 
Wagenaar (1986) used a similar procedure. He recorded diary entries over a 
period of six years, but for each entry he noted who, what, when and where. Fie 
found 'what' cues were best at evoking recall. 'Where and who' came next, while 
'when' cued little response. However, lie also found that combinations of more 
than a single cue made a big difference in favour of retrieval, and that If'when', so 
ineffective by itself, was added as a second cue it greatly increased response. An 
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explanation for the greater success of multiple cueing could lie in the resultant 
narrowing of the context, and corresponding increase in specificity. The efficacy 
of'-when' added to 'who, what or where' could result from enabling, the combined 
cue to define a sort of mini-life-period, and so again to sharpen the specificity. 
A retrieval strategy that enlists the help of semantic knowledge is "subject 
enumeration. " Whitten and Leonard (1981) cite its frequent use by students when 
trying to recall the names of their teachers at high school. The technique consisted 
here of mentally drawing up a semantically based list of school subjects taught and 
fitting names to them. Arguably, this strategy assists the recall of what Conway 
(1990) calls "knowledge of autobiographical facts" and not autobiographical 
experience in the sense of remembering, participation in an event. 
Verbal protocols of remembering suggest that search strategies often incorporate 
verification checks at various points. Most interviewers are familiar with such self- 
interniptions as "... No, it was the Tuesday - definitely - 'cos Wednesdays he always 
left early for... " 
in the present research, the answer to the question: "What sort of thing brings this 
memory to mind? " most often refers to something visual. But cues can, and do 
include every one of the senses. Taste and smell, when they apply, can be 
particularly effective. 
However, though not invariably so, autobiographical memory usually does involve 
imaging. In fact, Brewer (1956) describes autobiographical memory as 'image- 
based', and in a later experimental study (1988), he shows a positive correlation 
between the amount of imaging and veridicality. He found visual imaging to be by 
iý 
far the most common, a finding published earlier by Smith (1952) and confirmed in 
the present research. 
The paramountcy of visual imaging may explain why, according to most subjects, 
it is visual cues that most commonly evoke personal memories for them. Visual 
dominance may well go further. The cueing, power of words and ideas may also be 
partly determined by the ease with which they can be imagined in the mind's eye. 
Thus, in studies ofcue word recall, many researchers have found that object words 
draw faster response than emotion words. The present research confirms this in 
Study 2. Objects can be visualised, emotions in the abstract cannot. 
A recency effect in the recall of experienced events has been noted by many 
researchers; inter alia Whitten and Leonard (198 I ), Baddeley and Hitch (1977). 
Conway (1990) points out that, as a general tendency, recency would have 
adaptive value. Recent information is likely to be more relevant to present needs in 
a changing world than more distant recall from the past. Yet, however valuable 
recency may be in general, its strength as a determinant of recall is eclipsed by 
particular personal interests. Thus, in the study by Baddeley and Hitch (1977), 
where recall of games played during, the season by a rugby team showed a strong 
recency effect, the game remembered almost as well as the most recent was the 
only one they won - mid season. 
1/nvlunlca"v Reecal1 
Sometimes aptly called 'pop-up' memories, such recall comes unsought and 
unexpectedly to mind. It can, of course, relate to any life period, but is most 
striking when it represents a scene or event from the forgotten past, for example. 
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early childhood. By definition there is no retrieval strategy and often the cue is not 
identified. 
In a penetrating introspective study Esther Salaman (1982) discusses instances of 
her own involuntary recollection of "forgotten" childhood experiences. They come 
"unexpectedly, suddenly and bring back a past moment, accompanied by strong 
emotions, so that a 'then' becomes a 'now'. " Her examples differ from most 
childhood memories in that they had never been consciously rehearsed before. The 
information they presented came as new to her, though rationally she assumes she 
must have once known and forgotten. In this connection she quotes Dostoyevsky: 
"Some people appear not to think of their memories in childhood, but all the same, 
preserve such memories unconsciously. " this is confirmed by several instances in 
the present research, where subjects declared with some surprise that they had 
never remembered the event "till now, " and yet described the memory as vivid. 
On the question of why autobiographical accounts of childhood are usually not 
written till late in life, Salanian (p. 50) believes authors show special understanding. 
She cites De Quincey and Asakov, who both said that for them their childhood was 
'dead' in middle years. De Quincey believed that childhood memories are not 
forgotten, merely "waiting to be revealed when the obscuring, daylight shall have 
withdrawn. " Proust is quoted as writing "The echo of a childhood memory never 
ceases, but is not audible until life grows quiet, like convent bells whose sound is 
drowned in the noise of the day and is heard again in the silence of the evening. " 
(Salaman herself was aged 70 when she wrote about involuntary recall). 
Turning to the inexplicable nature of cueing when recall is involuntary, Salaman 
quotes from Chateaubriand's "Menmories d'Outre-Tombe, " where lie says that 
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hearing the song of a thnish cued a happy memory of another time and place, long 
ago, where he used to hear thrushes sing. This cue is clearly insufficient, for he 
must have heard thrushes singing many times without triggering this memory. A 
similarly inexplicable cue concerns Marcel Proust, quoted from his "Jean Santeuil". 
f 
Here, when he catches sight of the Lake of Geneva, Marcel is involuntarily 
transported in a childhood memory to a sea-side place in Brittany. But why? The 
two could scarcely be more dissimilar in appearance! 
In both the above cases, the inadequacy of the objective cueing suggests the 
triggering association was really subjective. This is also likely, when Salaman 
(p. 54) found it possible to experience generalised, as opposed to specific, 
involuntary memory in the form of a feeling of acute homesickness for Russia. 
This, she recognised as nostalgia for tier childhood -a feeling shared by many 
subjects in the present research. 
Details of the three autobiographical childhood events reported by Salaman need 
not concern us here. Their veridicality is, in a way, irrelevant, one she admits she 
images in the wrong house, and all three are demonstrably vivid reconstructions. 
The point is that the elements from %0hich the reconstructions are made have not 
been forgotten. Nor have the strong, emotions which they bring. 
Reminiscence 
Esther Salaman writes that once a nostalgic event from her childhood has returned 
to her memory, she cherishes and rehearses it. This is the essence of reminiscence 
- voluntary rehearsal, usually for pleasure. However, it is particularly associated 
with the elderly, and often focuses on childhood and early years. 
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This finding emerged from an investigation in homes for the aged over a period of 
fifteen years by Coleman (1986). Fle found motivations for reminiscence ditl'er 
both categorically and in degree. Not all his subjects reminisced. About 121%o 
deliberately avoided doing so because they found their past unpleasant. Amongst 
those that did reminisce, Wö were troubled by their memories. The model group 
42°/0 were of high morale and enjoyed reminiscing. There were also among those 
of high morale 300, 'o who did not deny reminiscing but saw no point in it. 
The enjoyment experienced by those who reminisced was not necessarily derived 
from recall of pleasant experiences. Sometimes, it involved stress, danger, or 
hardship; the satisfaction lay in having overcome it. The 'self had won! Such 
strug les naturally related, for the most part, to active, adventurous life-periods, 
often in the subject's early life. 
Reasons for reminiscing may also include the plain fact that old age has little to 
look forward to, and much to look back on. For many, a memory excursion into 
carefree, nostalgic childhood might make a pleasant break froill tile 
uncompromising monotony of the present. 
The retrieval of autobiographical memories is, of course, central to every aspect of 
the research reported in chapters 4.5 and 6. However, because of the exploratory 
nature of this research, it was considered essential to avoid any researcher- 
influenced constraints upon retrieval methods. In Study I free recall was invited of 
any event within a given childhood arge span. Cued recall, used in Study 2, again 
imposed no constraints on what the subjects chose to recall. The third study 
concerned the remembering, or not, of specific information known to the subjects 
in childhood. Subjects were not asked in any of the three studies to report on the 
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retrieval strategy they were using. Such enquiry was deliberately avoided as it was 
felt that any procedural self-analysis would be strange and unfamiliar to subjects, 
and would probably inhibit the free Clow of memories. 
39 
1.7 Chapter 1- Summary 
0 The aim of the research is to identify the determinants of childhood memory 
f 
" Using an exploratory approach, the research addresses the following, 
questions: 
i) How young does autobiographical memory start? 
ii) What sort of events are remembered? 
iii) How vivid are childhood memories? 
iv) Which senses are involved? 
v) How did people feel at the event and at recall? 
vi) What triggers childhood memories? 
vii) What is the personal meaning of "fiat is recalled? 
o Two assumptions are made and justified; that autobiographical memories have 
adaptive value and that they contain an affect component. 
o The theoretical framework for the research was outlined in terms of the 
relationship of autobiographical memories to other kinds of memory; the 
nature and properties of autobiographical memory and its functions. 
" Current views on the retrieval of autobiographical memories were discussed, 
including the process of reconstruction; the role of emotion; models of 
organisation and the efficacy of ditierent types of cue and research strategy. 
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This chapter has focused on theories and findings that relate primarily to 
determinants of adult memory. The following, chapter addresses issues that are 




Theoretical Issues About Childhood Memories 
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2.1 Introduction 
Memories of early childhood are, of necessity, limited by the stake of cognitive 
development reached by the child at the time of the event. This ditTerentiates them 
from adult-encoded autobiographical memories in two important ways. Firstly, the 
'facts' of an experience might be wrongly understood. This would change what 
Nelson (1991) has called the "What happened" element, and would consequently 
distort the "What I felt about it" component. 
Secondly, an event that an adult would recognise as important, might not be seen 
by a young child as having, any personal significance, egg the assassination of a 
President. In such case, it would probably not be encoded at all, and might be 
wrongly written off as 'childhood amnesia' (see 2.6). 
It is, therefore, hypothesised that as a result of cognitive development, memories 
encoded during different a, e-spans of childhood will show differences both in the 
content and the qualities of the memories. It does not follow, however, that there 
would also be differences in the strength of the affect factor, for this need not 
relate to cognitive accuracy, and is noticeably functional in babies from birth. 
This chapter reviews current views about the development of memory ability in 
children since these are crucially important for understanding the differences 
between childhood memories originating from different periods of childhood. 
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2.2 Developmental Differences 
At a physical level, Parkin (1987) draws attention to the fact that in the brain the 
hippocampus and amygdala take some time before they reach full development in a 
child. Both are known to be important parts of the brain's mechanism of memory 
(Milner et at 1968, Rose 1992). Whether, and how, neurological immaturity limits 
remembering is, as yet, uncertain. However, far more is known about the 
cognitive aspects of development during, the years of childhood. Research in this 
field owes much to the seminal work of Pia;, et as well as to more recent 
researchers. 
2.2.1 Me Pigzelicm Account 
A prediction concerning the kinds of memories to be expected at different 
encoding ages can be loosely inferred from Piaget's descriptions of the 
developmental characteristics commonly found in each of the encoding, age groups 
used in this research. Piaget (197 3) categorizes these as: 
Age under 3 Sensory-motor / pre-operational 
Totally egocentric. 
A`e 3-5 Pre-operational 
Still egocentric. Also, centering on one aspect of an object, to the 
neglect of other aspects, so distorting reasoning. 
Age 6-8 Concrete operational 
A solid bedrock with which to construct the present from the past 
Ade 9- 11 Concrete operational (continued) 
At objective levels of reality, existing schemas can be modified to 
accommodate new information. 
Ade 12 - 14 - Formal operational 
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and 15 - 13 A great influx of abstract ideas and ideals about the self, the world 
and potential human relationships. Frustration because the scope 
of desires has greatly expanded, while the ability to littlil them 
has not. Self conscious awareness. 
F 
Pia`et's categorisations point to a progressive %%, idenin, in the scope of children's 
autobiographical memories, from mere sensory encoding to interpretive 
understanding and organisation as the child's knowledge increases. 
An interesting example of understanding growing with a`, e, consistent with Pia, et's 
is empirically provided in an experiment by Winmmer and Perner (19S 3) 
in their studies of 'Theory of Mind'. This experiment illustrates the way 
interpretation of events is limited at a stake when the child is not able to 
understand the point of view of 'other minds'. A child was asked to put a 
chocolate into a box and was then briefly taken out of the room with a promise 
that, on return, the chocolate could be taken out and eaten. A second child, 
already watching in the room, was then told to remove the chocolate and replace it 
in a basket. This second child was then asked where will the first child look for the 
chocolate on return to the room. Most three year old children wrongly indicated 
the basket, while by age four, most children correctly chose the box. This suggests 
that younger than around four, children may not be able simultaneously to 
conceive the possibility of a model of reality that clitTers from their own experience. 
Piaget recognises that, with cognition not yet at adult level, but with emotions fully 
active (though not necessarily stronger than in later years) the affective component 
in childhood will have a bigger role to play than in adult encoding. When Piauet 
(1969) wrote: "An individual first experiences affectively before he can 
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comprehend or use his understanding, " he was referring to childhood memories. 
However, as outlined in Section 1.4.1 many researchers, before and since have 
accorded primacy to affect as a determinant of adult personal memories (e. g. 
Bartlett (1932), Nelson et al (1983): "Goal orientation is always affective 
r 
motivation", Robinson (1980), and many others). Here, however, the question is 
not one of primacy, but of relative balance between affect and cognition, the two 
parts that are hypothesised as constituting an autobiographical memory. 
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2.3 Developmental Differences - Scripts and Schemas 
Though Pia`et's findings have never been seriously challenged, there are other 
ways of addressing the issue. For instance, Schank and Abelson's proposed 
structure of scripts and schema's was discussed in Chapter I in relation to adult 
memory, by which time life experience had already built the schematic structures. 
But life experience starts in childhood, and so, therefore does the building of 
schemas and their adjustment to accommodate new information. The need for 
flexibility to make adjustments, though constant throughout life, is never greater 
than for the expanding memory store of a growing child, Nelson (1991 p. 9) points 
out that memory storage in the form of flexible schemas based on expectation 
drawn from experience, accords with her own developmental / adaptive approach 
"Memory for recurrent conditions and routine actions is most valuable for an 
organism's adaption to its environment. The connection with early schema 
development is obvious. " So is the relevance to childhood autobiographical 
memory. "A schema", writes Nelson, "need not be true or correct to be part of the 
system. " Schemas she reminds us, are based on both fact and affect. They are not 
only reminders of "this is how it usually happens, " but also of "this is how I usually 
feel about it. " Many would recognise the truth of this in relation to a 'visit to the 
dentist' schema. 
Behaviourally, the affective factor is influential. If it is positive, we are encouraged 
to welcome, and possibly seek a repetition of the schematised experience. If it is 
negative, then we shall try to avoid it, WHO in turn, may lead to avoidance 
behaviour, such as taking extra care in looking after one's teeth to minimise visits 
to dentists. Neutral feelings about something are also behaviourally influential. 
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For "[ have no feelings about this activity" means I shall not bother to seek it, but 
nor shall I take any steps to avoid it. 
Probably the earliest schemas to enter the memory system are procedural (Rose 
1992). This would accord with Pia;, et's findings that until the ap of about two, 
infants are e`ocentrally concerned with learning, to cope with their environment. 
The earliest practical use to which a schema is purposefully applied may well be 
knowing how to get mother's attention. This would probably result from the fact 
that mother usually did come in response to instinctive cries of discomfort such as 
pain or hunger. Repetition, however, would schematise the experience into useful 
knowledge that crying would bring mother for whatever reason. 
Nelson (1991) argues that, though logically input must precede storage, the nature 
of the memories' storage system will determine the way input must be encoded to 
be put purposefully within it. There is, perhaps, more of an holistic unity and less 
of a 'chicken and e' conundrum about this if one relates it to Bartlett's (1932) 
reminder that, to be meaningful, a memory is not just of something but about its 
relationship to something, else. In other words, an event memory would be 
meaningless without its context. In this li`, ht, the schematic structure and the 
events that built it are really aspects of the same life experience. 
Nelson et al (1953) suggest that for very youn`, children, the generalised scripts 
based on repeated experiences are acquired before the ability to isolate or report 
specific events. Evidence is provided that infants can answer general questions 
about, for instance, going, to bed or what do they do at playschool, but find it 
harder to answer specific questions in relation to the same contexts, such as "What 
did you do at play-school today? " it is, of course, possible that the child's 
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difficulty may arise from the fact that often nothing memorable will have had 
happened 'today' to lift it out of the repetitive uniformity that enabled the 
generalised schema to be built. 
E 
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2.4 Developmental differences - Social Interaction 
Self coherence and social interaction were listed in Chapter 1 as adult functions of 
autobiographical memory. But, as also with the building of schemas, the process 
s 
begins early in childhood. Fitzgerald (1988) suggested that memories from early 
adult life form part of a personal narrative, which sets the developing, self in a 
social and cultural context. There is evidence (Fivush et al, 1987) to suggest 
Fitzgerald's statement could be amended from 'early adult life' to from 'early 
childhood'. 
Social intercourse begins with mother / baby talk. Nelson (1991 p. 9) reports on an 
exceptional twenty-seven month-old child initiating social interaction with a "do 
you remember, Mommy? " conversation. It is not surprising, that the acquisition of 
linguistic skill should be used early to describe, and so stabilise, personal 
experiences in the child mind. 
This is well illustrated by Nelson's transcription of 2.5 year-old Emily's cot talk, in 
which she runs through recent events in her own mind before fallind, asleep. This 
verbalised rehearsal is, of course, providing the required repetition of key elements 
that will enable their assimilation in generalised schemas as discussed in an adult 
context in Section 2.3. From this observation, Nelson (1057) concludes that "The 
basic ways of structuring and interpreting reality are consistent from early 
childhood to adulthood. " 
Nelson (1991) sees the role of repetition as central to childhood memories She 
theorises that basic episodic memory is a temporary holding system, and that if 
experience is not 'reinstated' by repetition it will not be remembered for longer than 
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six months at most. This is offered as an explanation of the transient 
characteristics of many very early childhood memories, which are vividly recalled 
for days, sometimes weeks, and are then completely forgotten. 
c 
Reinstatement by rehearsal is greatly assisted by talk. Pillemer (1984) and Fivush 
and Reese (1992) all draw attention to how a progressive mastery of narrative style 
leads to more social interaction. Narration involves structured formulation that 
helps retention in memory and the shaping and sharing of autobiographical 
experiences. The adaptive roots of this symbiotic partnership are examined in the 
next section. 
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2.5 Developmental Differences - Language Acquisition 
Despite the important facilitatory function of language in personal and social 
development, discussed in the previous section, language may play a relatively 
minor role in childhood memories younger than about 5-6. Sensory recall is 
predominantly visual and does not include words at all. Neither the visual incasing 
nor any related affect are likely to have been verbalised by a young, child at the time 
of encoding, though it may be verbalised later in conversation. Consequently, the 
memory may contain no linguistic ingredient, and will be recalled as an experience, 
that is, as it was experienced without words. Wolfgan Kohler (1947) points out 
that we can be aware and remember without words. He draws attention to the 
common experience of walking, down a street. We shall observe many things, all 
of which have names, but we shall feel no need to name the things we see. 
However, even when language is no part of the memory, it is inevitably involved in 
the verbalised telling. This is of two kinds. There is telling, someone else, who 
presumably does not already know. And there is telling oneself what is already 
known, reviewing mentally but still using words. Adults will usually do this 
silently, while very young children may utter the words aloud, as in Emily's cot talk 
(see2.4). 
In the first case, telling someone else, language will be used selectively to 
emphasise, condense or make a better story. For, although personal memory 
belongs to the unchanging self, the telling of it focuses outside the self, it is 
directed at someone, for whom it needs to be made appropriate. Such modified 
rehearsal, if repeated, may result in actually re-coding the memory to suit the 
teller's preference. Pia`, et's (1973) finding that children below age three are 
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markedly egocentric would seem to make it less likely that, unlike adults, young 
children would be concerned with suitability for a particular audience. In any case, 
young, children would have only limited linguistic skill mith which to refine 
narration. 
s 
In the second case, telling, oneself, verbalised rehearsal is less likely to change the 
memory, for it is more in the nature of a commentary on something which is 
already being recalled. Re-coding is, nevertheless, possible The 'self may prefer a 
more favourable version in which some selected details are stabilised, or even 
enhanced, while others are omitted or modified. Bartlett (19 2) cites such 
instances in relation to memorising stories, which sometimes become altered to 
comply with the teller's norms. Freud's (1915) accounts of total suppression or the 
infantile screening, of unpleasant memories oiler extreme examples. 
Thus, the acquisition of language skill can modify narration, stabilise a memory, or 
can be instrumental in re-coding what is remembered. Yet, despite these links, 
remembering and narration are two quite separate functions. This is very apparent 
in the ease with which a multilingual speaker can tell about a single experience in 
more than one language. (A different situation applies if a memory has been retold 
so often that what is being remembered is not their experience itself, but a 
performance in a particular language). 
Nelson (1991) writes concerning, the emergence of autobiographical memory: 
"This question must be approached, in my opinion, from the perspective of the 
function of memory systems in evolutionary, adaptive terms. " Viewed in this light, 
it is seen that language and memory are symbiotic twins, whose adaptive value 
depends upon mutual development. Thus, a prerequisite for personal survival, the 
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ability to learn from experience, depends upon an ability to remember the past, or 
'what happens when. . 
'. To share such personal knowledge with others, and so 
enable co-operative planning and behaviour demands a language sophisticated 
enough to match the complexity of the information involved. Hence the inevitably 
mutual evolution of language and episodic memory. According to R. Leakey and 
R. Lewin (1992) most anthropologists today believe the process began over 2 
million years ago. But in a changing world, it probably still continues. So, when 
considering, determinants of autobiographical memory, Nelson's view suggests olle 
should include the essential link with language which determined the origins and 
gave adaptive encouragement to episodic remembering. 
Perhaps the most important property to have evolved in human language is escape 
from the present tense and location, known as displacement. This freedom has 
uiven humans the use of narrative communication, thanks to which this weakling 
among the beasts could will by organising mind as well as muscle As children 
develop language they are able to represent their memories in ways that are freed 
from the spatio-temporal context of the original experience. This allows them to 
begin to use their autobiographical memories to fulfil the functions of planning, 
problem solving, and decision making,. 
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2.6 Childhood Amnesia 
Opinions about the extent and duration of'childhood amnesia' vary, but probably 
no-one today believes it to he total. Rich memories from early childhood are too 
common for that. The term can only mean a deficiency in the ability to remember 
early autobiographical events, below some expected criterion. What this criterion 
should he still remains largely unresolved. Early research into childhood memory, 
thoroughly reviewed by Dudycha and Dudycha (1941 ) does not appear to address 
this question. Perhaps, in exploring, such aspects as stability, veridicality and 
affect, researchers saw no need for a yard-stick to establish a norm. 
Fiore recently, attention has turned to quantitative studies that have looked at the 
distribution of memories. including those of childhood, across the life-span. 
(Cohen and Faulkner 1987, Waldfo, el 1948, Crovitz and Quina-E loland 1976. 
Crovitz and Harvey 1979, Crovitz, Harvey and Nlckee 1980). Rubin (198'_) 
produced experimental evidence that memory was subject to a natural decline of 
retention that is progressive as the retention interval increases. However, Weltzer 
and Sweeney (1986), on reworking, Robin's data, found that the regression of his 
retention factor for the life-span from above age 8 did not fit the earlier period of 
birth to 8, when less was retained than predicted. A specific yard-stick for 
childhood amnesia was claimed by Crovitz and Schif%inan (1974) when they 
formulated a "power function regression equation that defined normal homogenous 
forgetting. " Applying, this in three experiments, they found that the number of 
memories for age 6 and below was less than their norm. Thus, the existence of 
childhood amnesia was, perhaps for the first time, quantitatively shown. 
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But if by amnesia we mean forgetting, as the use of a forgetting norm implies, then 
can we be sure? Such measurements assume that something was encoded in 
infancy which should, by normal criteria have been remembered, but was not. 
Hence, it has been forgotten. The validity of this conclusion rests on an 
assumption that autobiographical events are encoded in infancy at the same rate as 
in later years. There is no known basis for such an assumption. There are 
powerful arguments against it. Paucity of infant memories may well result chiefly 
from less encoding rather than more for`etting. 
When one considers the vast amount of learning about the physical and behavioural 
aspects of the world that even the dullest child accomplishes during the first three 
years of life, it is clear that a child's mind is fully capable of procedural and 
semantic memory retention. But all this remembering belongs to the child's 
gargantuan task of learning about its environment, and to acquiring and improving, 
bodily and instrumental skills to deal with life. The task is urgent and formidable, 
so at the start, it is likely to be a full time job for infant memory. Acquisition of 
autobiographical memories can wait. 
As Nelson (1991) has suggested, it is only when this schema building, process has 
accummulated a sufficient data bank of facts and skills, that competence and 
knowledge of the world can combine to allow the child mind to appreciate the 
holistic nature of an autobiographical event, to see the personal meaning of the 
experience, rather than to focus on one of its aspects, what Pia-get calls 
"centration. " 
Until then, what would be regarded and remembered by an adult as an event, for 
example infant Johnnie toddling, unaided into the room for the first time, might not 
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be encoded as such by the infant, whose attention would probably be fully 
occupied by the procedural memory concerned with the technique of walking, 
The turn around from a focus on particular aspects and skills to a wider grasp of an 
i 
event's meaning is, of necessity, gradual and prolonged. It demands repetition of 
the experience until procedural skills and semantic knowledge become 
'internalised', to use a Piagetian term, and so can be put out of mind. Only then can 
full attention be paid to autobiographical experience. 
When searching back into childhood memory we cannot possibly isolate the 
countless 'mini episodes' that occasioned the acquisition, repetition and refinement 
of our skills and knowledge of the world. But that is far from saying we have 
forgotten. Much more usefully, we have synthesised our memories of fragmented 
experiences into more holistic schemata, and it is selective encoding priority that 
has enabled us to do so. 
Reference to encoding rather than to retrieval as the possible prime factor in 
childhood amnesia has been made by Waldfoý, el (1948), who ascribes the relative 
paucity to "encoding deficiency, lack of intelligence, which will correct itself as 
children grow older. " Cohen and Le Voi (1986) also speculated that a young, child 
will "not yet have developed the general knowledge Schemas needed to interpret, 
organise and mentally 'index' early memories. " This is, of course, consistent with 
Pia`etian theory exhaustively. documented in Cook (1970), Flavell (196 3), Beard 
(1960), Piaget and Inhelder (1973 ). 
However, from an adaptive viewpoint, the early encoding, limitations appear not as 
a deficiency, but as developmental efficiency; an essential early concentration on 
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mastering those elements of procedural memory and semantic understanding of 
enviroment that enable the formation of schemata, without which the child could 
not later ascribe meaning, to experience and encode it meaningfully into 
autobiographical memory. In short, without this early 'amnesia', the development 
of later memory would be, at best, retarded. 
Freud (1914) in "Psychopathology of Everyday Life" expressed doubts that 
children, so evidently good at remembering, could really forget the first years of 
their lives. By 1916 lie had formulated his elaborate theoretical structure on how 
infant amnesia "veils our earliest youth from us and makes us strangers to it. " 
(Freud 1916 / 1953b vol. 16 p. 326). But today, few would be satisfied with his 
explanation of unconscious repression to escape the trauma of Oedipus and Electra 
complexes, or his belief that early childhood memories are really 'concealing 
memories' used to hide the traumatic ones which are potentially remembered after 
all, but are defensively screened from consciousness. 
More recently, Usher and Neisser (1993) have suggested that more than one cause 
may be simultaneously involved -a view shared here. For instance, Parkin (1987) 
points out the young child still awaits further development of brain areas such as 
the hippocampus and amygdala as well as the acquisition of the wide ranke of 
cognitive abilities researched by Piaget and others. But whether this must entail 
the building of a whole new memory structure, or only developmental adaptations 
within the juvenile model is a ditlerent matter. Nelson (1988) and the present 
writer, believe the developmental change taking place is primarily one of content 
enrichment and organisation, not involving, any radical change in the basic structure 
or encoding process. 
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Nelson examined the organisation of nieniory in children aged 3-5 and 5-7 using 
a framework of schema plus 'ta`g . 
She found no structural ditýerences fr om tile 
accepted adult pattern. Cues, however, had to be meaningful for the children. A 
study conducted by Fivush (1988) endorses the importance of the right 'tag for 
c 
retrieval. When asked, after a time lapse of one year, to recall a visit to a particular 
museum, many children could not recall the visit. But %"hen the question was 
changed to "What had you seen at the museum? ", the recall of archaeological 
exhibits was quite high. Fivush concluded the experience had been tiled tinder 
'archaeology' (even though the children may not have known the word) rather than 
under the name of museum. This study reinforces the view that some apparent 
childhood amnesia is really a mismatch between the encoding 'tag of a child's event 
memory and the cue proffered by an adult mind. This is undoubtedly one of the 
multiple causes Neisser had in mind when, in 1988 he wrote concerning 
developmental changes: "Because of these changes, the experiences of childhood 
do not fit adult schemata. Hence, they can no longer be brought to mind. " 
Cohen (1996) points to the probability that much of childhood memory is implicit 
and cannot be recalled to order, but is not necessarily forgotten. Explicit memory 
is, of necessity, delayed until there is sufficient vocabulary for narration. But even 
then, failure to retrieve a memory may be because it was never encoded. In other 
words, instead of a failure to recall, which suggests something amiss, we may be 
witnessing a 'right and proper' failure to encode 
59 
2.7 Prerequisites For Autobiographical Memory 
It was hypothesised in section 2.6 that, for young, children, there is adaptive 
advantage in the sequential development of different kinds of memory; ie that in 
order to develop their adaptively important ability for autobiographical memory, it 
is a prerequisite to master procedural memory and to gain sufficient semantic 
knowledge and cognitive skill to recognise the meaning of what is experienced and 
to organise it mentally in the personal memory store. The fulfilment of this is 
innately ensured by the natural sequence of infantile development. (See 2.2 et seq) 
But what about later years, when understanding has reached adult level? Are there 
then no longer prerequisites to autobiographical memory? It is proposed here, that 
there still are, but that they are categorically different. Instead of constraint 
imposed by the individual's ability to remember, the selection of what to store in 
autobiographical memory may be to some extent determined by the likelihood that 
the information will prove adaptively useful in the future. This factor underlies the 
tendency to remember first-time events and departures from the expected norm. 
However, not all first time experience is likely to be equally useful. As Nelson 
(1991) points out it is repeated experience that is more likely to represent a 
recurring pattern of events, and so to be adaptively more useful to remember. 
Consequently, we are not only programmed to learn all we can, and so increase 
our data base, but also, through a selective process of attention to repetition, to 
build the knowledge most likely to prove useful into schemata of expectation. 
There is widespread concurrence amon researchers as to encoding, priorities 
(Cohen and Faulkner 1957, Fitzgerald 198S, Conway 1990). All list novelty, 
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unusualness and consequent surprise, emotionality and personal importance as 
characteristic of autobiographical memories. The fact that these qualities are not 
always listed in the same rank order of importance. may reflect a difference of 
experimental paradigms, but almost certainly rank order will reflect what is most 
c 
important in particular circumstances to a particular self. No matter how diverse 
life's phenomenological experiences may be, it will be the unchanging self that will 
do the remembering. A coherent and stable self concept must, therefore, rank as 
the most important prerequisite. As Rubin (1986) put it "Autobiographical 
memory is about the self. " 
Neisser (1939) stresses the central role of affect in the self-concept, (see Section 
1.4). He describes the 'private self as "our own feelings and beliefs. Our 
ultimately private emotions which are probably beyond verbal description. The 
private self involves awareness that these are uniquely our own. " Thus, by 
definition the child cannot acquire autobiographical memories before acquiring a 
self concept which is a gradual process (1liell 1990). 
Nelson (1991) affirms that no recall of an event that involves the self is possible 
without recalled awareness "what I felt about it. " The fact that the self must 
always be the experiencing ego is the basis of the prediction in the Introduction to 
this thesis that an affect component will be present, and probably discernible, in all 
autobiographical memories, and also, that in early childhood memories the 
prerequisite of affect will have a relatively bigger role to play because cognitive 
understanding is not sufficiently developed to encode the nature of the event very 
effectively. 
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The developmental changes that occur throughout childhood and which have been 
outlined in Sections 2.2 - 2.7 will necessarily be reflected in the nature of 
childhood memories from different periods. One of the aims of this thesis is to 
chart the qualitative changes in childhood memories across the age range. 
3 
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2.8 Summary - Chapter 2 
" Piaget's account of the stages of development suggests ways in which 
childhood memories drawn from dilierent age periods are likely to differ. 
F 
" There is evidence that children develop scripts and schemas from an early a_, -, e. 
These gradually begin to form an organising framework for memories. 
" Social conversations shape and stabilise children's memories. Developing 
language skills allow memories to be represented and reconstructed flexibly. 
" Childhood amnesia may be partly accounted for by failure to encode early 
experiences. Memory for procedural skills and general semantic aspects of the 
environment are more urgent for survival and so it is argued precede the 
development of autobiographical memory. 
0 Prerequisites for the development of autobiographical memory include 
cognitive experiential and pragmatic factors. The development of the self 







There is wide consensus today as outlined in Section 1.4.3 that autobiographical 
memory is not a static filing system of discrete memories, but is dynamic in 
response to new experiences and to new understanding of old experiences. It 
follows that events encoded in childhood may well be remembered in a different 
light in adult years. There is, therefore, a categoric difference between the study of 
how children remember events and how adults recall their childhood. Extensive 
investigation of how children remember has been carried out by researchers such as 
Nelson, Hudson, Fivush, Morse, Piaget and many others. It has usually focused on 
the ability to remember events in relation to a child's age. The paradigms used 
need not concern us here, for the present research addresses the very different 
issue of adults remembering childhood. - 
Research on the recall of childhood memories relies on two methods, free recall 
and cued recall. Free recall has the advantage of placing no constraint whatever on 
what is recalled: cued recall has the advantage of allowing some measure of 
experimental control. Accordingly, both methods were employed in this research. 
The studies here aim to provide detailed analysis of the contents and nature of 
childhood memories, which will form a basis for inferring what qualities make them 
particularly memorable. Brewer (1986), writing about autobiographical memory in 
general, says: "It is clear that we need much more empirical work on the basic 
descriptive aspects of this important form of human memory. " 
The present research aims to move a little closer to filling the need. To supply the 
"basic descriptive aspects" in Study I it was considered the investigative paradigm 
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would need to meet the following requirements.. Subjects should feel no 
constraints upon either topic areas or contentstof the specific memories they chose, 
recalled from within stipulated age periods - from birth to age IS. Subjects should 
describe the properties / attributes of each memory in a structured way that would 
allow appropriate comparisons to be made. Subjects should rate attributes, 
including positive and negative emotions felt, so that the relative streºi the of 
different attributes could be measured. Results should be comparable by encoding 
age, subject ade and gender. Although self ratings obviously lack objectivity, it is 
the subjective qualities of the memories that are important for the purposes of this 
research. It is quite usual for researchers (inter alia Cohen 1989, and Cha(lin 
1983) to ask subjects to rate various dimensions of memory such as frequency of 
recall, vividness, emotionality and so on, in order to correlate these with such 
factors as subject age, memory a`, e, gender and age of encoding. The present 
research makes no apology for using self rating, for unless subjects are deliberately 
lying, what they say they feel is, for them, reality. 
These methods offer no way of assessing the veridicality of the recalled memories. 
Some researchers have sought to validate childhood memories by interviewing 
parents but, in the present study, this procedure was not practicable due to the 
wide range of subjects' ages. Moreover, it was not an important issue for this 
research which was primarily concerned with the nature of the memories rather 
than their accuracy. 
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3.2 Methods Chosen 
The research described in this thesis employed two different methodologies. 
Studies I and 3 used a form of survey research whereby childhood memories were 
s 
elicited by purpose designed questionnaires and then rated for the strength of 
various designated qualities. Study 2 employed an experimental method whereby 
retrieval cues were manipulated and retrieval time was measured. The use of 
different methodologies to seek converging evidence is considered likely to 
strengthen the conclusions. 
To provide the diverse range of comparable information needed to serve the aims 
of Study 1, the research paradigm chosen was structured free recall. Subjects were 
asked to recall any memory from a designated age period to provide structured 
information about it (see questionnaire - Appendix A). Free recall was chosen for 
Study I because its spontaneity and unrestricted choice are likely to elicit 
memories that are the most personally meanin ful to the remembering self The 
designated encoding a`e periods were: below 3,3 - 5, t9 - 11,12 - 14,15- 13. 
These divisions were thought to be sufficient to differentiate between 
developmental stakes, without beim, too many to allow subjects to respond easily. 
Cued recall was used for Study 2 because the few constraints it imposes allow 
direct comparison between emotion and object cued memories. This provides a 
test of the hypothesis that emotion is related to vividness and retrievability The 
measure used was latency of response so that the accessibility of different kinds of 
memories could be compared. Subjects also rated different characteristics of the 
memories to enable comparison with findings in the free recall of Study' I 
(Questionnaire and cue words - Appendix B). 
/7 
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Study 3 demanded a different approach, for it concerned forgetting; the obverse of 
memory. The object was to measure the annual rate of forgetting autobiographical 
details in relation to memory age, topic area and gender. Subjects were therefore 
asked to recall specified items so that the amount recalled could be assessed. The 
method employed was a standardised questionnaire that asked subjects to recall 
facts which they would have known at the time about their schooling, aged 
between 6 and 11. (Questionnaire - Appendix E). 
Details of the methodology for each study is provided in Chapters 4,5 and 6 and 




FREE RECALL BY ADULTS OF CHILDHOOD MEMORIES 
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4.1 Introduction 
This study is primarily concerned with the attributes of memories that are recalled 
rather than with their topic content. The latter is, however, taken into account 
when it throws light on determinants of recall, particularly in relation to encoding, 
ages. 
The questions in the questionnaire shown in Appendix A were designed to elicit 
answers to the following questions: 
How early does autobiographical memory start? 
What sort of things do we mostly remember? 
How well do we remember them? 
How vividly do we recall the physical aspects of these events? 
How important is sensory imaging? 
Which senses are involved and how intensely? 
How often does'observer' imaging of the participating self occur? 
How strongly did we then / do we now feel about what happened'? 
What emotions were then / are still aroused? 
How often do we recall the particular memory? 
What sort of thing triggers its recall? 
And finally, how would subjects describe, in a nutshell, what each memory 
'means' to them, what do they feel is its personal significance? 
Previous studies have not so far provided a detailed analysis of childhood 
memories from across the whole age range of childhood, and have not compared 
the childhood memories recollected by adults of different a`es. Few studies are 
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available that investigate relationships across the wide field of determinants using, a 
sin`le sample of'ordinary' people aged between 21 - 91.. 
t 
However, despite its essentially exploratory nature and survey methodology, there 
are several broadly based hypotheses addressed by the present research. One is the 
prediction that the total intensity or vividness of a childhood memory is determined 
not only by the vivid recall of the physical aspects of what happened (that is, by its 
sensory quality), but also by the intensity of what was, and possibly still is, felt 
about it. This prediction is based on the well established relationship between 
vividness and emotion found in adult memories (see Section 4.3.7). 
It is predicted that: 
" Despite the fact that adults are doing the remembering, qualitive changes will 
be found in memories of childhood that reflect the developmental changes at 
the age of encoding. 
" That, as with adult memories, autobiographical memories of childhood will 
have an affective content. 
" That strength of affect is related to the vividness of memories. 
" That the relative importance of different determinants will vary with encoding 
age. 
The research will examine the principal determinants that are hypothesised to be 
involved in the adult recall of childhood memories. 
7/ 
(i, arack'ri. slic Of 77ie Ale, noii' Recalled 
This concerns such aspects as encoding age, topic, sensory involvement (rated for 
intensity) and imaging (Field view) and / or self imaging (observer view). In short, 
it is descriptive of what is recalled. Selection of the characteristics to be explored 
Evas guided by previous research. 
Predominant among the characteristics observed by researchers in the past has 
been the prevalence and strength of visual imaging in autobiographical memories. 
For Ribot (1882) remembering was "A vision in time. " For Brewer (1986) 
"Remembering is mostly imaging. " Nigro and Neisser (1983) drew attention to the 
two different viewpoints employed in the visual imaging of autobiographical 
events; 'field' in which the event is imaged as it was seen at the time, that is, 
without seeing one's self in the picture, or alternatively 'observer' as a spectator 
could have seen it with the rememberer taking part. In a series of studies they 
found that the distribution of field and observer viewpoints was related to the 
dimensions; (1) emotionality and (2) self awareness. Observer memories involved 
more emotion at encoding. A field viewpoint was found to relate more positively 
to the recency of the event than to any intrinsic properties. 
7vppic Areas 
The relative incidence of different topic areas found by previous researchers has 
usually been based on the recall of memories drawn from the whole, or a 
substantial portion of a subject's life span. This is very different from deriving the 
mean incidence of topics that describe events recalled from separate three-year 
ade-spans from birth to eighteen. It is, therefore, only to be expected that findings 
would ditfer. Memory topics will vary necessarily with the life experience typical 
of each age period. For instance, in a study by Cohen and Faulkner (1987), it was 
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found that, averaged across the life-span, births, deaths and marriages topped the 
rating lists at 22° ö followed by holidays at Il .So. 
This rank order of topics is 
clearly unlikely to be replicated in childhood memories. 
Recall J wIoi s 
Other determinants operate primarily at the recall stake. These, of course, relate 
to the memory recalled, but even more directly to aspects of recalling, it. They 
should, therefore, offer promising ground for seeking determinants of recall. 
Among aspects included here, are clarity and vividness, contextual coherence or 
isolation, confidence in correct recall, emotional arousal (rated as at the time of the 
event and at recall), frequency of recall, extent of rehearsal and external reminders, 
cueing the particular memory, its personal meaning The rationale for including 
these determinants in the study is discussed below. 
Vividness has usually characterised the recall of memories that are easily accessed. 
At the extreme of vividness are Flashbulb memories. Brown and Kullik (1977) 
found the main constituents to be emotionality. surprise, importance or 
consequentiality or unusualness. The presence of the same qualities was confirmed 
by Rubin and Kozin (1984). They asked students to rate three recent experiences 
for personal importance, vividness, surprise and emotionality, and for how often 
the event had been rehearsed in discussion. The most common topics were sports, 
accidents, injuries and meetings with the opposite sex. The most vivid memories 
also received the highest ratings for surprise, personal importance and 
emotionality. 
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Memories within the present research are not described as 'Flashbulb', yet within all 
encoding age periods vividness is frequently described at the highest level: "I see 
and re-experience it again" (question 8) 
I 
A link between emotionality, accessibility and vivid recall has been confirmed in 
studies by many researchers (Cohen and Faulkner 1987, Robinson 1980, Bartlett 
1932, Conway 1990, etc. ). Robinson investigated whether it is the intensity or the 
quality of the emotion, for example pleasure, that determines the speed of access 
to a memory. In three studies which involved self rating, of memories for intensity 
and positive / negative emotionality, Robinson found intensity was a good 
predictor of recall; the nature of the emotion was irrelevant. 
Pillerner et al (1933) asked three groups of college alumnae to recall four 
memories of their first year at college, after time lapses of two, twelve and twenty- 
four years. In all three groups the modal type of memory was of a first-time, 
emotionally poiý, erful personal event, which was considered at the time to have life 
importance. 
('o nfidejice 
In real life, people, for the most part, seldom question whether what they 
remember is a true record. Confidence levels are invariably very high. Yet tests of 
genuine diary entries against foils show that such confidence is sometimes 
misplaced. Barclay and Wellman (1986) show this in a series of chary entry 
recognition tests. Barclay suggests generic merging over time as a possible cause. 
Outside of controlled experiments, it is often impossible to check the truth of 
recall, especially for events of a personal nature distant in time and place. Such 
difficulties preclude the checking of the childhood memories in the present 
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research. No doubt there are inaccuracies. But. arguably, this need not matter. 
Determinants relate to what the subjects thought they actually remembered - not 
what they might otherwise have more accurately recalled 
Ishinct A fei, roric's 
Memories of infancy have sometimes been described as 'island memories' because 
they are not recognisably related to the continuum of life experience. It was noted 
in Section 1.5 that children are unlikely to have organised their autobiographical 
memories into the life periods and temporal sequences of Barsalou's model. To 
investigate the question of contextual isolation, subjects in Study I were asked 
whether they could remember what was happening immediately before and after 
events encoded (a) in early childhood and (b) in later childhood. No control list of 
adult-encoded memories was thought necessary, since the description 'island 
memories' seldom applies to teenage or adult recollection. 
Rehecnwial and Evklmrl Rcn , ndciw 
There is an interesting paradox between the effects of repetition on experience and 
repeating a memory. It has commonly been found that uniqueness, implying the 
total absence of repetition of the event or experience, is a powerful aid to the 
accessibility of a memory. Yet it has also been found, often in different studies by 
the same researchers, that repeated rehearsal of the memory also acts powerfully 
as an aid to recall. (Conway 1990, Cohen and Faulkner 1957, Rubin et al 1956, 
Brown and Kullik 1977. Bohannon 1988, etc. ). 
A suggested answer to the conundrum is that, in the first case it is the intensity of 
emotion (surprise or whatever) aroused at encoding, that makes the event so 
memorable, while in the process of recall it is reminder cues that index the memory 
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and that rehearsal 'shows the way' by linking the milestones of the memory (what 
Ribot 1882, has called reference points). 
The questions of frequency of rehearsal and the nature of external reminders is 
addressed in Study 1, as well as subjects' beliefs about whether their memories are 
influenced by such extraneous factors. 
('nneing 
In Section 1.5 it was noted that cueing, provides valuable insight into the 
or`anisation of autobiographical memories. In Study I the only cues supplied 
were the desi`nated a`, e periods from which memories had to be recalled. 
However, subjects were asked to say what kind of cues usually triggered the 
memories. For convenience, subjects' descriptions of cue types relating to 
particular memories have been collapsed into four categories: /kc'rcc'pil! cl/ that is, 
sensory input: sight, hearing. smell, taste, touch, heat or cold, pain, ac/ion that is, 
something the subject or someone else does; en; ulirma/ that is, recognition of a 
particular feeling belon`in to this event; vencu/ - arising, from a spoken train of 
thought, either silently alone, or in conversation s0h others. 
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Emolionalily 
Few, if any, researchers into autobiographical memory have not found emotionality 
to be an important constituent quality. An example of empirical work supporting 
the link is provided in a study by Conway (19&9). Subjects were asked to generate 
memories in response to three different types of word cues: (1) emotion, (2) 
taxonomic, for example, furniture, (3) groups of people, for example, school 
teachers. Memories were categorised as either autobiographical, generic or 
semantic. Emotion cues were most effective in evoking autobiographical 
memories. 
Research has also shown that experiencing congruent emotions can evoke recall of 
past experiences in which these emotions were strongly felt. (Teasdale and 
Fogarty, 1979; Snyder and White, 1982; Gillian and Bower, 1984). Typically it 
was found that if a depressed happy or neutral mood is induced in a subject, then 
in free recall more corresponding events will come to mind. 
Some researchers have awarded primacy to emotionality in the determination of 
recall. (e. g. Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1954; Robinson, 1930; Nelson; 1983,1991). 
The present writer's hypothesis that an affect content is included in every personal 
memory is based on the view that its presence is necessary if autobiographical 
memory is to serve its hypothesised adaptive purpose. 
Growing interest within cognitive psychology in the nature of `self', and its 
inseparable link with affect, makes it likely that many today will agree with the 
above view. But to be meaningful, such a prediction calls for some way of 
demonstrating a balance between recall of the objective facts of'what happened' 
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and the affect evoked, which combined form the memory of the autobiographical 
experience. This is an issue left unresolved by previous research. 
In Study I it is considered possible to separate these elements because the same 
subjects provide separate ratings within each of their recalls concerning,: 
(l) Overall intensity of realism that combines clarity, vividness and affect. 
(2) A rating for the intensity of sensory imaging of the physical aspect's of the 
event. 
(3) Separate ratings for affect, or what they felt/still feel about it. 
Pei- onuI Ateaning 
As with emotionality, personal meaning features increasingly in the list of factors 
ascribed by researchers to autobiographical memory. This is in step with drawing 
attention to the role of experiencing and evaluating 'self. 
Little or no formal research has been possible on personal meaning, for it is not 
something that can respond to manipulated variables in the laboratory, or even be 
reliably inferred fi-oni real life. Indeed it is difficult to define, although subjectively 
clear to the experiencer. Moreover, the term itself is likely to mean something 
different for the rememberer, according to the life period of encoding. During 
active years, personal meaning will often be related to goal orientation and will 
imply action of some kind. With childhood memories, all that probably belongs to 
the irretrievable past. This certainly applies to most of the subject sample in the 
present research. Consequently, for them, personal meaning probably involves no 
action, and is likely to be more a matter of how they feel about the event when 
7, r" 
they recall it. Appropriately, personal meaning is the final question to be asked in 
Study 1, for the answer sums up the present holistic impact of each memory. 
r 
Thus, Study I investigates the extent to which memories of childhood events retain 
the various senses involved in the event and are mentally imaged at recall, and also 
how strongly various emotions were, and still are, evoked by what happened. 
It is hypothesised that results will show the presence of both sensory imaging and 
persistent affect as joint determinants of recall. Such a finding would also support 
the hypothesis that autobiographical memory is an adaptive tool, since, in the living 
generation, the essential attribute of learning from experience depends on 
remembering what happened in the past. 
. 
In accordance with the indications derived from the previous research outlined 
above, this study examined the following memory attributes: topic, clarity, sensory 
quality, vividness, context, emotionality, frequency of recall, origin, cue type and 
personal meaning. Three variables were investigated in relation to these attributes: 
age of encoding, subject age and gender. Memory qualities are likely to change 
with age of encoding (see Chapter 2) as the child's abilities, interests and activities 
change. They are also likely to change to some extent with subject age due to 
forgetting over time and the effects of ageing on memory. However, frequent 
recall and personal importance may preserve selected memories. (Cohen & 
Faulkner, 1988). Gender may affect the kind of topics that are remembered and 
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109 adults, 53 men and 56 women. Aý, es ranged between 21 and 91. Median age 
53, with 54 older and 54 younger. Subjects had no academic or other special 
interest in the area of research. 
They were selected randomly from local electoral registers. The initial approach 
was by letter, inviting them to participate in a university based study concerning, 
childhood memories and saying that the writer (personal references provided) 
would `phone in a couple of days, hoping, they could then arrange a convenient 
time either at the writer's address or at their own. No details were given which 
might bias the results. No remuneration was offered. 
The positive response rate was slightly above 75%o. All but 5 out of' the 109 
subjects chose to come to the researcher's house. 
Sampling Procedure 
Every Nth name from the electoral register covering, streets located conveniently 
near the researcher's address. 
Sai, piing Area 
London SSV 13. Few of the subjects were born and brought tip in their present 
location. Their childhood memories ranged over a geographical scatter within the 
British isles and overseas to an extent that makes regional bias unlikely. 
SO 
AGE BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE 









-l. ý. 4. Materials 
Questionnaires with space for verbal answers to be recorded by the researcher 
were constnicted. The pro-forma questionnaire at appendix A will show that a 
very wide net is cast inviting subjects to provide free recall examples of childhood 
_, -, es 
from memories that illustrate topic and other differences across encoding 1C 
birth to adolescence. The questionnaire elicits the incidence and strength of a 
subject's exogenous senses used in imaging, and similarly to what extent various 
emotions play a part in the recall. Finally it provides an opportunity for subjects to 
identify, in a nutshell, the personal meaning of each memory recalled. This data 
provides the basis for testing the previously stated hypotheses. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Although no attempt could be made to aid recall by replicating encoding 
environment, care was taken at least to minimise incongruity by avoiding a 
laboratory atmosphere. Subjects were encouraged to `feel at hone', with a cup of 
tea or coffee beside them, seated in an armchair in the researcher's study, facing a 
window with a view of sky and trees. They were not subjected to any time 
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pressure. A relaxed atmosphere was considered important, since experience has 
shown it helps reminiscence. 4 
A structured interview was employed, using spoken questions standardised as on 
the questionnaire (see Appendix A). Free recall was requested of one event from 
each of 6 three-year a`e spans, from birth to age IS. 
Subjects were reassured about confidentiality and were asked, if possible, to recall 
a specific discrete event or happening, rather than merely some remembered 
environmental feature or general event. Those who, despite trying briefly, could 
not recall an event within the required age span were told not to worry, and to 
proceed to the next 3-year span. Thus, the 633 memories recalled fell short of the 
654 that would have resulted, had each of the 109 subjects produced 6 memories. 
The shortfall relates almost entirely to events before age three. 
For the sake of speed and legibility, answers were spoken and the researcher tilled 
in the questionnaire. Each memory, as briefly written tip, was read aloud to the 
subject for confirmation, and was then followed by a battery of standardised 
questions relating to aspects of the recall process and to the aFfect experienced. 
Subjects were not informed beforehand what form the research would take, so they 
were not able, in advance, to choose and rehearse `suitable' memories. 
S 
{ 
I: nrvcling Age. Sj aiz. v 
The six ace spans from each of which subjects were sequentially invited to'recall a 
memory were: 
Before age 3 
3 but less than 6 
6 but less than 9 
9 but less than 12 
12 but less than 15 
15 to 18 inclusive. 
Noic: That whereas the first five are in 3 year spans, the sixth is extended to 4 
years to include memories at ae l3. This is to provide equal opportunity for both 
early and later school leavers to recall job interviews or first job experiences; a 
popular choice on leaving school. Statistically, this imbalance is immaterial since 
the present research does not concern quantitative recall within age periods, other 
than incidence at the earliest period. 
S 
4.3 Results 
Some of the results are being presented as purely descriptive statistics, simply to 
enrich understanding of the nature of childhood memories. Others, i. e. those that 
relate to hypotheses are analysed appropriately. 
-1.3.1 Ilc'c"all Of Events Before The Age Of iliree 
How Young Can We Remember? Out of the total sample of 109 subjects, '90, i. e. 
83% were able to recall an autobiographical event before the age of three. 
Of the 19, i. e. 17% who could not do so, 11 were nien and 8 women. After the age 
of six, all except, one subject, i. e. 999%ö were able to recall an event within each 3- 
year age span between 6-18 inclusive. The one subject who failed was a woman 
who could recall no particular event between the ages of 6-9. However, as she 
had, without difficulty, already produced memories from both of the younger age 
slots, her failure cannot be ascribed to `childhood amnesia'. Her own explanation 
was: "Life was on such an even keel at that time. " After age nine there were no 
blanks. 
4.3.2 Incidence Uf i fe, norr T ol'ic. r 
Memories were classified according to topic and the percentage of memories of 
each topic were calculated and are shown in Table 4.3.2.1. Separate percentages 
were also calculated for each age band and are shown in Table 4.3.2.2. To enable 
comparison 19 of the categories used here are those previously researched in 
relation to a broader spectrum of adult memories. (Cohen and Faulkner 1987). 
X4 
A 20th cate`ory, especially applicable to children, has been added, namely 
Adventure - deliberately sought. Memories were classified into topic areas 
independently by three judges. Where an event overlapped into two or more 
cate`ories it was encoded into its main category as agreed by the judges in 
discussion. It was not found appropriate to sub-categorise events as first time, last 
time, unique or repeated. Reliable distinction was too often impossible, since so 
many early childhood memories centre on some activity or aspect of a common 
situation which was, nonetheless, new to the young, rememberer, and so nay well 
have been first time or unique. 
The relative incidence of different memory topics varied across the age bands. 
However, the significance of these variations was not analysed statistically. Not 
surprisingly, early memories concentrate within a narrower orbit of activities than 
those of later years. Table 4.3.2.1 shows that nearly half the memories up to age of 
l8 lie within only four categories: School, Trivia, III-health and Family happenings. 
in that order. The high incidence of Trivia recalled from early age periods is 
discussed later. The four categories alone account for 4c)° o, to which should 
probably be added a good deal from: Birthdays, Anniversaries, etc. since these are 
also mostly within the family. 
School and I: chicalion 
Despite the frequently reported strong impression made by first days at nursery, 
pre-prep. and prep. schools, and later, at schools, colleges and universities, more 
than half (52%) of all schooling, memories are encoded between the age of 9 and 
14 (see Table 4.3.2.2). 
S5 
7ririn 
These are happenings which would probably be classed by adult standards as too 
insignificant to class as events. For example: "I remember being in a railway 
carriage accompanied by my nanny while my parents were in another 
compartment" (ade under 3), "I was watching knights jousting at the Leicester 
pageant when I was seized with an urgent need to pee. A teacher took me behind 
the bandstand" (age 6-9), "I remember pushing my own dark green push-chair on 
a cold winter's day while wearing a white coat with a hood" (age under 3). As can 
be seen in Table 4.3.2.2, the Trivia category is steeply biased towards younger 
encoding age. This may well reflect adult inability to recognise something within a 
memory which may have been far from trivial to the child at the time. Subjects' 
vividness and emotionality rating of Trivia memories ollen support this view. 
Ill Health 
From Fig. 4.3.2.2, it will be seen that recall of Health, Accidents and Hospital 
relating to the entire family household, covered by this category, plunges steeply 
from a mean of over 20% for other encoding ages to only 2°ßö for the 15-18 
period. This could be partly due to the fact that by this age the usual children's 
illnesses are over. Table 4.3.2.2 shows that nearly two-thirds of Ill-health recall 
(65%) relates to before age 15. On the other hand, adult afflictions have not yet 
begun. It is also possible that teenage problems, and a desire for independence 
leave less room for concern about the health of the rest of the family. 
Famih' Evenly 
Family centred memories are twice as frequent in the younger encoding age 
periods. The period from birth to 8 accounts for two-thirds of them, while from 9 
to 1S has only one third (see Table 4.3.2.2). lt is perhaps not surprising that 15% 
X6 
of memories within the youngest age span, before age 3, are family centred. Less 
clear is why the percentage drops to its lowest, 4%%, between ages 12 and 14, 
before picking up again to 110,0 at 15-13. This variation may not be statistically 
significant. Alternatively it may reflect physical and attitudinal chan`es at the onset 
of puberty, as sometimes reported by developmental psychologists. (Infielder and 
Piaget 1958, Flavell 1963, Beard 1969, Meadows 1983). 
An early adaptive urge to explore is reflected in the finding, that 1010 of adventure 
recall is in the under 3 age span. Between 3 and I1 the percentage rises steadily, 
probably in step with the physical development needed to broaden adventurous 
possibilities. Diminution after age 12 may indicate the onset of other interests. 
«in- and Nalionul Service 
Recall of War/National service chiefly depends upon when and where the subject's 
childhood happened to be. Its rank order should not, therefore, be generalised 
beyond the present sample. 
Achic'remews 
The recall of achievements is inevitably linked with the development of 
accomplishments. Consequently, it increases with the subject's age of encoding 
until the early teens, especially as achievement is often linked to organised sports. 
Active, Pus: sive Pcwlicihalion 
This was classified by the same three judges who categorised events into topic 
areas. It is not always easy to draw a clear distinction between active and passive 
participation, since in both cases the subject is personally involved. The most 
.'7 
C 
frequently used criterion was initiation of the reported activity. Was it activated by 
the subject, or was it something that happened to the rememberer or was observed 
by him? Such a dividing line would seem to put such a topic as (14) Spectacles, 
theatre, cinema in the passive category. Yet if, as in one case, the memory was 
leaving the grandstand during the show in order to do a wee behind the stand, it 
would be classified as active. Fortunately, after discussion of such ambiguities, 
there was no dissension among the judges. The percentages of memories judged 
to be active in each category are shown in Table 4.3.2.1. 
Table 4.3.2.1. suggests that memorability is unrelated to the extent to which 
participation in the event was 'active' or 'passive'. Three out of the four most 
frequently recalled categories are among, the lowest in 'active' participation. The 
absence of relationship is further illustrated by the two categories jointly ranked 
12th in order. Both have 3.50ßö share of the total, yet are as different as 86 and 64 
respectively in active participation. Statistical correlation between categoric 
incidence and active relationship is only . 
03. It seems that personal involvement, 
which is at the core of autobiographical remembering, depends more on what 
occurred than on who did what. 
NN 






I School l1% 
r 
1 . 4.6 64 
2 Trivia 74 11.7 47 
Illness. injury. hospital 64 1O. I 58 
4 Family & family occasions 54 8.5 52 
5 Adventure (deliberately sought) 40 <.: 100 
6 War and/or National Service 3% 6.0 
7 Achievement. exams. prizes etc. :6 5.7 94 
8 Holidays 2% 4.4 6% 
R Births. deaths. marriages 28 4.4 54 
10 Work. jobs. careers 27 4.: 74 
ll Sport 23 ;. h 74 
12 Friends R social occasions 22 3.; 86 
12 Love. romance. sex 22 ;. 5 64 
14 Spectacles, theatre. cinema etc. l% 2.8 78 
5 Home. moving, furnishing etc. 11 1.7 54 
16 Religious events. confirmations 8 I.: h± 
17 Catastrophes. fires. accidents 7 1.1 2% 
17 Pets 7 1.1 57 
1') Birthdays. anniversaries etc. 6 I. 0 ;O 
20 V. I. P. s meeting famous people 2 ().; 5O 
Total 633 
SJ 
1'ctbk -1.3.2.2 Difference In 7npic" hicic/c,, a' 8v. 4, ve Of Encoding 
Only those accounting for 5'! » or more of the total are shoN%n. Topic percentages show ho%% 
much of the total recall %%ithin each age period is devoted to each of the categories. 
TOPIC ENCODING AGE TOTAL 
<3 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-18 
n=90 n= 108 (i= 108 n= 109 n= 109 n= 109 n=633 
School ? 20 19 alt +2 IS IIS 
(? °. ýt) (17%) (I inn) (25nä) (27"0 ) (1 3°n) (I')oi)) 
Trivia 45 20 5 z n 1 74 
(61%) (27%) (7! 1%) (4" (0°') (111,11) (12"'it) 
III health 11 16 15 It) 11 1 64 
(17°n) (25(ko) (23 oä) (I6%) (17%) (2%) (10%) 
Family events 8 14 14 It) 2 6 54 
(15%) (26%) 
, o) (26 (19n) (4°) (1 
1%) (9%) 
Advcnturc 4 7 8 1 5 h 4(1 
(Il)^ö) (IW n) (2Oo, n) (2? "ýt) (I ilk") (I5%) ((6°. i, ) 
War/Nat. 3 6 8 9 4 9 38 
scR"iCC (8%) (16%) (? 1'ßü) (24"o) (I 1, ';, ) (21"n) (6`%ü) 
Achievements 2 2 6 ; 9 12 ? 6t 
(6%) ((i°. ö) (17%) (14.. ßn) (25%) (?. inn) (6%) 
TOTALS 76 85 74 77 63 41) 424 
Note: Nearly half the memories lie within four categories: School, Trivia, III 
Health and Family Happenings in that order. 
90 
1)i/ferences In Topic' liwicIc/ice By (. eiicIer 
Women are more likely to recall schooling. family-centred events. childhood 
achievements, and to some extent, matters of health (see Table 4.3.2.3) Men recall 
I 
considerably more childhood adventures, and also more trivia, i. e. items or 
experiences of personal, childish interest that others would probably consider too 
trivial to be recognised as events. The incidence of 'War/National Service' 
memories depends chiefly on when and where subjects happened to be during their 
childhood and `teens, so cannot be taken as representative beyond the present 
sample. 
7c7hle 4.3.2.3 Difrcrc'nce. c !nl ric hºc iclc'ncc" By Gender 
(Only topics accounting, for 5° 0 or more of the total are shown) 














School 118 18.6 51 67 4? 57 14 more F 
Trivia 74 11.7 42 32 57 43 14 more NT 
Ill health 64 U). I 3l 3 48 52 4 more F 
Family events 54 8. i 21 ;O 61 22 more F 
Adventure 40 6.3 2; IS 62.5 37.5 25 more NI 
War/Nat. Service ým 6,. 0 28 la 74 26, 48 more NI 
Achievements 36 5.7 17 14 47 5± 6 more F 
l)iffi. 'rences In 7ohic Incideitcc' II , S'iihjec1 Age 
The incidence of memory topics recalled by subjects of different ages is shown in 
Table 4.3.2.4 and the way that topic incidence varies with subject age is graphically 
illustrated in Fing 4.3.2. 
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Out of the four categories most frequently recalled, which between them account 
for some 50% of all topics categorised, the incidence of Trivia and of Illness is 
relatively unaffected by the age of the rememberer (see Table 4.3.2 4) This is 
markedly not so with some other topics. The shills are not statistically analysed 
because the numbers are too small. However, some of the major shifts are 
interesting. For instance, the steep plunge in old age in the recall of School events. 
Later, in Study 3, it will be found that very old people can remember their 
schooling surprisingly well if asked to do so. The fact that they do not do so in 
free recall must therefore reflect choice rather than ability. In other words, school 
events are not a topic that comes readily to mind in advanced old age. Conversely, 
Family often plays an increasingly important part for the very old, and here Table 
4.3.2.4 shows a sharp upsurge in the recall of family topics. It would seem that the 
incidence of topic recall may in part depend on the amount of personal interest or 
involvement in the topic felt at the time of recall which, in turn, may reflect an age- 
related change in the, funcliw, of reminiscence. 
Also, predictably perhaps, the category of Work, Jobs, Careers is less accessible 
during the active years of actually getting, on with it' than aller retirement. 
Remembering concerns the past - at around 70 in this topic area it almost doubles, 
suggesting the onset of the age of increased reminiscence in retirement. 
The category `Friends, Social Occasions' shows a pronounced peak among people 
in their thirties. This might be because, for many, these are socially very active 
years, involving not only personal friends, but also children's school friends and 
parents, children's parties, etc. Though the events beim, recalled here are not 
contemporary with the 30s-decade, but are of childhood, it could be conjectured 
that subjects' minds in this age group are more than usually attuned to the topic 
9 
area. Recall within the category `Love, Romance, Sex' is understandably low in 
childhood experiences, which mostly occurred before puberty. It stays between 5% 
and 2°ßö in all age groups, from the twenties into the nineties! 
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'luhle a. 3.2. -I 
Percentages show how much of the total recall %%ithin each age group is devoted to 
each of the categories. 
AGE GROUPS 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- Total 
29 39 49 59 69 719 91 by ctgs 
School. col lcgc. ctc. 2(3 9 34 24 is 12 I 118 
Z; "ý 2u 6 IS^4 IS".. t; "4 _"% 
Trivia 5 6 23 I; 16 7 4 74 
9% 1; ^b 13% In^'o I(r^b ')", 1204 
Illncss. injury. hospital 3 z 2() 17 6 13 2 6-i 
^n 714 11% 131111, ('10", I(i" (6"ö 
Family R. family occasions s t 11 ' Q 6 v 54 
14% 7% (-, "i, 7 "ö 904 7"4 26^% 
Adventures (voluntary) 2 4 13 .4 7 3 z . tn 
4"' 9^it 7^it (i"n 7"n i^n Z"u 
War or National Scn-icc n (3 7 $1) 3 6 3 tic 
cº^"r 011-b 4^; r 14^ß tNr 7°ý 9'! 1r 
AchicIl"cmcnts. cram ctc. s 1 12 Its 3 3 2 t(, 
7"4 7" 7" 3% 4% 6"";, 
Holidays ? 4 10 7 2 2 0 25 
1"vlr 
ý"fir (''ir 5"l, 2'14 2"1 o"f1 
Births. deaths. nmrri. 11ZCS 4 2 9 4 4 4 2 25 
7";, 4" b 4016 i" n 4" 6 5" n h" it 
Work. jobs. carccrs ti 2 3 ; (; . 3 27 
O^.; 4"o 2" ö 4"; 1 (i""ir 1(1". 9111, 
Sport. hobbies 2 1 5 .t 6 4 1 23 {^ir 2^n 2"b i"ö 606 "ü i^n 
Friends. social occasions 0 6 0 3 3 4 (3 22 
()^n I i°n 311", 2" 3no ; "ö o"ir 
Love. romance. sex t 2 S 4 2 2 I 22 
5^ir 4", 4 4" 
. 
1% 2"ö 20n ";, 
Spectacles. theatre. Films 2 1 9 2 t 0 I IS 
T'n 2°;, 511ö 2"n 21b o';, i^n 
Home. moN ing. furnishing I o t 2 1 2 o Ii 
2".. tr'b 2'';, 2 ..;, % 2^. %r On 
94 
Religious events I 0 4 0 I 2 0 
2% Wo 2" it 0% 1°n 2% 0% 
Catastrophes. accidents. etc. 0 0 2 I 2 2 0 7 
(1°n 0% 2% 1% 2% 2n. b 0% 
Pets (º n I 2 3 I (1 7 
(1% (1% Inn 2% % 1% 0% 
Celebrations. birthdays. etc. tº lº 1 I 2 I I 6 
l)ý. ö ný (l. o Inn ný 1.41 ? nn 10", n =n 
VIPs. meeting famous people 0 o I 0 0 0 I 2 
Wo 0116 Inö Dnä lºnb Of P's 
TOTALS BY SUBJECT AGE 57 46 I' I 135 'ºIV . 92 34 633 
No. of Subjects in AGE GROUP 11 7 30 2t Is I5 - I0 ) 









































4.3.3 A k'morl' (7urii 
in order to assess how clearly subjects remember the events they described, 
question 2 of the questionnaire asked subjects to rate the memory they had just 
provided as either clouded and vague (I point), fairly clear and definite (2 points) 
or vivid and detailed (3 points). 
On the whole, people believe their recall of events after the age of three to be 
clear, indeed, for the most part, vividly clear. Nearly 7S' O of subjects in the 
present study rated one or more of the recalls as 'vividly clear'. From Table 4.3.3.1 
it will be seen that, overall, only I'_% of memories were rated as vague, the rest 
were rated as fairly clear (41%) or vividly clear (47%). In general terms, the 
Younger the subject's age at encoding the more likely that the memory would be 
rated as vague or only fairly clear. Events recalled from later childhood were more 
likely to be rated as vividly clear. A Chi Square analysis confirms the significance 
of the differences in clarity ratin`s across the various encoding age groups. (Chi 
Square = 40.75, df 10, Critical value 23.21 at p<0.01). 
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7uhle 4.3.3. l Uirjcýrcýnrcý. c In ('lcýrilý lip . ý, ýºcý Ujl: nccýclinLº 
(Clarity ratings by subjects exuressed as Derceiitaues). 
ENC. AGE <3 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-I8 N1ean 
Vague 24 14 8 8 9 8 12 
Fairly clear 50 44 40 45 42 28 41 
Vividly 
clear 
26 42 52 47 49 64 47 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The differences in clarity ratings reveal an upward change in clarity between the 
ages of 3 and 7. This is consistent with a developmental view held by many 
authorities - from the early Jesuits to Pia; -et and his followers (Inhelder and Piaget 
1973). However, a chi square test of the data shown in Table 4.3.3.2 yielded chi 
squared = 4.54, df 2, p> 10, so the clarity shift specifically at around age 7 is not 
significant. 
Another increase in clarity seems apparent at the onset of puberty and teenage. 
Bearing in mind that recall here is by mature adults, with a median age of 53. one 
must assume that any boost to the clarity of remembering events in childhood 
'watershed' years reflects changes at those times to new and more intense 
awareness of experience. 
Vs 
1 , hlc' 4.3.3.2 Me 11IL'cn? 1)O'c"c'»lc1 2'. c Of A/c'lnjco1'ic's l; iutýclc'cllic'froi"c' Aiicl il flel- 
Agee Seven Receiving Each ('Icrriir l? rung. 




Vague 15 8 
Fairly Clear 45 38 
Vividly Clear 40 53 
Differences In (7uri1v Rr Gender 
Overall, Table 4.3.3.3 shows that men rate childhood memories as 'Vividly Clear' 
3.7°ö more often than women. But this mean figure masks important differences 
within the categories chosen by subjects to describe the clarity of what they 
remember. While the category `Fairly Clear' is much the same for both sexes, 
there is a noticeable bias towards the choice of "Vague" by women. To what 
extent this represents objective reality, as distinct from typical, subjective 
male/female attitudes is beyond the scope of the present research. It is possible that 
nien may be more reluctant than women to admit vagueness, even to themselves. 
The gender difference in clarity was significant by X2 = 17.5. dt 2, p< . 
01. 
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7c, hle 4.3.3.3 1)iffrr'i c'. r In ('lciri! º' fiº' (; c'nc%'r 
Male Female Difference 
Number 0,6 Number °ö !o 
Vague 19 6.17 54 16.56 10.40 >F 
Fairly Clear 131 42.53 133 40.80 1.73 > NI 
Vividly Clear 158 51.30 139 42.64 3.66 > hi 
308 100.00 326 100.00 
I)i. Terence In ('larilt' Of I-Ia'ptr And (Inhappr A /eºººvrics 13v (; antler 
The classification of Happy / Unhappy memories is based on subjects' ratings on a 
5-point scale of emotions they felt at the time of the event, as reported in response 
to question 12 of the questionnaire. The category 'Happy' includes ratings for, 
happiness, excitement, surprise and possibly 'other'. 'Unhappy' includes ratin`s for; 
unhappiness, fear, disappointment, anger, frustration, grief, jealousy, anxiety and 
possibly 'other'. 
Both amen and women remembered more unhappy than happy events. Among the 
53 nien in the sample, five, while categorising levels of clarity, were unable to 
categorise some of their memories as either happy or unhappy. These 
uncategorised memories are, therefore, omitted from Table 4.3.3.4 leaving 625 
instead of the total 633 memories actually recalled. 
/00 














Value 7 5 II 7 29 I8 25 15 
Fairly Clear 64 47 62 39 64 41 73 43 
Very Clear 66 48 87 54 65 41 72 42 
137 100 160 100 158 100 170 l00 
% Happy/) 
Unhappy 46% 54% ä 481,0 520: 0 
by gender ) 
Although these data were not formally analysed, it is apparent that, for both sexes, 
unhappy memories received slightly higher clarity ratings. 
%)IrfC'1'C'1JC'E'. ý %Jl i %Ql'l/1' v SJJliJC'C'/ Age 
These are shown in Table 4.3.3.5. The higher clarity rating, in the youngest subject 
age group may owe something to recency effect rather than relate purely to subject 
ade. However, the general uniformity of means across age spans suggest that 
clarity of recall is not usually affected by a person's age. Interestingly it would 
appear that the clarity of memory 'in the mind's eye' is unaffected by a`, e-related 
changes in sensory acuity which generally diminishes with age. 
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Table 4.3.3.5 I)iffc'ý"c'i, c'c's In ('/cn"ilý" IY S11hjecl Age 
(Rating Scale: Vague =I Fairly Clear =2 Vividly Clear = 3) 
Aye 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-91 
















Mean 2.8 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 
4.3.4 Incick'ººce Of . Sen. corn' Uºnºlilic'. vI,, Alejººnricks 
In the questionnaire, questions 3,4 and 5 queried the involvement of different 
senses in the memories recalled, and question 7 asked subjects to rate the vividness 
of each sense. The incidence and nature of visual imaging for each memory was 
probed in question 3 of the questionnaire. 
Differences In Incidence Of Senso v Qualities Ri' Age Of Encocliiig 
Early sensory development is an adaptive advantage. Consequently, most of our 
senses are fully developed by the time autobiographical memory starts. Their 
respective involvement will, therefore, depend on the nature of the event rather 
than on developmental readiness, and their use of the senses in imaging will relate 
to their relevance to the meaning of what is beint, remembered. 
Thus, because practically every personal experience involves seeing something 
sight scores 99°%% involvement. On the other hand, such senses as Taste, [eat, Cold 
and Pain, are not so often relevant, and so occupy the lower end of Table 4.3.4.1. 
Touch and smell occupy mid positions. 
0 
f 
Since the relevance of sensory qualities to an experience is unlikely to change with 
age, the involvement for each sense should not he greatly affected by encoding, 
ade. Table 4.3.4.1 shows that the involvement of senses is fairly consistent across 
encoding age periods. There is, however, a notable exception - Sound. 
Table 4.3.4.1 shows a steep and steady increase in Sound involvement over the 
years. This is graphically illustrated in Fig 4.3.4.1. This need not mean that sound 
is biologically different from our other senses. A probable explanation is that the 
sound involved here is not simply a sensing of noises, but predominantly the use 
and understanding of the spoken word. A stron, learning element in the 
development of linguistic skill and understanding would be expected to show an 
increase in the meaningful involvement of Sound in step with growing maturity. 
There is some indication in Table 4.3.4.1 that the incidence of Sound in memories 
changes at around the age of 7. 
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7ubIc' 4.3.4.1 Irrc"ickenre ()f S'cn. so,: v QrrcrluJic'. s 8j" Age Of Encociing 
Note: As the number of memories is not the same in all age groups, the 
involvement of each of the senses is shown as a percentage of the actual number of 
recalls in each age group. 
Age <5 6-l1 12-18 0-18 
n=198 n=217 n=2 18 n=63.31 
% 0/1 0 01, "0 
Sight 98 99 99 99 
Sound 43 65 71 59 
Touch 28 33 32 31 
Smell 16 22 26 22 
Heat 7 6 10 8 
Cold 4 8 10 7 
Taste 3 9 4 5 
Pain 5 4 6 5 
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Differences In Inc; ch'ce Of scý,,. cu, c)al; ties fig (. 'cIcr 
Table 4.3.4.2 shows that, the recall of most senses is very similar for men and 
women. The biggest difference is in the recall of Pain. Men report recall of pain 
associated with a memory with a slightly higher frequency than women. The 
difference, however, is not large. Here, one might conjecture that nature adaptively 
provides women with a welcome attribute to reduce recall and avoid d%velling, on 
the painful aspects of menstruation and child-birth. This would clearly apply more 
directly to adults than to children. But the ability not to dwell on pain might well 
extend to adult recall of childhood memories. 
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'I'cthle 4.3.4.2 1)iffcýicýncc!. c In Iýiciclcýliccý OJ', S'cii, cni t Onulilies 1k (n'uck'r 







SIGHT 5.6 5.7 









TOUCH 2.0 I. 9 
SMELL I.; 1.2 
TASTE 0.4 0. : 
HEAT O. 5 0.7 
COLD 0.6, 0.4 
PAIN 0.5 0.2 
Uiffcýrcýnccý. r In Incidence Of Sc'n. cort' Qualilies" /? v Subjerl Age 
Table 4.3.4.3 shows that seeing in the mind's eye' is scarcely affected by growing 
old. Imaging sound, however, does softer some decline, and this is particularly so 
in imaging one's own voice. People in their twenties are more than two and a half 
times more likely to hear their own voice in a memory than subjects in their 
ei`hties. However, the sub-sample size at 80+ is too small for statistical reliability. 
I07 
7itble -1.3.4.3 ýllc-cup Nm»hrr UJ', tlcýýýmric. ý (()nl O%O In Jr/zieh I": urh 
Seu. ve {F'cr. c 









A,, e Trend 
Sight 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.8 Little change 
Sound 2.25 2.0 2.0 1.4 Decline after 80 
Smell 0.85 1.4 1.2 1.2 Little change 
Taste 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 Little change 
Touch 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.2 Decline after 80 
Cold 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 Decline after 80 
Heat 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.0 Decline after 80 
Pain 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 Little change 
i. czin! Imugei y In AI lc'mc)ric». c 
This was investigated in question 3 of the questionnaire, %khich asked subjects: "Do 
you picture the event in your mind's eye? If so, in colour or black and white; Still 
like a snap or moving like a film? Do you see yourself in the picture as though 
looking at the scene from the outside, or do you see it through your on eyes as 
when it happened, without seeins, yourself? Of the 630 autobiographical memories 
in the present research, 620 (98%) involved visual imaging The recall of events in 
the mind's eye can of course vary in vividness as can imaging; in all the senses. 
However it can be seen from Table 4.3.5.1. that subjects rated the vividness of the 
visual quality of their memories far more highly that, the vividness of any other 
sensory qualities. There can be little doubt as to the paramountcy of vision in the 
remembering process. 
('o b !!!. 
Most people recall in colour. Out of the 620 memories visually imaged, 498 (80%) 
were in colour, and 119 (19%) were in monochrome. Several subjects objected 
/ r). r 
that "black and white" in the questionnaire did not describe how they saw without 
colour. Some subjects use both colour and monochrome in their imagging. 
Al4)remc'IN C 
Most people see movement in their visual recall. Movement was reported in 523 
out of the 620 visually imaged memories (84° o). For 87 subjects (I4° o) the visual 
imagery was in still pictures. 
, S'el f li»uging 
Most people do not see themselves in the scenes they image. Of the G? t) memories 
imaged, 499 (80%) were using, what Neisser has called 'a field view', that is as the 
participants saw the events at the time, without seeins; themselves. There were 
138 instances (22%) in which subjects imaged themselves as children taking part 
within the scene, that is an 'observer's view', as though seen by an outside 
observer. There were also 24 instances (4%) of 'both', vdicre the self was both 
seen and not seen in the recall of the same event. Several subjects who reported 
'both' in relation to particular memories explained that they switched views 
according to mental focus, rather like a Necker cube. The choice of 'field' or 
'observer' views, or 'both' is not consistent for subjects. The same subject will 
often vary the choice among 6 different memories. Scrutiny of the topics of the 
memories suggests no ready correlation with the choice of view with %Vhich they 
are imaged. 
It will be seen from Table 4.3.4.4 that the balance between imaging in colour or 
monochrome and of moving or still is considerably influenced by the encoding, age 
of the memory. Memories from below ade 6 are more likely to be monochromatic 
109 
and static than memories from later years. In contrast, the choice of `field' or 
`observer' views is almost unaffected by encoding age. 









Monochrome 56 33 30 119 
29°, % 15°, ö 140"0 19% 
In Colour 137 179 182 498 
71°iä 84% 85% 80% 
No Movement 47 21 19 87 
2406 10% 9% 140%ö 
Movement 144 187 192 523 
74°, o 88% 90°, 0" 84% 
Self Image 44 52 42 138 
23 % 241'O 20% 22% 
No Self image 156 169 174 499 
80°, ö 80°. ö 81% 801 % 
I isrml lnicrg ! 1' And (; ender 
Table 4.3.4.5 shows that nien reported 9% more images in monochrome than 
women, and this difference was significant by Chi square test (X2 = 7.06, dF I, 
p<. Ot). This may reflect a difference in the rate of early childhood development, 
since both sexes image without colour to a greater extent at the youngest encoding 
a`es than they do later. Females seem to make the change sooner. Men also 
reported 4% more still images than women, but this difference was not significant. 
More women reported images seen from an observer point of view, but this 
difference was also not significant. 
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7c)hk- 4.3.4.5 I s,, cil I1»ULºcýrý ý1 nc! l ýcý))clcýl 
Percentages of males and females reporting memories with dillcrent visual 
properties. 
Male Female 0 110 
n=53 n=56 Diffierence 
Monochrome 24 15 9 Mi>F 
Colour 76 85 9 F>NI 
Still 17 1; 4 Mi>F 
Moving 83 -87 4 F>N1 
Self Image 19 24 5 F>Mi 
No Self Image 81 76 5 M>F 
I isual 1ý»ugeý BI' . Steh jcýc J Age 
Unlike encoding age, Chi square tests showed that the age of subjects was not 
significantly related to imaging, in monochrome or colour, or in still and moving 
pictures. (Chi square = 0.7 and 0.65, df3, n. s. respectively). 
There does seem to be sins of an increase of "observer" self-imaging in the 60's 
and 70's decades, but this also failed to reach significance, Chi square = 0.9 dF 3, 
i1. S. 
/11 
7uhle 4.3.4.6 1 is, ial l"uv"e ' By Sul! jc'c"l Age 
Mean numbers of memories with ditierent visual properties. 
I 
20-39 40-59 60-79 30-91 
11=18 11=53 11 =33 11=5 
Monochrome 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.0 
In Colour 4.4 4.6 4.3 5.0 
Movement 1.3 0.5 1.1 1.4 
No Miovement 4.6 5.1 4.6 4.6 
Self Ima`ing 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.8 
No Self Imaging 5.0 4.8 3.8 5.2 
Auuclilol y lingVerr In Childhood Aleniories 
The sense of hearing is the second most frequent sense that is a component of 
childhood memories, sight being the first. In the present research only 5 out of the 
109 people in the sample (all with normal hearing) did not remember any sound as 
part of the memories they reported. Questions 4 and 5 asked whether subjects 
heard their own voice, other voices or other sounds when they remembered 
childhood events. Of the 104 subjects who remember hearing sound of any kind, 
several heard more than one of the above three categorises in a single memory. 
The resulting total of sounds heard was 668. 
Within this total: 122 were remembering own voice (18 ö) 
342 were remembering, other voices (51 e o) 
204 were remembering, other sounds (31°ßö) 
112 
I 
The fact that other people's voices are remembered so much more than one's own 
is, perhaps, only to be expected. Receiving all vocal communications depends on 
listening, to another's voice. But one does not need to listen to one's own voice 
when initiating a Communication. 
Auclilrny Image) Rv Age Uf lancnclinýq 
From Table 4.. 3.4.7 it will be seen that the incidence of recalling sound in a 
remembered event rises steeply up to the encoding, age span 6-8. Own voice 
scores then continue to rise gently, while scores for other voices level out. Scores 
for other sounds show a slight decline after a, e 9-11. One might conjecture that 
this is because, by that arge, Most sounds have become familiar, and are therefore 
less memorable. Only 91 i. e. 14% of childhood memories involved voices. Not all 
voices were verbalising; some were crying, singing or simply shouting. 
/1.11 
7uhlc' 4.3. -!. 7 Auditory lln(ýv'r i- Br Agc' Qf Aucocliný º 
Because the number of subjects differs within encoding age spans, incidence scores 













Omi voice 4 16 IQ 22 25 2.4 
Other Voices 30 44 6 60 
Other sounds 20 2: 32 40 37 3-I 
Mean % total 
incidence 54 83 114 125 122 125 
These data were analysed using Pearson's correlation tests. A significant 
relationship was found to exist between a; ge of encoding and the incidence of own 
voice sounds in memories, r=0.92, df = 4, p<0.01. However, no such 
relationship was found for other voice sounds, r=0.79, dt' = 4, p=0.06. or for 
other sounds in general, r=0.79, df = 4, p<0.07. The increased incidence of 
'own voice' in memories may reflect developing linguistic skills. 
Ainliloiy Iningert' By Gender 
As the numbers of men and women subjects differ, it is percentage of categoric 
incidence of dif'erent sounds that are compared. These show that there is virtually 
no difference between men and women in the way sound is imaged when adults 
recall their childhood experiences. Scores for the incidence of imating ones own 
voice was 18% for both sexes, for other voices incidence was ä I°%ö men and 52% 
women, and for non-vocal sounds 3 l°%ö men and 3 0°rä women. 
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Iahle 4.3.4.8 AialiIorr Imcrgc'I: r 13i' Sul? jecl Age 
Scores in each category represent the mean number of memories (out of 6) 









Own Voice 1.9 1.05 0.85 0.6 
Other Voices 3.6 2.9 3.5 2.0 
Other Sounds 1.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 
Of interest here is the fact that there seems to be some indication of an age-related 
decline in the reported incidence of own voice sounds in memories with the level of 
incidence dropping from 1.9 in the youngest age group to 0.6 in the oldest. This 
decline was found to be significant by Pearson's correlation test, r=0.97, df 2, p< 
0.05. 
C Ompari. cvn Of i isua1 Anci Somid Imaging BI' SuI )jec l Age 
While the recall of sound plays a slightly decreasing role in the recall of childhood 
memories, the older the subject becomes, the part played by visual remembering 
remains virtually undiminished through decades ranging from the twenties into the 
nineties. This was seen in Table 4.3.4.3. 
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4.3.5 I iricli, css of S'cn. cc, rt Iýýýcýýýert' In ýI Icýucu ic. ' 
Question 7 in the questionnaire asked subjects to rate the vividness of each of the 
senses in the recall of each event on a five-point scale, where I meant not of all and 
5 meant as vivid as in real life. The results are shown in Tables 4.3.5.1.4.3.5.3. 
The vividness of sensory images was analysed in three ways. First, vividness was 
assessed by age of encoding. Next, differences in vividness across gender were 
explored. Finally, vividness by ae of subject was examined. 
A one factor within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the data for age of 
encoding differences in Table 4.3.5.1. The single factor was age encoding and the 
dependent variable was the overall mean rating of vividness of sensory imagery 
collapsed across sensations. There was a significant main effect of age of encoding 
F (1,7) = 4.03, MSe = 0.24, p<0.05. This indicates that, overall, vividness of 
sensory imagery increases with arge of encoding. 
! l11) 
7ühh' -1.3.5.1 IZulin, ýýti UJ'! iý iclnc. ý. c l)J', ti'ýýtcc, rt lýýýcr, crt' /it'. ýý, ýcOf l; ncv, clins, ý 
t 
As numbers of subjects are not the same in all encoding, age spans, scores are 
shown as means, i. e. the rating score for each sense within each age span divided 













SIGHT 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 
SOUND 1.2 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.2 
TOUCH I. 0 1.0 1.2 1.2 I.? 1.2 1.2 
SMELL 0.4 0.7 0.9 0,6 0.9 1.5 0.8 
TASTE (). l (). 1 0.4 0.2 0.0 11.2 0.2 
HEAT 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 
COLD I 11.4 0.2 1), 3 0.4 0,3 
PAIN 0.2 0.2 0.2 l). 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
O%crall Mcan 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 I. 3 I.: --- 
In general more recent memories are given higher vividness ratin`s by subjects. 
This effect is most marked for Sound and Smell. Very early memories <3 and 3-5 
are consistently rated as being, less vivid on these several dimensions than 
memories from subsequent childhood years. 
l/7 
7i: I'Ie 4.3.5.? Ratings Qf D r'icI, u. '. sc Of . St'nson' !i cig',: 1' 











Sight 3.94 4.31 0.41 
Sound 3.46 3.92 0.46 
Touch 3.46 3.49 0.03 
Smell 3.46 3.37 0.40 
Taste 2.71 3.82 1.11 
Heat 2.00 2.67 0.67 
Cold 2.53 3.64 1.11 
Pain 2.37 4.64 2.27 
3.50 3.97 0.47 
Table 4.3.5.2 shows that overall women consistently rate the vividness of sensory 
qualities in their memories higher than amen. When the data were collapsed across 
sensation type the gender effect was found to be significant, F(I, 11 )=6.48, NISe = 
2.608, p< 0.05. 
11. s 
'Icºh/c' 4.3.5.3 Rulings OJ' Ii viclncw. v. v()f S'en. vnri Iincigc'; yy 13ir Sººhjecl Age 
Subjects rated the vividness of each of the senses in. each recall on a five point 
scale, where I meant not at all, and 5 meant asrvivid as in real life. 









Sight 4.23 4.05 4.35 4.17 
Sound 3.17 3.98 3.89 4.24 
Touch 3.03 3.37 3.10 4.83 
Smell 3.31 4.86 3.36 3.52 
Pain 4.01 2.23 3.12 5.00 
Taste 3.31 3.53 3.48 5.00 
Heat 2.21 2.60 3.24 n/a 
Cold 2.30 1.83 3.91 3.00 
Overall Mean 3.52 3.78 3.92 4.21 
From Table 4.3.5.3. it will be seen that subject age has no consistent relationship 
with the vividness of imaged recall. A one factor within subjects ANOVA was 
carried out with the subject age as the single factor and overall mean rating; as the 
dependent variable. This confirmed that there was no effect of subject age, F<1. 
This accords with the earlier findin`, (Table 4.3.3.5) that clarity of memory is 
unaffected by increasing, a e. Thus, both Findings together confirm that imagery is 
unaffected by ageing. The sudden upsurge in Table 4.3.5.3 for Sound and Touch 
during the oldest decade is based on too small a sample to be statistically reliable. 
1191 
f 
Also, there does appear to be an unexplained peak in the imaging of Smell for 
people in their forties and thereafter, a steady decline. 
(o111j'Na1ive 
. 
Scot-es Befwee! / fnchle11CC' Am l I7 hbiexv 0f S. 'ns rv hnctýeiy 
Table 4.3.5.4 shows that the frequency with which particular senses are involved in 
the imaging of memories need have nothing to do with their vividness when they 
are involved. Pearson's correlation test confirmed that there was no significant 
relationship (r =0.69, df 6, n. s. ). 
In the case of Touch and Smell, the relationship between incidence and vividness is 
actually reversed. Touch is recalled more often than Smell, yet the vividness of 
Smell is slightly higher. A similar reversal occurs with Cold and Taste. Cold is 
imaged more often than Taste, yet Taste receives a more vivid rating. The most 
extreme reversal concerns Pain. Only about one in fifty memories includes Pain, yet 
when it is recalled, its vividness is equal third in rank order. 
l2O 
Kable 4.3.5.4 Incidence And ! ivic/nc'sc Of Senso, i Bitt g('fl' 




Sight 5.7 4.2 
Sound 3.5 3.7 
Touch 1.9 3.5 
Smell l. 2 3.7 
Heat 0.6 2.3 
Cold 0.5 3.1 
Taste 0.3 3.3 
Pain 0.3 3.5 
As. sc'. csii g Realism 
Question 8 in the questionnaire asks subjects to indicate the degree of realism in 
their specific memories (what Brown and Kulik call 'live quality' in their definition 
of flashbulb memories). Subjects were asked to choose between: 
a) It's like a play-back. I can see and re-experience it again; 
(maximal realism) 
b) I don't really remember it happening. But I remember that it happened. I 
know certain facts about this event; 
(not very realistic) 
C) With an effort I can reconstruct the event, building up the picture by 
drawing from what I know about it; 
(not at all realistic) 
d) A mixture of 2 or more of the above. 
Means of catergoric incidence are shown in Table 4.3.5.5. 
121 
I 
Out of the total 633 memories, 620 (981%ö) were described as: "It's like a play-back. 
I can see and re-experience it again. " This leaves little doubt that people Bold on 
to, and mentally relive, personally meaningful childhood memories as part of 
themselves in the past. However, subjects' assessments for Realism were not 
always consistent with their ratings for Clarity in response to question 2, where 
they were asked whether a memory was Vividly Clear, Fairly Clear or Clouded and 
Vague. Sixteen subjects who, in question 8, chose maximal Realism, described 
Clarity in question 2 as only Fairly Clear or Vague. 
Unstructured enquiry showed that subjects often differentiate in their own minds 
between what they regard as Clarity and Realism. It appears that Clarity may be 
equated with unclouded sharpness of visual imagery, while Realism represents a 
more holistic comparison between what was experienced at the event and what is 
being experienced at its recall. Thus, in a memory judged to have Realism, the 
feelings aroused at the time of the event are evoked by the memory. 
/: 2 
7uh1c4.3.5.5 , Sºrhjc'c/. c'rý. c. re. ý. rntc'ºN Of I? c'cºli. ýºtt 1ºº Ilc'cul/in, ýý ! 
'hilclhrýncl l: ý'c'uls Rº' 
Are Of !:; ºcocIi, ºg 
The table shows the proportion of the total niimber of memories supplied by each 













a) 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
b) 0.03 0.01 0.01 - 0.01 0.02 
C) 0.03 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.01 
d) - - - - - - 
The overwhelming preference across all encoding ages for "It's like a play-back. I 
can see and re-experience it again. " would not necessarily apply so strongly to 
other methods of autobiographical research. In free recall, it is to be expected that 
the most realistic should come to mind. Nonetheless, the Figures can leave no 
doubt that people regard some of their childhood memories as very realistic. 
Analysis by subject age and gender also showed no differences and, therefore, is 
not presented separately. 
Rc'ulis, » Of Recall 6i III, l. il/h' Or 
How essential is imaging for realism of recall'? The present study provides 3 
memories from 7 subjects in which subjects claimed there was total absence of 
sensory imaging. Yet, all but one, claimed maximal or fairly high realism of recall. 
123 
In other words, replying, to question 7, they said recall involved neither sight in the 
mind's eye, nor sound, smell, taste, touch, heat, cold or pain. But from the options 
offered in question 8, four insisted, even iahen challenged, on choosing: "It's like a 
play-back. I see and re-experience it agaim. " (Two of them volunteered an 
amendment, deleting the words, `1 see'. ) 
Three subjects opted for the middle grade of realism, and only one (possibly a case 
of traumatic amnesia) chose the lowest grade. Where subjects denied ima, ing they 
were asked what form, then, does the remembering, take? And "In a nutshell, what 
does this memory mean to you? " Their replies are quoted verbatim in Section 4.4 
and further examined in the final discussion. In most of these cases the memory 
retained affect and sematic properties but no sensory qualities. 
Imaging Without 7'he I seal &',, se 
in addition to the above 8 cases without um- sensory imaging, 10 other cases were 
provided by 10 subjects in which they claimed there was no visual imaging 
although various other senses were involved. 
Visual imaging is commonly rated as the most powerful contributor to recall. Yet 
in its absence, subjects' clarity ratings do not seem to have suffered as much as one 
might expect. Out of the 10 subjects, 2 chose the top rating option in question 2 
of the questionnaire, rating, the memory as Vivid and detailed; 6 chose Fairly clear; 
and only 2 chose Cloudy and vague. 
These findings sug est that, though sensory, and especially visual imaging usually 
plays a major role in determining recall, a memory can be real and vivid without 
1: 4 
imaging. The re-experiencing must then consist entirely of affect, coupled with 
historical knowledge of the event. 
t 
How commonly is this likely to occur? Within the present sample, the 8 cases with 
no sensory imaging represent only 1.3% of the memories examined. If one adds the 
cases of substantially limited sensory imaging, namely total lack of visual 
involvement, the share rises to 2.81o. But if, instead of counting the memories, one 
counts the people who recalled them, then one finds that out of our 109 subjects as 
many as 17, i. e. 15% or more than one in six people, occasionally recall with little 
or no sensory imaging. An ability to remember without imagery is even more 
evident in the study by Nigro and Neisser (198 3) where they found that out of 171 
memories, 29 had neither 'field' nor'observer' imaging. 
4.3.6 Afemoi-t' 1"or 77ºe ('oºNexl Of I xenl. c 
In order to investigate how far childhood memories retain the context in %vhich the 
remembered event occurred, subjects were asked whether they could remember 
what was happening, immediately before the event they recalled, and what 
happened immediately after. (Questions 9 and 10 in the questionnaire - Appendix 
A). The responses showed that recall of both 'before and 'alter' was very poor fier 
early childhood memories supporting the view that they are contextually isolated 
'islands' and these data were not analysed further. 
/:? 
4.3.7 Rc'Ie, ziion Of Eººrolio» ºul inlc'nWlt' Or"c'r üºººcc 
In questions 12 and 13 of the questionnaire rating by subjects was on a five point 
scale for each of the emotions remembered to have been felt at the time of each of 
the events recalled. A rating of 1 meant hardly at all and 5 meant as intensely as in 
real life. A rating of O was recorded if the emotion was not experienced at all. The 
same rating procedure was immediately repeated for what was felt about the event 
`now' at recall. These ratings are shown in Table 4.3.7.1. The ditlerence between 
the `then' and `now' totals were percenta`ed, and the mean percentage scores for 
rated emotions are shown in the tables that follow. The emotions tabulated are the 
12 with the highest incidence from within a list of 53 originally described by 
subjects (see Table 4.3.7.6). 
The hypothesis that the emotional component of memory is adaptive would predict 
the retention in memory of adaptively useful negative emotions, i. e. what to avoid. 
Yet one would also expect the passing of time generally to reduce the intensity of 
both positive and negative emotions felt about an event that is no longer directly 
relevant to the present situation. This, too, is adaptive, for we Would be ill 
equipped to deal with current needs if our emotional awareness were clogged by a 
possibly irrelevant past. Johnson, in her MEN model (1986) has pointed out that 
one function of the reflective system is to allow us to think about tigers without 
experiencing actual terror. 
The expectations of retention and the selectivity as to what is retained are both 
confirmed in Tables 4.3.7.2 and 4.3.7.3. Thus, the largest differences between 
ratings for 'at event' and 'at recall' are for Surprise, Anxiety and Excitement, all of 
which depend on the novelty of a situation or on uncertainty about the future. 
Hence, once the unknown future has become the familiar past, there is no rational 
126 
place for these particular emotions. It is, indeed. surprising that they should persist 
e 
at all at recall. (This anomaly is particularly evident in old age, as can be seen later 
in 4.3.7.4). 
The emotion of Happiness receives a slight increase in rating for 'now', with a 
corresponding decrease for Unhappiness. Scrutiny of relevant memories suggests 
this is often because something which at the time was an unhappy disaster (e. g. 
doing a wee where one shouldn't) becomes, in adult recall, a happily amusing 
incident within a generally nostalgic view of childhood. Rating differences 
between 'then' and 'now' are lowest for the negative emotions: Disappointnment, 
Fristration, Fear, Anger, Grief, Pain and Jealousy, but these received very low 
ratin`s. (Mean ratings are less than I where I= Hardly at all and 0= not 
experienced). 
Rating differences between 'then' and 'now' cannot be regarded as erosion over 
time as both ratings are being given at the same time, that is now. A correct 
interpretation of the information provided by subjects should, therefore, read: 
"Even after the passage of (in some cases) very many years, I can still remember 
how I felt about it when it happened, and I can still feel some echo of the feeling 
now when I remember it. " This is, of course, consistent with the adaptive view of 
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Kele, Nloll Qf I: molio, z. c 1' Eiwoding Age 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was carried out on the data shown in Table 
4.3.7.2. The first factor was encoding, age (2 levels; 0-8 and 9-18) The second 
factor was occasion (at event and at recall). The dependent variable was overall 
mean emotion rating. There was no significant eI' ect of encoding age. However, 
a reliable main effect of occasion was found, F(l, 12) =6 48, MISe =13.78, p< 
0.01. This shows that emotions were significantly stronger at the time of the 
event. There was no significant interaction olencodin;, age and occasion. 
/Y) 
7ihhlc' 4.3.7.3 , Subjects' 1(cNi/ýýº. c Of I: /11U/%r11! 1ýc'11 J3º' ' I: //c' cl%//, Lº, 4s, ýc' I'c'/'%rýcl. ý': 
0-849- IN 
(Scores are mean ratings on a scale of 0- 5) 
0-s 9-IS 
At Event At Recall At Event At Recall 
Happiness 2.0 2.1 22 2.3 
Excitcnicnt 2.1 0.8 2.4 I. 0 
Unhappiness 2.1 1.0 2.1 1.1 
Anxiety 2.1 O. 5 2.4 0.3 
Surprise 1.6 (l. 1 1.7 0.2 
Disappointment 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.7 
Frustration I. 0 O. ; 1.0 0.4 
Fear 1.1 0.2 1.1 0.1 
Anger 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Grief O. 3 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Pain 0.3 (). I ().: 0.0 
Jealousy 0, I 0.0 O. I 0,0 
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Retention Of 1; 'nmlivnv Rh Gender 
Table 4.3.7.3 suýests that when an event is remembered. men, on the whole. 
retain less of the emotions felt at the time of the event than women do On the 
other hand, women seeng to show a greater decline of intensity at recall for certain 
f 
ne`ative emotions, namely: Frustration, Anger and Grief, though the emotion of 
Jealousy is more strongly retained by women. However, the gender differences are 
small and were not analysed statistically. 
7crhle -1.3.7.3 . Sahjcýcls'ýI kýa, r IZcNirr ý OJ'I: ruc, liun. c / iýI, Rý (ýcýnclcýr 
T (As there are 53 males and 56 females, ratings are shown as means, i. e. the total 





















happiness Itl. 'º 12.1 1.2 1?. 6 1.11 1) 0.3 Male 1). ') 
Excitement I5.3 4.6 -1(1.7 13.7 6.? -7.4 Male 33 
Unhappiness 12.1 i. K -6.3 12.1 6.4 -; ; Male U. S 
Anxiety 13.4 I. 6 -1 1.3 12 ? 2 'º ". 4 Male 2.4 
Surprise 1(1.2 (1.7 9.3 1.3 -40 Male 1.5 
I)isa t villtIllen( 5.3 2.9 -2 
i 5, I 2 14 -23 
M ale 11? 
Frustration 5.8 2.0 -1.5 5.7 1.7 4.0 Female (1.2 
Fear rß. 7 (1.7 -6.0 0.4 1.5 -4. ') Male 1.1 
Anscr 4.3 2.4 -I. 'º 4.3 2.1 -2 2 Female (). 3 
Grief 1.3 0. '1 _(1,. { 2.14 1.8 -1.0 Female 0,6 
Pain 21 0.3 -1.8 1.5 0.4 -I. I Male 0.7 
Jealousv 1.1 (1.1 -1.0 (1.5 (1.2 . 0,1; Male (1.4 
Other (1.4 (). I -(), i (1.2 (1.2 (t. U Male -tl, l 
RelenliOn Of Enmlionul Inh'nsi! º' R º' Siib jc'ci f1, c'c' 
Table 4.3.7.4 lists results for the five emotions with the largest ditterences between 
'then' and 'now' ratings. Because sub-samples are small within the two upper 
decades of the ae ranke, results are collapsed into 20-year periods. 
/33 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was carried out in %rhich the first factor of 
subject age had 4 levels and the second factor: occasion, had 2 levels (at event and 
at recall). The dependent variable was the mean emotion ratings. There was no 
significant effect of subject arge, F<l, indicating, that the emotional intensity of 
memories is retained as people grow older. There was a significant effect of 
occasion, F(1,4) = 15.09, MSe = 1417.29, p<0.02. Mean emotion ratüigs fell 
lo from 8.7 at event to 2.2 at recall. A significant interaction was observed, F(3,5) _ 
4.635, MSe = 27.02, p<0.03, such that the loss of emotional intensity was less in 
the oldest group. 
Overall, the table shows that people tend to lose the intensity of their original 
feelings over the years, until they reach the age of 80 and over, Then, there appears 
to be a drop in the difference between `then' and `now' ratings. This may suggest 
that old people re-experience their recall of childhood events with greater realism, 
and so can recapture such feelings as Surprise and Anxiety, which had previously 
largely disappeared because both the event and its outcome were already familiar. 
However, the small number of subjects in this oldest group means that any 
interpretation must be speculative. 
The evidence lends support to what Salaman (1952) wrote quoting, various authors 
to the effect that childhood memories lie dormant durin the busy turmoil of lire's 
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Hcrly/ v Ancl (! iihapl>>" Lmolions Fell Al 1&'c'u// O/'(7ýi/c/hcicýcl , 1Ic'mo, ic. ti 
Previous research has tended to show a preponderance of hippy memories which 
has been dubbed 'the Pollyanna Principle' (Cohen 19%%). However, the answer to 
the question: "Do we mostly recall happy or unhappy nmenmories? " does not permit 
r 
a simple answer. An overall count may suggest n slight bias towards `happy' (sec 
Table 4.3.7.5). A Chisquare test showed that the relative incidence of happy and 
unhappy memories did not change significantly with age of encoding.. (X2 = 1.47, 
df 1, ms). However, the assessment of the happiness of autobiographical 
memories is complicated. A straight count measures only incidence and not 
intensity. It takes no stock of the impact of recalling, the event, i. e. its emotionality 
or personal meaning which may vary greatly between different people and different 
types of memory. For example a single memory of a sad death or suffering may 
well outweigh in emotional impact, several memories of jolly social occasions. 
Thus, incidence alone offers no valid measure of happiness or unhappiness. 
Nor is an assessment of affect at the time of the event necessarily true at recall. 
Reversals from unhappy at the time to happy now are not uncommon. To 
complicate matters further, nearly a third of all subjects reported mixed feelings of 
both joy and regret about different aspect of the same memory. 
However, Tables 4.3.7.6 -8 do provide an indication of the different types of 
emotion which were classed as happy or unhappy. It will he seen that under the 
broad umbrella of happy childhood nostalgia there is the cosy comfort of parental 
love and care and also the security of family togetherness. Not surprisingly, in a 
later table (4.3.12.2) it will be seen that such topics chiefly provide the happiness in 
memories encoded before a`, e 9. Egocentricity, which Pia(Yet noted as 
characteristic of early childhood, is evident in Table 4.3.7.7 which shows 'self= 
/±(, 
,C 
centred' topics to account for 20% of happy memories, while `other-centred' 
accounts for only 2%. 
Of 633 memories, 490 had Happy or Unhappy emotions associated with them. Of 
these 490,475 (97%) could be unambiguously classified as Happy (52%) or 
Unhappy (48%). Classification was by consensus between three independent 
judges who read the summarised version of each event, as previously approved by 
the subject after verbally providing the memory. 
Table 4.3.7.5 Happy Unhappy Mcºlcrnce 
. "ý 
Age Happy unhappy DifFerence 
0-8 60% 40% 20% more happy 
9- 13 540%ö 46% 8°, ö more happy 
/; 7 
"1': I k 4.3.7.6 Incidence Of Flu/y»- l hthup/'t' /: 'molions /'di Al Read/ 
f 
HAPPY No. UNHAPPY No. 
Nostalgia For childhood/youth 35 Resentment/an,, cr 211 
Family togetherness Anxicty 20 
Achievements 2R Fear of physical harne 18 
Amusing to recall 2? Embarrassment 17 
Happy excitement I Disappointment 17 
Thrill of novelty/adventure IS Frustration 15 
Love of parents 16 Sadness 15 
Peaceful contentment II Insecurity 13 
Pride/self satisfaction Itº Ski tue Itt 
Security 9 Rejection 1) 
Self-conlidcncc/independence 9 Concern for others 9 
Interesting to recall 4) Self-conscious concern 7 
Freedom Guilt 6 
Group enjoyment : Unhappy to remember 6 
Rclicf 5- Bewilderment 5 
Gratitude 4 Injustice 4 
Happy friendships 4 Fear of unknown 4 
Happy centre of attention 2 Shock 4 
Sex/romance 2 Sad parlina 3 
Happiness for others I Jcalousv 
Luck I Unpleasant duty 3 
Beauty of nalurc I Pain/discomfort z 
Fear of human discord 3 




Crowd phobia I 
Dislike of ritual l 
Hopelessness I 
Seeing disfgurenicnt, I 
Total 24S 227 
Note: This omits emotions not easily classified as Fiappy or Unhappy 
/3's 
luh/c' 4.3.7.7 I octal Al e a. c Of l1ulpl>>' 1: i»nlinmtc 
\` 
NOTE: There is probably considerable overlap betwr: en 'nostalgia' and 'family' 
centred categories. `Nostalgia for childhood' is unlikely to exclude a family 
context. 
,,;, or 24.9 
No. happy cmots. 
. \'o 7: I LGL I Nostalgia for childhood/youth 14 
Amusing to recall 2; 9 
Interesting to recall 9 4 
67 27 
1": 1.1 /rL Y (7: ". VTRAD 
Family togetherness 
Love of parents 16 6 
Cosy contentment 11 4 
Childhood security 9 4 
07 27 
SEL! ' ('EV7REI) 
Achievements 2S I 
Pride/self satisraction I 4 
Self-confidence/Independence 9 4 
Happy centre of attention 2 1 
Luck I - 
5tº 20 
'lT1: 1IE-VT (7:. ß'7R!? /_1 
Excited arousal Iý 
Thrill or novclty-/adventure I ýt 7 
37 IS 
*SC. I1'F. CE. V7RI'D 
Freedom ; 2 
Relief 
Enjoying beauty of nature 
II 4 
1'/: ERS (7:. ß'712/: l) 
Group cnjoymcnt ; 2 
Happy friendships 4 2 





07711iR. S ('/:: \ REI) 
Gratitudc 4 2 
Happiness for others 1 _ 
2 
TOTAL* 248 100% 
* This omits emotions not easily classified as Happy or Unhappy 
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7uhlc' 4.3.7.8 Focal Areas Uf u nhapp y I: nuulion. v 
III -- N 
"%o1227 
No. uiiha % cnmots. 
Rcscntmcnt/angcr 20 9 
Anxicty 20 9 
Fcar of physical harm 8 
Embarrassnunt 17 x 
Disappointment 17 8 
Sadness I; g 
Frustration 7 
Insecurity I; 6 
Shame 10 ; 
Rejection 9 4 
Seif-conscious concern 7 .1 Guilt G 3 
Unhappy to remember 6 
Bcii ildcnncnt 
Injustice suffered 4 2 
Fear of the unknown 4 2 
Shock 4 2 
Jealous} I 





11: 1.1! IL1C7:: \'7RED 
Fear of discord ; 
Sad parting I 
6 2 




Crowd phobia I _ 
2 
Sympathy/concern for others 9 4 
Dislike of ritual I _ 
Horror at disfgurcmcnt 
4 
TOTAL 227* ()()q to 
* This omits emotions not reliably classifiable happy / unhappy 
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I mulionul 1? 'versa And A lived l"'eIiii. v 
It is interesting to note that of the 633 memories. only 10 memories (I. SS'o) 
showed a reversal from happiness to Unhappiness between encoding and recall, 
whereas 81 (12.8%) showed a reversal from unhappiness to happiness. 
In addition, 55 memories (8.7%) included mixed feelings of both happiness and 
ýNb unhappiness. For example, one subject remembered being, happy to have won 2nd 
prize, but disappointed it was not Ist prize. It is therefore evident that 
categorisation of autobiographical memories into merely happy / unhappy could be 
simplistically misleading. 
4.3.4 1Fi"equucncy qf Recall Of (7hildhiovcl i%/c'morie. c 
Question 14 of the questionnaire asked how often the memory was recalled. 
Clearly, this is an important factor in the retention of childhood memories and in 
the maintenance of their quality. Table 4.3.8.1 shows frequency of recall for each 
Age of Encoding band. It is clear that the Encoding a; ge of a memory seems to 
play little or no part in detenninin;, the frequency of its recall. Considerable 
variation is likely to exist between different people and the frequency with which 
they recall memories of specific events. But in ; general, the figures suggest that 
some 4 out of 10 people will recall a particular memory once in every few years. 
Over 3 out of 10 people, once or twice a year. 2 out of 10 subjects say they 
recalled the event they remembered in this study less often than once in ten years, 
while fewer than 1 in 10 said they recalled it as often as once or twice a month. 
la_ 
7u1, le 4.3. R. I I'errc'nlagcs" Of Sub/'cis Ilepnrling /: itch 1.. 'n'/ Of Frcgnciwv l)f 
Recall /. O1" c'cac"h . -1 mac' (? f Encoding Band 
I 
A(le Of FncodinV 
Frequency <3 3-5 6-8 9- Il 12-14 15- IS 0- IS 
11=90 103 103 109 109 109 633 
Once or twice a 
month 
3.3 4.6 6.5 3.7 5.5 6.4 5.1 
Once or twice a 37.8 32.1 28.7 26.6 29.4 32.1 30.9 
year 
Once every few 40.0 47.2 46 3 44.0 44.0 43.1 44.2 
years . 
Less than once 
every ten years 
18.9 15.8 18.5 25.7 21.1 18.4 19.8 
These data were not analysed formally because it was clear that there was no 
consistent trend related to age of encoding. There was no significant difference 
between amen and women in frequency of recall. 
Frequency Of Recall ür , Suh jccl Age 
The trends evident in frequency of recall by subject al='C suggest a tendency to 
reminisce more frequently with advancing years. Recall of specific events "Once or 
twice a month" is seen to occur far more often after the age of 70 than it did in 
earlier years. Conversely, the less frequent recall "Once every few years" is seen to 
be more common before the a`e of 60. However, the smallness of the sub-samples 
at the extreme upper end of the age range does not permit statistically acceptable 
levels of confidence. 
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Table 4.3.4.2 Per"ceiilcages Of AIcmo»"ies Reccallecl Al I; cu"h Lei-el Of Rr'equuenic l' 
As J? eporlec/ Bj' , Sub jec1 In l=och I)c'c"cuk' Of Such jec l Age 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-09 711-79 80-89 90 E 
11=II n=7 n=311 n=23 n=18 n=15 n=3 n=2 
64 mcm 42 mcm 174 mcm 131 mcm 105 nlbm 87 mcm 17 mcm 12 mcm 
Once or 
Iwicc a 1.6% 4.8% 4.6% 3.8% 3.8% 10.4% 1 1.7`%% 8.311., 5.2% 
month 
Once or 
t111CC 8 45.3% 21.4% 30.1"/" 28.31110 34.3% 29.71/11, 41.2% I6.7% 31.1`No 
\'C11 r 
011ce 









4.3.9 Origins Of Alemoric'. c 
Wherever external reminders of childhood experiences occur, there is a danger that 
some aspect of the reminder will distort or replace the objective facts of the 
original event. This is especially likely to happen in memories from infancy, where 
adult recall is based on secondary sources such as photographs or family stories. 
For each recall, question 16 in the questionnaire checks whether the memory origin 
is entirely first hand or helped by any external reminders. 
Table 4.3.9.1. shows that people judge the origins of memories across all encoding 
age periods, from birth to 18, to be almost entirely first-hand, rather than 
influenced by any external reminders. For the youngest age span, encoded before 
age 3, there are a few instances where reminders were acknowledged to have 
assisted remembering. 
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7iºhlc' 4.3.9. ! Urigins (. )J', 1 feºººuric'. s Br-tt gr OJ' EE: nc ocliii , 
Key: a) entirely first-hand 
b) based on seeing photos, diaries, family talk, etc. 
c) a mixture of these 
To allow for differences of subject numbers in encoding age periods, results are 
expressed as percentages of the maximum possible incidence in each encoding age 
swan. 
<3 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 1-18 Totals 
n=90 n=108 n=108 n=109 n=109 n=109 
of ýo o /o o- io of ýo o .o o .o 
a) 92 92 95 97 98 97 95 
b) 2 3 1 4 1 1 2 
c) 8 4 4 5 2 2 4 
Note: Differences in scores between age periods are too small to be significant. 
it ! (! IJ )I Origins Rr Gelidel. 
Table 4.3.9.2 clearly shows that men and women do not differ. in attributing their 
childhood memories to first-hand experience or to other origins. The differences 
shown in the table are too small to be significant. 
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7ithle 4.3.9. E Rlcnturt Oridºin. c fit Gender 
Key: a) entirely first-hand 
Z! ýý) 
b) based on seeing photos, diaries, family talk, etc 
c) a mixture of these 





a) 94%. %% 96 ö 95o o 
b) 2°iä 2°/o 2% 
C) 3°A --l0 
-1°'ö 
expressed as percentages of the maximum possible incidence in each category. 
-1.3.9.3 Afenmrt' Oricins Bi Sid? jec1 Age 
It is clear from Table 4.31.9.3 that there is very little variation by subject arge. 
Overwhelmingly, almost all the subjects reported their memories were based on 
first-hand experiences. Differences are too small to be significant. 
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7c, hk . 1.3.9.3 AIemoi j, Ori, L'in. c Ix Subjc'c"/ Age 
Percentages of subjects in each a`, e band reporting different memory origins 
Key: a) entirely first-hand i 
b) based on seeing photos, diaries, family talk, etc 


























A) 98 95 95 94 95 92 100 100 96 
B) - 2 1 3 1 7 - - 2 
C) 3 7 6 4 5 1 - - 3 
4.3.10 7i pe. c Qf Cues Thggerii g Recall 
It is, perhaps, only to be expected that cues which trigger personal memories 
should be as diverse and personal as the memories they evoke. 
Each of the categories listed in Tables 4.3.10. I-2 represents not one thin;, but a 
vast ranke of possibilities under each categoric unmbrella. Nor are the categories 
mutually exclusive; usually several are simultaneously involved. Indeed, it would 
be rare for only one sense to be aware. From within the complex amalgam of input, 
it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to isolate a single factor or specific 
combination of factors that triggered a particular memory. (Was it really just a 
madeleine cake that triggered Proust's prodigious recall? ) 
For manageability cues categorised under four types: 
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Perceptual = sensory input: sight, hearing, snmell, taste, touch, heat, cold or pain. 
Action = something the subject or someone else does. 
Emotional = recognition of a particular feeling that belongs to the event. 
Verbal = arising from a `spoken' train of thought, either alone or in 
conversation with others. 
The four categories: Perceptual, Action, Emotional, Verbal have been collapsed 
from more extended answers offered by subjects in response to question 17 which 
asked: - 
What sort of things brin` this memory to your mind? 
Would it be something you see or hear? 
(If yes) Always the same one? 
Do other senses like smell, taste, touch, heat, cold, pain ever remind you of this 
event? 
Does any particular action remind you of it - something you do or someone else 
does? 
Does it come to mind with a particular kind of feeling which you recognise as 
belonging to this event? 
Or is it produced by a train of thought? 
The attempt has been to select the predominant category for each memory, though 
no precision is possible. Often, cueing involves doing, or seeing something done 
14S 
while hearing something at the same time. The verbal category also includes 
silently verbalising a train of thought, even though subjects may be unaware what 
brought the train of thought to mind. 
r 
Bearing in mind the probability that several cues act in combination, the high 
incidence for the `emotional' (feeling) category in Tables 4.3.10.1 -2 should not 
be interpreted as meaning a memory was solely, or even primarily, triggered by the 
re-experiencing of an emotion, though this could be. The response refers to the 
awareness of a particular feeling that was recognised as belonging to the event, and 
resuscitated by its recall. 
At the time of remembering, the particular feeling may well have been occasioned 
by some other environmental or mental conditions. Yet, without its presence, the 
effectiveness of other triggering factors, alone may not have reached the threshold 
needed for recall. As one subject (already quoted earlier) put it: "I can't think of 
that now - I'm not in the mood. " This subject was a woman, aged 56. The event, 
encoded at younger than age 3 concerned trying to totter unaided down a garden 
path to reach some flowers, and being caused needlessly to fall down because of 
her mother's scream of panic when she saw her. When her father picked her up she 
wept with rage and frustration. She reported both these emotions, as well as 
`unhappiness' as being felt `now, at recall' in answer to question 13. Indeed, the 
subject additionally volunteered: "I remember it so vividly because I can still feel 
my anger". When asked about the remaining emotions listed on the questionnaire 
(h-m), she brushed the question aside with "i can't think of that now - I'm not in 
the mood. " Clearly, it was `being in the mood', harbouring persistent anger at 
needless frustration, that enabled her to remember this specific tumble out of the 
many she must have experienced while learning to walk. 
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Of I; iýrnclüºLº Table 4.3.10.1 7j7)e of ('uc By Age 
`- `` 
<3 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-18 
Type n=90 n=108 n=11)3 n=109 n=109 n= 109 n=633 
% % o % 
Pcrccptual 84 83 83 90 ; tý ;t 85 
Action 24 25 39 45 39 34 
Emotional 77 8% 81 85 Rtº 83 84 
Vcrbal ?; 54 51 52 47 45 51 
Note: Columns do not add to 100% because more than one cue type is sometimes 
involved in a single nmenmory. n= number of memories in each encoding 
period. 
Table 4.3.10.1 shows that the perceptual category of cues predominates across all 
encoding age periods. The relatively high rating.: for "Emotion" in Tables 4.3.10.1 - 
2 may indicate the conscious presence of an emotional response to what is being 
perceived rather than a cuein`, factor in its own right. There is a noticeable 
7ý1ý 
increase in 'action' cueing after aý; e 5. 
The data in Table 4.3.10.1 were recoded and ranked so that percentages across 
age groups were treated as subjects. This allowed a Friedman test to be carried 
out to examine whether there was a greater incidence of one cue type over 
another. There was a significant etiect of cue type, Chisquare = 19.05, df = 3, 
p<0.01 with perceptual and emotional cues significantly more frequent than action 
or verbal cues at all encoding; ages. 
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Men and women do not differ significantly in the cue categories that respectively 
tri, `, er their childhood memories. 






























Perceptual 85 83 85 83 79 87 94 81 85 
Action 22 31 51 26 39 27 55 16 .4 
Emotional 87 97 90 84 79 80 `t 8 84 
Verbal 41 50 40 55 60 62 67 l7 -1ý1 
Note: n= number of memories in each decade. 
A Friedman test of the ranked data again showed a significant et 'ect of cue type, 
Chi square = 19.05, df = 3, p<0.01 showing that for subjects of all ages perceptual 
and emotional cues predominate. 
W) 
Table 4.3.10.2 shows that subject age does not change the rank order of cueing 
categories, except in the 40s decade. Here there is a marked reversal where 
`action' takes numerical precedence over `verbal'. One couldsurmise that in the 
40s decade there are likely to be active children in the fancily reminding adults or 
what they themselves did at that ae. Figures for 80 plus should be disre`arded as 
statistically unreliable due to the smallness of the sub-sample. Nevertheless, they 
do indicate consistency in the rank order of cue types. 
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1'c>>svna/ R lennicýýý. c Of il tcýmýýi icý. c 4.3.11 
This relates to the final question in the questionnaire. The subject, hiving been 
asked to analyse a reported memory into its various components, was here invited 
to summarise its holistic personal meaning. In order to ensure a manageable, nut- 
shell answer rather than an elaborated discourse, the question was phrased: 'IF you 
had to store this memory in a file, how would you label it? What does it mostly 
mean to you? " 
Responses were categorised by consensus between three independent judges. 57 
categories were identified. The fact that, with few exceptions, these are categories 
of affect lends support to the hypothesised inclusion of an adaptively necessary 
affect factor in autobiographical memories to enable and encourage us to learn 
from experience. Out of the total 633 memories examined, personal meaning was 
described in terns of emotion in 468 cases i. e. 77%. This su Bests that for most 
subjects 'emotion' and 'personal meaning' are inseparable, and synonymous. Some 
memories evoked more than one kind of emotion, hence the total number of 
examples in the 57 categories was 4()0. 
Personal meanings show many differences across encoding ade periods: birth to 8 
and 9 to 18. A rank order across the whole encoding, age spans, birth to 18, is 
given in Table 4.3.11.1. Table 4.3.1 1.2 shows there is no significant ditTerence 
between the number of categories evoked by childhood memories encoded before 
or after ade 9. But there is considerable difference in the incidence of some of the 
categories involved. Nostalgic recall of the caring warmth, the security, the 
parental love and the togetherness of family life is much more evident before the 
a`, e of 9. Conversely, but by a smaller margin, categories like personal 
achievements and emotions that involve self-awareness, such as pride, shame, 
/;; 
I 
embarrassment and frustration, as well as altruistic concern for others are more 
common after the age of 9. It is, perhaps, more than coincidental that `self- 
confidence/independence' peaks in the 6-S age group which often seems to mark a 
mental and physical dividing line between infancy and childhood. 
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7u/ile 4.3.11.1 Runk Order Of Personal Aleanings 
*. 
The Category Labels 
These aim to identify the essence of subjects'iverbatim statements concerning the 
personal meanings of memories encoded from birth to age 18. Whilst short labels 
cannot hope to describe complex feelings, they can perhaps sufficiently indicate the 
general nature of the personal meaning. 
Rank order No. % of 490 total' 
l Nostalgia for childhood/youth 35 7 
2 Cosy family togetherness ?1 6 
Achievements 28 6 
4 Amusement at rccall 23 5 
5 Resentment/anger 20 4 
5 Anxiety 20 4 
7 Happy excitement I) 4 
;i Thrill of novelty/adventure 18 4 
K Fear of physical harm 119 4 
10 Embarrassment 17 
10 Disappointment 17 ? 
12 Love of parents 16 
13 Frustration 15 ? 
13 Sadness IS 
l; Insecurity I? 
16 Peaceful contentment II 2 
17 Shame 1 tº 2 
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41 
17 Pride/self-satisfaction I (ý 2 
Iy Security q 2 
I Rejection 2 
19 Sclf-confidcncc/independence t 9 2 
y Sý mpathv/concern for others 9 2 
Q Interesting to recall 9 2 
24 Surprise 7 
24 Self-conscious concern 7 
26) Guilt 6 1 
26 School days feeling 6 
26 Unhappy to remember 6 
29 Bewilderment 
29 Freedom 
29 Group enjoyment 
29 Relief 
33 Injustice 4 
3: Fear of the unkno«n 4 
Gratitude 4 
Happy friendships 4 
33 Shock 4 
Sad parting 
:8 Jealousy 
g Unpleasant duties ? 
:g Pain/discomfort ? 
,8 Fear of human discord ? 
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;Y Boredom 
3$ Fighting back I 
d5 Sex/romance 2 - 
45 Happy centre of attention 2 - 
45 Loneliness 2 - 
4$ Happiness for others I - 
4$ Nausea I - 
48 Crowd phobia I - 
48 Luck I - 
48 Vivid dream I - 
48 Dislike of ritual I - 
48 Hopelessness I - 
48 Horror at seeing disfigurement I - 
48 Heightened a«arcness in crisis I - 
48 Beauty of nature I - 
TOTAL 4')O 
/57 
7crhle 4.3.11.2 Incick'ncc' Of Categories Qf l'c'rsoncrl A leaning l; rokc'cl ily 
Alemories l; »coclc'cl hi Age Ik'ricxlc (fiulc'r 8&9- IS 
I't__ __I _t_. k VI11y LitlegUl les iiiiou111IIIS; to -, -, o or morse or [ne muli are tinUWU) 









Thrill of novcltc/adv cnturc 
Fcar of physical harm 
Embarrassment 
Disappointment 







Concern for others 
Rejection 
Seif-confidence/independence 
Interesting to recall 
Security 
TOTALS 
Numbcr of Memories 
Wean no. of emotions pcr mcmorv 
20 15 35 
24 7 31 
i 2; 28 
8 15 23 
11 ') 20 
8 12 20 
7 12 19 
9 9 is 
12 G I18 
5 12 17 
5 12 17 
12 4 16 
6 9 15 
7 :1 1? 
9 4 1? 
6 5 II 
3 7 lO 
7 1n 
2 7 9) 
4 ? 9 
4 9 
j 4 9 
6 1 9 
182 199 381 
306 327 633 
1.6 8 1.04 cliffcrcncc 2. P'., 
1"1 
i 
Correlation tests between birth -8 and 9- 18 show an extremely low level of 
correlation (R = 0.07). In other words, the incidence of categories of personal 
meaning differ with age of encoding Table 4.3 11.2 shows that, whereas 6 of the 
top 10 are common to both encoding age periods, 3 of the top 4 (Family 
Togetherness, Nostalgia and Fear of Physical Harm) for the age group 0-8 do not 
appear in the top 10 for 9- 18, and the top category for age 9- 18 (Achievements) 
is not in the top 10 for 0-8. However, the top 10 for each of the arge spans does 
contain 6 common categories. 
/59 
4.4 Discussion: Study I 
This study yielded a detailed analysis of the nature of childhood memories. In 
accordance with the hypothesis that these memories would retain their vividness 
and their emotional impact in later life, the study examined the content of 633 
childhood memories and assessed the qualities of the memories in relation to 
subject age and to the age of which the memories were originally encoded. 
Two findings were unexpected in the light of previous research. First, is the fact 
that 90 out of 109 'ordinary' people (83%) could remember personal events before 
the age of 3. This contrasts with most earlier research which tended to regard 
memories before 36 months as unusual rather than normal (see, for example, 
Sheingold & Tenney, 1982). 
Opinions as to how early autobiographical memory starts in childhood have shifted 
substantially during recent years, in step with growing evidence of very early 
memories. Thus, years ago, Freud (1905), Waldfogel (1948), Klein (1972), 
Tulving (1972) all believed that there is little or no autobiographical memory 
retrievable frone younger than about 7 years old. In contrast, more recently Forbes 
(1988) reports evidence of episodic recall in a two-year old, and Fivush, Gray and 
Fronlhoff (1987) published "Two-year old's talk about the past. " However, unlike 
the memories reported in the present study, it is not known how long the early 
memories reported by Forbes, Fivush et al persist in later life. The present study 
shows they not only can, but very often do. The ability to remember, throughout 
one's life, the adaptively useful lessons learnt from early experience clearly has 
adaptive value. Hence, the retention of childhood memories into extreme old age 
provides evidence of a persistent adaptive function for childhood memories. 
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S 
Another unusual finding in Study I concerns imagery. Brewer (I986) describes 
autobiographical memory as "image based", and later (1988) he empirically 
showed a positive correlation between strength or ima`ing and veridicality. While 
the present study confirms the importance of imaging no relationship to veridicality 
was investigated. Subjects reported imaging 77% of their memories. Yet more 
than 1 in 6 subjects claimed even when challenged, sometimes to recall vividly with 
little or no imagingg. These subjects claimed `to re-experience' the event. 
In an effort to gain further understanding, they were asked: "In a nutshell, what 
does this memory mean to you? " Their replies are quoted verbatim, together with 
conjectured explanations. A noteworthy absence of imaging was also found by 
Nigro and Neisser (1983) when a substantial proportion of their subjects denied 
using either a 'field' or 'observer' imaging; in their recalls. 
//, / 
'I&ý-1: xlýcýricýnccýcl' 1; ý cýýrl. c tt illwul 1incit. 'iiiL. ' 
Iicocin. g 
TOPIC: Brilliant school results after coaching by two private tutors. 
PERSONAL MEANING: "Achievement". 
CONJECTURE: There is no one specific event for sensory 
imaging. The subject only claimed to remember 
1hul it happened Yet, after nearly 60 years, she 
still retained enough feeling, about her 
experience at age 14 to bring the memory to 
mind in free recall. 
n;. }: n}: nvý: n.. }... rv. }}}: ': L. v}\nv: i}: tin: v}:.:. ". ': : ": ^:?: r"}: r:!?: v'"v:: '?: }: }}}}:: ": ":: }: ZXI 
-xi 
TOPIC: A motorist, out of a side road, crashed into their car. 
PERSONAL MEANING: "Watch out for dangerous driving". 
CONJECTURE: No sensory recall of the actual crash, and very 
poor recall of immediately after, strongly 
suggests traumatic amnesia. However, recall 
Mai it happened is clearly strong, enough for the 
memory to have surfaced in unprompted free 
recall, and to evoke an echo of anxiety. 
16, 
death, was acquired ii several stakes, involving 
different people and surroundings. Within this 
composite diversity, specific sensory details 
would have been meanin`less, compared with 
the acute common denominator of sorrow. 
Consequently perhaps only the powerful feeling, 
was encoded, and not any environmental 
features. 
/(; 
--: -S. 'sez ::.:,.. S. age Encoding. 
fit 
TOPIC: Raue at Nanny for buying, him a twopenny Mars bar instead of the one- 
penny Milky Way he had sent her to buy with his six-pence pocket money. 
PERSONAL MEANING "People don't do as they're asked! " 
CONJECTURE: As common idiom so aptly puts it, he was 
`blinded with rage'. In other words, his attention 
was so absorbed by his feelings that awareness 
of the environment was greatly diminished. 
Environment was, indeed meaningless, since the 
emotional experience in no way depended upon 
it, and could have occurred anywhere. 
imaging; is necessarily particular to a specific 
image in the mind. Feelings can be, and usually 
are, more broadly based. So, when repetition 
generalises the memory of similar events, 
sensory imaging may decline, while feelings may 
even be cumulatively enhanced. 
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to you is holding back". 
CONJECTURE: This subject said: "I re-experience the feeling. I 
experience his crying, rather than hearing, 
sound". It could be that the most powerful of 
the imaging senses, namely vision, was simply 
not available for encoding. If lie could not see, 
but only hear his little friend, it is feasible that 
the stron feeling of distress evoked could 
dominate the entire encoding of the event. It 
evidently did, to the extent of masking recall of 




TOPIC: Sheltering with family in darkened air-raid basement. 
PERSONAL MEANING: "Excitement". I 
CONJECTURE: The sense of vision was denied by darkness. 
Again, as with the previous subject, the absence 
of the most powerful of the senses enabled 
strong feelings to eclipse the weakened ranke of 
sensory imaging,. 
discrete event that could be specifically imaged. 
As with subject 54, this is a case of 
remembering Thal it happened, without 
remembering the actual happening. 
In most of these examples, the absence of visual imagery can be explained because 
the memory is a generic one rather than a specific one. Nevertheless, such 
memories can still be rated highly for clarity and emotionality. 
, \, f- 
The topic areas we remember best (Section 4.3.2) appear to be those in which our 
personal interest and the intensity of what Neisser has called our 'private' feelings 
//41) 
were at their strongest at the time of the event and still evoke a powerful echo at 
recall. This is particularly apparent in early childhood memories, where cosy 
family togetherness is, not surprisingly, more meaningful than any events of global 
importance that may have been occurring at the time. Thus, for a child, the death 
of a much-loved family pet would be more memorable than the assassination of a 
President. At the other end of the age range, 80 plus, a similarly important role for 
self-involvement is mirrored in the predominance of Family as topic area of recall. 
In general, the topics that are reported most frequently are clearly related to the 
construction of a self-history and self-concept as suggested by Fitzgerald (1988). 
The findings in this Study regarding, topic areas are not readily comparable with 
those reported by other researchers. Research in this field has usually been 
concerned more with the distribution of memories across a subject's life-span than 
with the topic of recall. Studies have also often used highly untypical subject 
samples of college students or personnel, and have not stipulated specific encoding 
a`e periods. 
Subject a`e. both at encoding and at recall, has a marked influence on what is 
remembered. Recall of trivia is very much more frequent in the younger encoding 
years and there is a steep trend for this category to diminish in later childhood and 
adolescence. Family centred events are encoded twice more frequently between 
birth and 8 than between 9 and 18. It has been found by several researchers that 
old people tend to recall disproportionately more memories from childhood. For 
example McCormack (1979) using, a sample all aged over 72, found that more 
memories were recalled from the first quartile of encoding age than from any other. 
However, little attention has been paid to what sort of things are being recalled. 
The present study shows Schooling and Family Events are recalled more often by 
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women. Men recall more Childhood Adventures, and perhaps less predictably, 
more Trivia. Topic areas are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Most people rate their childhood memories as 'Vividly Clear'. Analysis shows a 
significant increase of vivid clarity related to encoding age, especially between the 
ages of 3 and 7. Overall, the later the period of childhood to %%hich the memory 
belongs, the more vividly clear it will be. This is most evident after the onset of 
puberty and teenage, which suggests there may be a new and more intense 
awareness of experience at that time. Most recall in the present study involved 
visual imaging irrespective of any other senses involved. Neither `ender nor 
subject age affects this visual predominance. Memories encoded before age 6 are 
more likely to be monochromatic and static than those encoded later. 
Of the other senses, the involvement of ones own voice shows a notable rise in 
step with encoding a e. It is surmised that this need not reflect any biological 
difference, but more likely relates to the growing importance of the spoken words 
in step with the development of linguistic skill and comprehension. 
% 
The recall of Heat, Cold and Pain showed very little gender differences. There 
were slight trends showing that women recalled Heat more than men, while men 
were more prone to remember Cold. The recall of Pain is also slightly higher for 
men, and one might conjecture that nature provides habituation to minimise painful 
memories of such female activities as childbirth and menstruation. Such an ability 
to forget pain would clearly benefit adults and not children, but if it is innate then 
its effect could well precede adulthood. Smell, while showing no gender 
difference, unaccountably increased its imaged contribution with a11 e. 
/ox 
Although subject age does not generally affect the incidence of senses involved in 
imaging, the imaging of one's own voice is considerably tower in the 30's decade 
and older than in the 20's. Two reasons, or a combination of both, could be 
surmised. Firstly, the elapse of far more time to forget the sound of one's own 
f 
childhood voice, and secondly the fact that the timbre of the voice may have 
changed more between childhood and 80 than between childhood and the 20's. It 
is also possible that the difference is due to the fact that the upper registers or 
sound which characterise children's voices become less audible with age, even in 
normal hearing. This, however, seems a doubtful cause, for it would show a 
positive correlation between imaging and physical correspondence which appears 
absent for all other senses. It is interesting that, although sensory acuity declines 
with a`e, this does not appear to affect the sensory quality (other than for own 
voice) in the ima`ery of early memories. This, of course, need not indicate a 
dissociation between perception and memory imaging,. The imagin concerned 
here is of perception as it was then, years ago, before ageing had impaired acuity. 
The indication is that sensory imagery depends on what was perceived at encoding, 
and is not affected subsequently by impairment of physical sensory organs. 
Rating by subjects shows there is a great difference in vividness between the 
different senses that are components of the memory image, and this does not vary 
with encoding age and subject age. Visual imagery in memories was rated about 
twice as vivid as any other kind of imagery. Overall, women rated sensory 
vividness in their memories significantly higher than men. Vividness ratings across 
encoding ages support the findings of such developmental researchers as Piaget 
(1973), Cook (1970). Pillemer and White (1989) and showed a correlation 
between age of encoding, and rated vividness with a discernible watershed at ages 
between 6 and 8, followed by one on a lesser scale at the onset of puberty. 
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A high level of vividness is, perhaps, only to be expected in free recall, for it would 
seem natural that the most vivid memories should come to mind. But results here 
show a positively overwhelming choice for maximum vividness rating. 
gC 
The 'island' nature or lack of contextual coherence of memories was measured by 
asking whether the subject could recall what was happening, immediately before 
and after the event described. Recall of before and aRer was poor at encoding 
ages below 5 and only improved slightly with age of encoding. These findings 
emphasise the selectivity of childhood memories which consist, for the most part, 
of isolated scenes that are not integrated into a narrative sequence of events. 
The retention of emotions over the time between an event and recall is far from 
equal among the various categories of emotion. Predictably, such emotions as 
Surprise, Anxiety and Fear which are closely tied to the original event should 
disappear once the unknown future has become the familiar past. In fact, they 
never do entirely vanish, and surprisingly, in old age the loss of emotionality was 
less. This suggests that in old age childhood memories are relived with greater 
realism than when, at younger ages, life obscures any focus on the past by present 
activities and cares in line with the views of Salaman (193? ). Most important for 
the hypotheses of this thesis was this finding, that, although memories do lose some 
of the emotionality of the original experience, the intensity of the emotion that is 
retained does not diminish across the life span. 
Althou`h not formally analysed there were trends suggesting.; that, as well as age, 
gender is seen to play a part in the differential retention of emotions. Women 
/7o 
appear to retain more of the emotions they originally felt than amen, particularly 
concerning memories before the a`, e of 3 and the emotion of Jealousy at any 
encoding age. On the other hand women forget feelings of Frustration, Fear and 
Grief faster than men. F 
Our belief in the independent, first-hand nature of our recall is almost absolute 
across all encoding a`es according to subjects' confidence levels in this study. 
Subjects strongly rejected the possibility that their memories were derived from 
1"b secondary sources, such as photographs. 
Statistical analysis shows that childhood memories are more frequently triggered 
by perceptual or emotional cues than by action or verbal cues. Usually the 
perceptual cues include something seen, heard, or both. The unlimited diversity of 
type of cue matches that of the memories which they trigger. Often the adult 
rememberer does not recognise the cue responsible for a particular recall. In the 
present study "I'm sure I don t know mhat made nie think of that, " was often 
spoken by subjects in some astonishment. Yet probably this should not be 
surprising. For, when one takes into account the high proportion of early 
childhood memories that adults class as Trivia, it follows that the appropriately 
associated cues might not be recognised. 
When questioned about personal meaning of a memory subjects almost invariably 
responded by describing the affective quality. The personal meanings of childhood 
memories reported by subjects show many differences between the encoding, age 
periods birth to 8 and 9 to 18. The list rank order is headed by 'Nostalgia' in one 
form or another. From the diversity of events recalled it is evident that 'Nostalgia' 
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depends less on what happened (often Trivia) than upon a ; generally warm feeling 
about lost childhood. 
To summnmarise, let us look again at three main areas; factors that are affected by 
r 
arge of encoding, by gender and by subject age. 
In contrast to earlier views of Childhood Amnesia which held that autobiographical 
memory does not start before age 4 or later. the present study found that 83% of 
the 109 subject sample could, without difficulty, recall and describe an event 
before the age of 3 when specifically invited to do so. Possible reasons for this 
difference are examined in the final discussion (Chapter 7). 
A factor greatly influenced by the age of encoding is the incidence of various topic 
areas recalled and the personal meanings and affective quality of the memories - 
what was and still is felt about the event. Here, the developmental progression 
from infancy to adolescence accords with the findings of Pia et and his followers. 
It spans a range from almost total physical egocentricity to semantic and social 
understanding of the world around us. Gender, too, influences the incidence of 
various topic areas of recall. Women tend to recall School, F{ome and Family 
events more than men, who, on the other hand, remember more Childhood 
Adventure and Trivia. Women also rate their memories as more vivid than nien 
do. 
Subject age at recall inevitably plays a major role in the choice of what is 
remembered and what is felt about it. If one accepts that at all ages a determinant 
of remembering is personal meaning, then it follows that the topic areas of 
memories recalled during early childhood will differ from those recalled in adult 
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years. The choice of topics to recall will change to fulfil the changed functions of 
remembering as people grow older. It fellows that the memories of a sample of 
subjects with a median age of 53 will differ from those of undergraduate students 
(e. g. Robinson, 1936). Such differences preclude comparisons. 
f 
In the present study an important finding is the small extent to which subject age, 
includin old age, affects the reported vividness of recall. It appears that 
deterioration of the sensory organs due to agein need not atiect the sensory 
vividness in the imagery of memories. Perhaps this should not be surprising for 
once the 'recording' is made it will not suffer if the microphone bets damaged. 
Subject age in relation to forgetting is investigated in Study 3 (Chapter 6). 
Several findings in this study appear to support the hypotheses stated in the 
introduction. Firstly, to enable autobiographical memory to serve its 
fundamentally adaptive purpose, an early start would seem desirable, as soon as 
possible after the prior need of learning the procedural control of motor activities 
has been met. By the age of around thirty months most children have acquired 
sufficient procedural skills to allow then, with adaptive advantage, to start 
remembering the favourable or unfavourable aspects of events. In other words, to 
move on from learning only motor skills to learning from event experience. The 
present study confirms the early start of autobiographical memories at before age 
3. 
Secondly, our ability to retain vividness and emotionality in the recall of 
remembered events again suggests adaptive value. A lesson once learnt from 
experience, usually stays to remind us for life. Today medicine and health care 




This survey has fulfilled the purpose of allowing, us to characterise the nature of 
childhood memories. It has shown the kind of topics that are remembered and 
highlighted the vividness of the memories; the predominance of visual imagery and 
the pervasive presence of an emotional component. Although these memories are 
usually detached from the context of occurrence, they nevertheless retain a high 
degree of realism. The hypothesis that childhood memories will include two 




CUED RECALL OF CHILDHOOD MEMORIES 
5.1 Introduction 
The rationale behind using cued recall as a methodology rests on the assumption 
that all memories are triggered by cues, even though often we are not aware what i 
the cue was that evoked a particular memory. By manipulating the type of cues, 
and noting the incidence, latency and characteristics of the response recalled, it is 
hoped to cast some light on the organisation of the memories in long; term store. 
When cued recall was devised by Galton towards the close of the last century, his 
initial method was randomly to scrutinise objects he encountered while walking, 
and mentally to examine what ideas they evoked. Later he used a list of seventy- 
five words to see what ideas they triggered. There is not really a great ditl'erencc in 
method, for all the objects he had seen had names, and could thus be regarded as 
`object words'. In today's adaptations of cued recall the aim is very similar. But 
instead of 'what kind of ideas', enquiry is usually directed to `what kind of 
memories' in response to categorised word cues. 
Today, cued recall is still widely used, following the adaptation and use of Galton's 
paradigm by Crovitz and Schif iann (1974). A suitable choice of cue word types 
has enabled the exploration of different aspects of nmenmory. 
For example, Conway and Bekerian (1987) used cued recall to explore what 
determines the vividness in flashbulb memories. They found that qualitative 
characteristics recognised at the time of event, such as consequentiality, personal 
importance, surprise and emotional impact determine vividness at recall. Vividness 
is thus entirely decided at encoding (the encoding view, Brown and Kulik, 1977). 
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In contrast. Rubin and Kozin (1984), also using cued recall, concluded that 
Personal Importance. i. e. the degree to which an event is felt to be relevant to the 
'self, is so paramount that the presence of other qualitative characteristics is or 
relatively minor importance. Pillemer (1984), also using cued recall, found that 
Cr 
emotional involvement was the most reliable predictor of tlashbulb vividness. 
The present study uses the experimental method of cued recall to amplify the 
findings in Chapter 4, where numerous differences between early childhood 
memories and later memories emerged from the analysis. Qualitative and 
quantitative differences were found in relation to age of encoding, and there was 
also evidence that emotion is an important component. Because the experimental 
method of cued recall is more rigorous than the structured free recall used in Study 
1, it is being applied here primarily to test whether age of encoding and 
emotionality affect the accessibility of memories as measured by retrieval time. 
Previous studies by the present writer (unpublished) and by other researchers, inter 
alia Robinson (1976) and Conway (1989) have already established that emotion 
cue words produce slower retrieval than object or action words. In consequence 
of the above prior knowledge it was predicted that retrieval would be faster for 
object words, but, in the light of findings in Chapter 4, emotions would be seen to 
relate to many of the memories produced, irrespective of the type of cue prompt. 
It was also predicted that the effects of cue type would vary with the age of 
encoding. This prediction arises from the findings that the emotional content of 





. S. 7 
15 men and 15 women, with no psychological training or special interest took part 
r 
in the study. They were all aged 39 to 60. and had a mean age of 43.3 years. 
5.2.2 Design 
The experimental design used is 2x2, related. The two independent variables were 
type of cue and age of encoding. Cue type was of two kinds: (1) emotion words 
and (2) object words. Age of encoding had two levels : birth to 8 and 10 to 18 
(age 9 was omitted to show a clear break). 
The effectiveness of the cue words was measured in relation to prompting 
memories within each of the two encoding age periods. The dimensions measured 
were drawn from those investigated in Study I (Chapter 4) in relation to ages of 
encoding. They were: 
1, Incidence of recall 
2. Response time 
3. Detail (Who? Where? When? ) 
4. Vividness 
5. Personal importance at the time of the event 
6. Frequency of recall 
7. Unusualness of the event at the time 
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8. Emotionality of the event at the time 
5.2.3 AIlcrlel"iulc 
32 small, identical cards were used. 16 bore an emotion word cue (3 happy and 8 
unhappy), and 16 had object word cues. 
List of cue words: Appendix B 
Instructions to subjects: Appendix C 
Questionnaire: Appendix D 
5.2.4 Pr(weCIIire 
Subjects were seated comfortably with a small tray beside them on which 8 cards 
were spread out face downwards. They were told this research concerned the 
tri`gering of early memories, and that each card on the tray had a word printed on 
its face side which might or might not trigger a memory for them within the 
(defined) age period 0-8 years or 10 - l8 years. It was explained they would be 
asked to pick up a card at random and read the word aloud, at which point a stop- 
watch would be started, Speed of recall would be measured. Immediately a 
memory in the appropriate age period came to mind, they should say "Yes", and 
the triggering time would be noted. If no memory cane to mind within 30 seconds 
they would be asked to pick up another card. 
They were then given a blank questionnaire and a run-through of the questions. It 
was explained that the description of the event could be very brief, just enough to 
establish it as an event that involved active or passive participation on their part. 
The mere imaging of a scene or an object, however vividly, would not serve as an 
event for our purpose. 
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Subjects were asked to take special care to include only what they actually 
remember, and not what today they know was, or must have been the case. Thus, 
"Who was there? " should include only those whose presence they really do recall 
as part of the event. "Where? " should evoke specific imagery and not just historical 
knowledge. "When? " should concern actual awareness of a time dimension as part 
of the event, that is awareness of the time of day, of a special day etc., not just a 
calculated year date or their age. 
6 
Regarding the rating, scale for importance, unusualness and emotionality of the 
event, it was stressed that the rating should reflect "at the time it happened" and 
not now. Subjects were reminded during their interviews to be sure and observe 
the above criteria. For the sake of speed and legibility, all questionnaires were 
filled in on behalf of the subjects from their spoken answers. 
To safeguard against the possibility that some cue words might be inherently better 
or worse than others at trig`ering memories, the sets of 16 emotion cue words and 
16 object cue words were each sub-divided into 2 sets of 8. The resulting, 4 sets 
were exposed in rotation across the encoding a`, e periods. Individual cue words 
within each set were exposed in random order. 
To counteract possible learning and/or fatigue bias, 15 subjects were asked to 
recall memories from the 10-18 encoding age group first, and the other 15 subjects 
started with the 0-8 age group. The cue words and the order of presentation are 





Wherever comparative performance is shown as a percentage difference (e. g. A is 
x% lar(yer/smaller, faster/slower than B) the usual convention is consistently 
followed of treating B as the base figure and calculating A-Bx 100. 
B 
lxl 
5.3.1 Incidence Of Recall 
ßv cite hpe: There was virtually no difference in the incidence of recall triggered 
by emotion and object cue words (70.00; and 70.8 % respectively). 
Rv encoding qze: The 10-18 encoding, ae period produced 5.6°0 more memories 
than the 0-8 group (347 and 329). 
Failure to recall an event within the 30 sec. time limit occurred 13.5°'o more often 
in the 0-8 encoding age group than in that of 10-18 (151 and 133). A two way 
ANOVA, related design, with Cue Type and Encoding, Alge as variables yielded no 
significant effects, F> I for both variables. 
"fahle 5.3.1. I Alcýmcýricýs IZcýccrllcýcl ýt ilhin 3fl , ti. ýrrýnclc 
Emotion Object Both 
0-8 163 166 2Q 
(max 240) (max 240) (max 480) 
10 - 13 171 174 X47 
(max 240) (max 240) (max 480) 
Both 3 36 340 
(tnax 480) (max 480) 
Is 
5.3.2 Latency Of Recall (1 hlucljiý. c/ccl) 
Response time, i. e. time in secs. between exposure to cue word and triggering of 
memory are shown in Table 5.3.2.1. 
{ 
Object cue words prompted recall 31.2% faster than emotion cue words (9.5 and 
13,8 secs. means). 
Memories from the 0-8 encoding age group were prompted 9.3° ö faster than those 
from the 10-18 group (1 1.0 and 12.2 secs means). 
This suggests that across encoding, age periods the speed of response and incidence 
of recall are unrelated, since the slower 10-18 encoding age period produced 5.6% 
more memories than the faster 0-8 group (see Incidence table). 
A2x2 within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the latency data. The first 
factor was cue type which had two levels: emotion and object. The second factor 
was age of encoding which had two levels: at 0-9 and 10-18. The dependent 
variable was reaction time. A reliable effect of emotion/object was observed, 
F(1,29) = 45.702, h1Se = 1.085, p<0.01. Mean reaction times were 13.8 seconds 
for emotion and 9.5 seconds for object cues. This shows that memories were 
retrieved faster for object cues. A reliable main effect of encoding period was also 
observed, F(1,29) = 4.645. MSe = 0.08, p<0.05. Mean reaction times for the 0-9 
age group were 11.0 seconds and 12.2 seconds for the 10-18 age group. This 




Mean time in seconds bct ccn exposure to cue %%ord 
and triggering of memory 
Age at b Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 13.5 8,6 4.9 
I0-IS 14.2 10.3 3.9 
Both agc periods 13. ßi 9.5 4.3 
l. 14 
5.3.2a Acljn. cled Lcitenct, Sýcric. c 
Adjusted scores include 30 secs. unproductive search time for each failure to 
produce a memory within the 30 sec. time limit. Thus, adjusted figures take 
account of the varying incidence of recall or failure within the two conditions. 
Without such adjustment, a condition that produced 7 out of 8 failures and only I 
memory, albeit rapidly tri`gered, would appear superior to one that produced 8 
out of 8 memories, though triggered, on average, a little slower. Adjusted scores 
are shown in Table 5.3.2a. 1. 
Bi' CI( ! ºpe 
Despite the `flattening' effect of the adjustment. object word cues are still seen to 
trigger recall 17.1°0 faster than emotion words cues (unadjusted 3 1.2"o). 
B)' encoding cage 
A two-way related analysis of variance (cue type x age period) - see Appendix G- 
was carried out on the adjusted response times. The efFect of cue type was 
significant (F = 23.28, df 1,29, p<. 001) showing. that memories were retrieved 
faster and more efficiently for object clues than for emotion cues. There was no 
effect of age period (F<1) and no interaction between cue type and age period. 
Is5 
7 ible 5.3.2a. / Acljiisled Alean Latency Of ! tear// 
Mean adjusted time in seconds between exposure to cue word 
and trig. zerin`g of memory 
Age at Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 19.8 15.2 :. 6 
10-18 18.6 15.7 2.9 




5.3.3 Rk,,, oo, 1)elui/ - Who Ulm 7Mere 
Table 5.3.3.1 shows that there was no significant difference in recall of information 
about 'Who' between cue types or a`, e periods. 
J 
Almost all recall included rememberin who, besides the subject, was crucially 
present at the event, though there was sometimes uncertainty as to who else might 
have been there. 
ý, N 
able-5.3.3.1 Who 6l (7s Mere? 
Percentage of subjects remembering, who was present at the event 
Arge at Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Both cue types 
0-8 98.8% 97.0";, u7 Q% 
10-18 98.8% P9.4% yý) Iýiö 
Both age periods 98.8% 
t\ 
IX7 
Where Was Mis? 
Almost all recall included remembering the general location of the event. e. g. "at 
my grandmother's house". 
Sometimes location and imagery were much more precise, e g. "sitting, at the 
scrubbed table in our kitchen". However, the questionnaire does not provide for 
qualitative distinctions, so any definite recall of general location was rated as 
positive. As Table 5.3.3.2 shows there were no si-gniticant effects of cue. type or 
a; ge of encoding. 
Table 5.3.3.2 Where Wt üc 77iis? 
Percentage of subjects remembering general location of event 
Age at Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Both cue types 
0-8 98.8% 98.2% yY. 51; ö 
10-18 100.0% 100.0111) 100.0 it 
Both age periods 99.4%'% 99.1 ", ý ý)9.: "".. 
. -ý 
ISS 
IVlºc'n Was i7ºis? 
Table 5.3.3.3 shows the percentage of subjects who were able to report when the 
memory occurred, time of day, specific day, etc. 
B1' ciic' /)/)e 
I 
Recall of "when" was 11.7% ö higher in memories tri ... ered by emotion word cues 
than by object words (71.4 "'o as against 59.7%). 
131, encodiiig age 
Memories encoded in the 10-I3 age group included 34.7°%ö more 'when recall 
than those encoded before a`e 9 (74.90,0 as against 55.6%) 
7uhle 5.3.3.3 When 6iüs 7hi. s? 
Percentage of subjects remembering hen event occurred 
Age at Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 6I. 4% I I. 4% 
10-18 80.9% 6ß). 0", ö 
Both an periods 71.2" 
Differences in age of encoding and in cue type were significant by Z tests (p < 
0.05). 
/, N9 
5.3.4 Alemm ' Ili iclnc', ts 
Vividness was rated on a5 point scale, where I meant not at all and 5 meant 
extremely. Ratings are shown in Table 53.4.1. No reliable differences were 
observed. r r 
Table 3.3.4.1 [n iclncý. c. c JZulin, ýý 
Mean rating, of vividness by subjects (out of 5). 
Age at b Type of cue words 
encoding, Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 3.67 3.66 O. () I 
10-18 :. 71 :. 7; i 0.07 
Both age periods 3.69 3.72 0. O3 
1 90 
5.3.5 AIe ioi y 1i, / of-AnIc' 
Memory importance to self at the time of the event was rated on a 1-5 scale, Where 
I meant not at all and 5 meant extremely. The ratings are shown in Table S. º. 5. I. 
Events recalled via emotion cue words had 16.2% higher "importance" rating than 
those prompted by object words. 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the data on personal 
importance of memories. The first factor was cue type which had two. levels: 
Nh emotion and object. The second factor was age of encoding which had two levels: 
at 0-8 and 10-18. The dependent variable was mean personal importance scores. 
A reliable effect of emotion/object was observed. F(1,29) = 62.838, MSc =9.83, 
p<0.01. Mean personal importance ratings were 4.03 for emotion and 3.16 for 
object. This shows that memories retrieved to emotion cues are significantly more 
personally important than memories retrieved to object cues. No main effect of 
a`e of encoding period was observed, F<I. No interaction was observed, F<3. 
These findings show that early childhood and later childhood memories do not 
differ in importance. 
\ý\ 
1')! 
7cºhle 5.3.5.1 Iinporlunre RcNin r 
Mean rating of importance to self at the time by subjects (out of S). 
Age at Age Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 3.92 3.41 0.4W 
10-18 4.12 3.49 0.63 
Both age periods 4.02 3.46 0.56 
\, 
IV: 
5.3.6 h-eq»enc"v (f Recall 
Frequency of recall was rated on a 1-5 scale here almost never =I and very often 
= S. The ratings are shown in Table 5.3.6.1. 
I 
Frequency of recall was rated 10.0° o higher [oor memories triggered by emotion cue 
words than for those tri`gered by object words. 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the data on frequency 
of recall. The first factor was cue type which had two levels: emotion and object. 
The second factor was age of encoding, which had two levels: at 0-8 and 10-I8. 
The dependent variable was mean frequency scores. A reliable effect of 
emotion/object was observed, F(1 29) = 9.006, MSe = 1,21, p<0.01. Mean 
frequency ratings were 2.10 for emotion and 1.91 for object. This shows that 
memories retrieved to emotion cues were rated as more frequently recalled. No 
main effect of encoding period was observed, F<I. No interaction was observed, 
F<3. These findings show that memories from early childhood and from later 
childhood did not differ in frequency of recall. 
buhle 5.3.6.1 Fregziefncr l)f IZc'caII 
Mean rating of frequency of recall by subjects (out of 5). 
Age at b Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 2.01 1.91 
10-18 2.1.9 1.91 0.27 
Both age periods 2.10 1.91 (). I () 
/9; 
5.3. S I; nrolionalii 
Emotionality, i. e. how emotionally arousing was the event at the time was rated on 
1-5 scale, where I meant not at all and 5 meant extremely 
Events recalled via emotion cue words were rated 21.8% more emotionally 
arousing at the time of occurrence than those triggered by object cue words. 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the data on 
emotionality. The first factor was cue type . vhich had two levels: emotion and 
object. The second factor was arge of encoding which had two levels: at 0-8 and 
10-18. The dependent variable was mean emotion scores. A reliable effect of 
emotion/object was observed. F(1 29) = 54.848, MSe = 17.272, p<0.01. Mean 
emotion ratings were 3.97 for emotion and 3.25 for object. This shows that 
memories retrieved to emotion words were rated more emotional. No main effect 
of encoding period was observed, F<1. No interaction was observed, F<2.5. 
These findings show there was no difference in the emotionality of memories 
retrieved from the 0-8 period and the 10- 18 period. 
7cºhle 5.3.8.1 EººnºlimºcºIi/t 
Mean rating of hon cmotionally arousing event as at the time by subjects (out of 5) 
Age at Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 3.88 3. ;4 0.54 
10-18 4.06 :. IQ 0.87 
Both age periods ?. 97 ±. 26 0.71 
The data from all the dependent measures is summarised in Table 5.3.9.1. 
! 9j 
5.3.7 How (Jinnsu l Min It) 
(Unusualness at the time of the event was rated on a I-5 scale: 'Often happened' 
scored I and 'First time' scored 5. Whether the evu t was unique is not known). 
r 
Events recalled via emotional cue words were rated 9.7o more unusual at the time 
than those triggered by object cue words. 
Events encoded between the ages of 10-18 were rated 3.0°%o more unusual at the 
time of occurrence than those encoded in the 0-8 period. 
Table 5.3-7.1 Nor (1nusual Was 10 
Rican rating of unusualness at the time by subjects (out of 5) 
Age at e 
Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 4.21 :. 87 0.34 
I0-I4 4.37 3.994 0.431 
Both agc periods 4.29 3.91 0.1 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the data on 
unusualness. The first factor was cue type which had two levels: emotion and 
object. The second factor was age of encoding. which had two levels: at 0-8 and 
10-13. The dependent variable was mean unusual scores. A reliable effect of 
emotion/object was observed, F(I 29) = 16.031, h1Se = 5.199, p<0.01 Mean 
unusual ratings were 4.29 for emotion and 3.91 for object. This shows that 
memories retrieved to emotion cues were rated as more unusual. No main effect of 
encoding period was observed , 
F<I 
. 
No interaction was observed, F<3 These 
findings show that memories from early and later childhood did not differ in 
unusualness. 
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5.3.8 I moiionaliir" 
Emotionality, i. e. how emotionally arousing was the event at the time was rated on 
1-5 scale, where l meant not at all and 5 meant extremely 
Events recalled via emotion cue words were rated 21.81ö more emotionally 
arousing at the time of occurrence than those triggered by object cue words. 
A two factor within subjects ANOVA was used to examine the data on 
emotionality The first factor was cue type which had two levels: emotion and 
object. The second factor was age of encoding which had two levels: at 0-8 and 
10-13. The dependent variable was mean emotion scores. A reliable effect of 
emotion/object was observed. F(1.29) = 54.848, NISe = 17.272, p<0.0 1. Mean 
emotion ratings were 3.97 for emotion and 3.25 for object. This shows that 
memories retrieved to emotion words were rated more emotional. No main elect 
of encoding period was observed, F<1. No interaction was observed, F<2.5. 
These findings show there was no difference in the emotionality of memories 
retrieved from the 0-8 period and the 10- 13 period. 
7cthle 5.3.8.1 F, molionc, li/i' 
Mean rating of how emotionally arousing event as at the time by subjects (out of 5) 
Ave at L. 
Type of cue words 
encoding Emotion Object Difference 
0-8 :. 88 3.34 0.54 
10-18 4.06 3.11) 0.87 
Both age periods ?. 97 ±. 26 0.71 
The data from all the dependent measures is summarised in Table 5.3.9.1. 
j9,; 
5.3.9 Summary Of Results 
74hlc' 5.3.9.1 
Total % or mean 
0-8 Emotion cues. 
Total "/º 0 1- in call 
0-8 Oh, jcct cuts 
Recalls (max. 240) Ifs: 67 ')"t, 166 69.2% 
Failures to rccall 77 X2.1"ft 74 0.3% 
Prompt timc in sccs. 2200.8 13.5 1423.1) 8.6 
Prompt time + 30 secs per failure 4510.8 I3.3 3645.0 15.2 
Who was Mac? 161 ß)3.8 i1 161 97.01c, 
Where was this? 161 9114.811%1 1611 98.2% 
Wllcll was this? I01) 61.4% i? 50.0 % 
Vividness (1-5 scale) 598. 3.07 607 3.66 
Illlportlncc (1-5 scale) 619 3.92 569 3 43 
Frequency of recall (1-5 scale) ? 23 2.01 317 1.91 
Unusualness (I-S scale) 636 421 641 3.87 
Emotionality (I-5 scale) 632 3.83 554 3.34 
10-18 Emotion cues 10-18 O bject cues 
Recalls (max. 240) 173 72.1% 174 72.5% 
Failures to recall 67 27.9"%n 66 27.5% 
Prompt time in secs. 2443.4 14.2 1795.6 10.3 
Prompt line + 30 secs per failure 4458.4 18.6 X775.6 15.7 
Who was there? 171 98.811/1, 173 99.4% 
Whcrc aas this? 173 100.0"o 174 100.0% 
When was this? 140 30.9% 120 69.9% 
Vi% idncss (1-5 scale) 041 3.71 657 3.78 
Importance (1-5 scale) 71% 4.12 608 3.49 
Frequency of recall (1-5 scale) 377 2.16 . 313 2 1.91 
Unusualness (1-5 scale) 756 4.37 686 3.94 
Emotionality (1-5 scale) 702 4.00 555 3.19 
To summarise these findings, this study has shown that object cued memories 
come to mind faster, but emotion cued memories are more important, more 
unusual, more emotional and more frequently recalled. 
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5.3.10 l orrelcalinn Of le,, w, v Allribt tes 
Kuhle . 5.3.10.1(on elculio,, s 
OjA lcI, zr VV Ai1rihnlcs 
Vivid. Import. Freq. Unii i a1. Emotion. 
Vividncss 1.00 - - - - 
Importancc (). 29** 1.00 - - - 
Rccall Frcqucncy 0.47** (). 3 1 ** 1.01) - - 
Unusualncss 0.05 O. 28** 0.07 1.00 - 
Emotionality O. 26** 0.71 0.26** (). "9** I. O 
Key: **Signifiicant at 0.01. 
NOTE: There are no correlations significant at 0.05 that are not also significant at 
0.01. With 675 observations, Pearson correlation critical values for one-tailed test 
are: for p<0.05,0.1638 and for p<0.01,0.2301. Table 5.3.10.1 shows Pearson 
positive correlations, all at significance level of p<0.01 between-. 
Importance and Vividness 
Recall Frequency and Vividness and Importance 
Unusualness and Importance 
Emotionality and Vividness, Importance, Frequency of Recall and Unusualness 
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5.3.11 Alemor v "Th1'ics 
The categoric labels in Table 5.1.11.1 were initially generated by concennsus among 
three independent judges after scrutiny of the 633 free recall memories in Study I, 
They were found, by the same judges, to accommodate all of the 676 memories 
evoked by cued recall in Study 2. The ranked incidence of ditterent memory topics 
is shown in Table 5.3.11.1 and similar data obtained from free recall in Study I is 
also listed for comparison. 
'ý",, ý 
7cthte 3.3.11.1 Afemoiy 7vt)ics: ('itect Recall (oinliol-ecl 11 i! h 1"i"ee Recall (Sllnlº. 
I) 
I I CUED RECALL II FREE RECALL 
1. School I. School 
2. Trivia 2. Trivia 
3. Family & family occasions 3. Illness, injury, hospital 
4. Achievement, exams, prizes, 4. Family & family occasions 
etc. 
5. Holidays 5. Adventure (deliberately sought) 
6. War and/National Service 6. War and/National Service 
7. Adventure (deliberately 7. Achievement, exams, prizes, etc. 
sought) 
7. Catastrophies, fires, 8. Holidays 
accidents 
9. Births, deaths, marriages S. Births, deaths, marriages 
9. Pets 10. Work, jobs, careers 
11. Friends & social occasions 11. Sport 
12. Birthdays, anniversaries, etc. 12. Friends & social occasions 
13. Illness, injury, hospitals 13. Love, romance, sex 
13. Sport 14. Spectacles, theatre, cinema, etc. 
15. Home, moving, furnishing, 15. Home, moving, furnishing, etc. 
etc. 
16. Love, romance, sex 16. Religious events, confirmations 
/9s 
16. Spectacles, theatre, cinema, 
etc. 
18. Work, jobs, careers 
18. Religious events, 
confirmations 
20. - 
17. Catastrophies, fires, accidents 
17. Pets 
19. Birthdays, anniversaries, etc. 
20. V. I. P. s meeting famous people 
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5.4 Discussion Study 2 
Results in this study of cued recall showed that: 
1. The incidence of memories evoked did not vary with age of encoding, or 
by cue type. 
2. The latency of recall was significantly faster for object words cues than 
for emotion words. This accords with the findings of other researchers, 
inter alia Robinson (1975) and Conway (195()). Latency was also faster 
for memories encoded between birth and 8 than for those encoded 
between 10 and 18. 
3. Adjusted scores ( which add 30 seconds unproductive search time when 
no memory was evoked) favoured object word cues, but showed no effect 
related to age of encoding. 
4. There was no significant difference in the recall of Who? or Where? 
between cue type or encoding age, but When? responded better to 
emotion cues. 
5. Vividness of memories was unaffected by age of encoding or by type of 
cue. 
6. Events recalled by emotion cue words were rated as more important than 
those in response to object words. Encoding age did not affect rated 
importance. 
00 
7. Memories cued by emotion words were more Frequently recalled. 
Frequency of recall was unaffected by apse of encoding. 
i 
8. Emotion cued memories were rated as more unusual. Unusualness rating 
was unaffected by age of encoding. 
9. Events recalled by emotion cue words were rated as more emotional at 
the time of the event. Emotionality was unaffected by age of encoding. 
The relatively poor recall of WHEN? compared with WHO? and WHERE? in 
relation to an event accords with the established view that the dating, of a memory 
is almost always inferential. However, according to Wagenaar (I9S6) in 
composite or multiple cueing, which he found to be the most eltective, the addition 
of WHEN? provides specificity which considerably aids recall. 
it is not possible to give a simple, clear-cut answer to the question : what kind of 
cues trigger childhood memories? The point was made in Study I that for any 
individual person, the cue that triggered a particular memory is likely to be as 
esoteric as the memory it brought to mind. Salaman (1982) quotes examples from 
memories of Chateaubriand and de Quincy, as well as from her own experience, in 
which cueing apparently consists of some environmental or emotional resemblance 
to that which prevailed at a childhood event. 
Grouping cue types into convenient categories for analysis as in the previous Study 
t offers only limited help, for cue types are far from mutually exclusive and usually 
occur simultaneously, e. g. something seen is also ollen heard and is inseparable 
2 01 
from some particular kind of activity. No such concurrence can cloud the issue in 
Study 2. where object word cues and emotion word cues were presented 
separately. In Study I perceptual cues were reported to be most ef'f'ective. 
Perceptual cues are probably more or Tess synonymous with object cues but Study 
I did not reveal any differences between perceptual and emotion cues. This lack of 
difference stems from the less powerful methodology. 
Two aspects of the findings in this Study were unexpected. Firstly, although 
earlier memories were retrieved faster, there was no effect ofage of encoding on 
any of the rated memory characteristics. Memory quality does not appear to vary 
with encoding a`e. This Finding contrasts with some of the results in Chapter 4, 
where age of encoding differences were found. This is probably due to the fact 
that, in this Study, age of encoding was grossly partitioned into only two periods. 
The second unexpected finding was, although object cued memories were more 
accessible, they were, paradoxically, rated as less important, less unusual, less 
emotional and less frequently recalled. Clearly, accessibility is related to these 
other characteristics. 
Why, one might ask, are object cues so powerful? Especially since, as seen in table 
5.3.8.1 the rating for Emotionality is high (3 out of max. 5) even for memories 
evoked by object cue words? The answer conjectured here is that object cues are 
more specific than emotion cues in the imagery or memory As Brewer (1986) has 
written, and the present Study I (Chapter 4) confirms, autobiographical memory 
usually involves imagery. Objects can be immediately imaged; abstract emotions 
cannot. An emotion word is applicable to an unspecified diversity of situations and 
so involves the search of an indefinite range of experiences to find an experience 
that fits. Hence, response to emotion cues take longer. 
0 
Why, one might also ask, should Emotionality often be rated so highly in memories 
triggered by object words? Probably because even a highly emotional experience 
must have had an objective environment, and there is evidently no reason why an 
associated object should not provide access. As Robinson (1980) found; it is 
intensity of emotion at the event that predicts memory availablity. The high 
emotional rating for memories triggered not only by emotion word cues but also by 
object words lends further support to the hypothesis that all autobiographical 
memory must, as an adaptive necessity, have an affect component. 
Table 5.3.4.1 shows no significant difference in subjects' ratin`s for Vividness 
between cue types or encoding ages. This contrasts with a steep increase in the 
ratings for Vividness of Sensory Imagery by encoding age in Chapter 4 (Table 
4.3.5.1). It was noted in Chapter 4 that subjects sometimes distinguish between 
the concepts of Clarity and Vividness. The former can be interpreted as unclouded 
visual imagery, and is usually acknowledged by subjects to be greater with older 
encoding age. On the other hand, the experience of Vividness can, on occasion, be 
powerful enough to produce high vividness rating for a memory that has little or 
no imaging at all. (See Chapter 4 Section 4.3.5). The question: "Flow vivid is this 
memory? " has, on occasion, been answered: "Oh. extremely vivid. I still 
remember very vividly how I felt, " even though the detailed imagery reported was 
minimal. Evidently many subjects in Study 2 are rating vividness in this holistic 
perspective. The absence of any encoding age influence on their vividness rating's 
suggests the presence of all emotional content powerful enough to negate the 
influence of poorer imagery in the younger age period. This surmise is 
corroborated by the fact that when emotionality is deliberately excluded, as with 
20$ 
rating the involvement of purely exogenous seises, the steep bias in favour of 
higher age of encoding is present (see Chapter 4 Table 4.3 5.1). 
To what extent do topic areas evoked by cued recall dit'er from those that emerge 
in free recall? The ranked incidence of diI erent memory topics is shown in Table 
53 .1I. 
l and similar data obtained from free recall in Study I is also listed for 
comparison. It is interesting, that, while no new topics emerged, there is some re- 
arrangement in the rank order of categoric incidence. For example, Illness,. Injury, 
Hospital, which occupies 3rd place in free recall rank order moves down 10 places 
to 13th for cued recall. On the other hand, Castastrophes, Fire, Accidents near the 
bottom at 17th in free recall moves up 10 places to 7th in cued recall. Otherwise, 
with the exception of Pets which rises 8 ranks in cued recall (doubtless because Pet 
is one of the object cue words) all other cater;, ories stay within 3 ranks of each 
other on their 20 step respective ladders. On balance, then, it is the similarity 
rather than the differences in the topic incidence of cued or free recall memories 
that is evident. It seems access to the content of long-term memory is not 
narrowly dependent on the method of cueing,. Actually there may not be so much 
difference in method between the free recall of Study I and the cued recall used 
here. Subjects in the free recall Study reported that the most frequently effective 
form of cueing was perceptual - hearing or seeing something. III cued recall thay 
are seeing words on cards. Galton made no distinction between seeing, objects and 
reading object words, so perhaps we should not be surprised at the similarity of 
topic incidence. 
In conclusion, although the findings of Study 2 revealed that emotion-cued 
memories are slower to access, they confirm the presence of an emotional 
204 
component even in object-cued memories and highlight the correlation of emotion 
with vividness, importance, unusualness and frequency of recall. 
20 5 
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 3 





The literature concerning autobiographical memory and ageing has tended to 
concentrate on the distribution of memories across the life span. The usual method 
used is cued recall, and the subject is asked to date the first discrete event that 
comes to mind in response to the prompt word. Results indicate the relative 
distribution of remembered events and their topic areas in ditlerent life periods. 
This can be taken as a general description of such research as that of Croyitz and 
Schiffinan (1974), Robinson (1976) and Rubin (1982). All the above aimed 
primarily to establish a forMUla for the normal rate of forgetting, against which 
elderly performance could be compared. Their subject samples were usually young 
college undergraduates. However, some researchers did include older subjects in 
their sample, while McCormack (1979) used a sample entirly aged over 70. At the 
extreme, Paul Costa and Robert Kastenbaum (1967) investigated the memories of 
187 American centenarians. However, it could be argued that mhat such research 
is measuring, using self-selected memories in cued recall among, the elderly is 
really the distribution across life-periods of subjects' favourite reminiscenses rather 
than their ability to remember actual details of childhood experience. Other studies 
have used experimenter-designated memories to avoid this dan`, er by requesting 
detailed recall of some specific event, such as the birth of a sibling (Sheingold and 
Tenney 1982). 
Both in free recall and in more constrained paradigms. it was usually round that the 
best predictor of remembering was frequency of mental rehearsal. This was most 
marked among; the oldest subjects. The influence of rehearsal alpoll; the very old 
was confirmed by the findings in a study by Cohen, Conway and Taylor (1994), in 
which two groups aged 18 - 55 and 64 - 84 were tested for detailed recall of the 
: 07 
circumstances in which they heard the news of Mrs Thatcher's resignation from 
premiership. Cohen et al found that whilst emotionality and surprise usually 
sufficed for retention among, middle-aged subjects. for the older group retention of 
detail Suffered if not frequently rehearsed. They also found that in the absence of f 
rehearsal loss of detail in recall was often compensated for by generalising, a 
memory or borrowing from relevant schemata. 
The present Study 3 seeks to avoid generalisation or schemata-borrowing by 
confining enquiry strictly to: whether people are able to recall specific details that 
were undoubtedly known at the ages of 6- 11, which, incidentally, are outside 
most estimates of childhood amnesia. 
There is a clear distinction between not rememberin, and fortettin;. In the former 
case, information may simply not have been encoded. In the latter case by 
definition, the information was encoded and has since been dimmed or 
extin`uished over time. It is with this latter phenomenon that Study 3 is 
concerned. In practical terms this puts constraints on the topic area investigated in 
order to ensure, as far as possible, that all the subjects did encode the kind of 
experience about which they are asked to remember. 
In this study, the topic chosen as likely to have been experienced most widely is 
schooling between the ages of six and eleven. Subjects' ability readily to recall 
memories from between these ages had been shown by findings in Study I. At or 
before eleven it is usual to transfer from junior to senior school. Any subject who 
stayed on at junior school beyond the age of eleven, or whose senior school was 
housed in the same building was excluded from the sample, since they would have 
had extended encoding opportunities. 
20S 
However, no matter how rigorous the temporal or other constraints. other factors 
may still influence recall. For instance, the amount of interest and, therefore, 
attention, that was being paid by various subjects to the chosen topic is likely to 
influence individuals' levels of recall. In this case, several subjects confessed they 
had paid little attention to school. There is also a more specific aspect of personal 
involvement. 
Brown and Kulik (1977) listed the chief determinants of retention as surprise, 
emotionality and consequentiality. Rubin and Cozin (1984) posited personal 
significance, while Pillemer (1984) put emotionality in first place. The presence of 
such factors must depend, in part, on the topic area involved, as well as on the 
questions asked. They do not lend themselves equally to every topic. In the light of 
the above findings, those questions in the present questionnaire that enquire about 
inanimate objects and their topography, are not conducive to emotional arousal, 
and so, would be expected to lower the probability of recall. 
Conversely, the frequency with which rosters and lists of names feature in school 
life, might well produce a higher than `normal' retention rate for this category. In 
other words, had a different topic been chosen, the categoric rank order might 
have been different. Yet, for want of any ideal alternative, it is thought that early 
schooling provides a choice likely to be usefully indicative of trends in memory 




The 83 subjects participating in this study, 44 women and 39 amen, were all from 
the 109 subjects who completed Study 1. The 26 who were excluded did not meet 
the criteria regarding a change of school in a different building by age 1I. Ages of 
the 83 subjects ranged between 21 and 91. The ages of the memories recalled 
ranged between 11 and 82 years; mean memory age 41 years and median 39 years. 
-N-- 6.2.2 Materials 
A standardised questionnaire with space to record subjects' answers. For the sake 
of speed and legibility, the researcher read out the questions and wrote down the 
answers. A specimen questionnaire with instructions to subjects is at Appendix E. 
The questions were constructed on the basis of informal pilot testing and were 
designed to probe memory for information that (a) Would have been known at the 
time and (b) could not easily be inferred or guessed. 
6 2.3 Procecltir e 
A structured interview technique was used. As in the first study of free recall, it 
was considered important to avoid an unfamiliar laboratory atmosphere and to 
make subjects feel `at home' and relaxed. This was achieved by carrying straight 
on after Study I was finished, usually pausing only for a cup of tea or coffee. 
Subjects were `eased' into this study with the following instructions: 
"Finally, I'd like you to think back again to when you were about 6-11 
years old. I shall ask you some questions about your schooling at that 
time. But I shan't expect you to remember all the answers, " 
210 
"So please try not to guess. Don't tell me what you think was probably 
the case - only what you cwluully renwinh u. If you don't remember, 
just say so. But if you do renienmber, I'd like to know how definite the 
memory is. So for each answer I shall ask you whether you're (a) 




6.3.1 /'/k' Mae Of Eoigelling 
This is presented as a percentage loss per annum. Subjects were asked 20 
questions about their schooling, up to age II. Positive answers were rated at three 
levels of confidence 3 for 'absolutely sure' or `vividly', 2 for `fairly sure' and I for 
`not very sure'. 
The resulting scores were then expressed as percentages of the maximum possible. 
Subtraction of the percentage score from the maximum 1001-0 gave the total 
percentage eroded. This divided by the memory age is the percentage loss per 
annum as shown in Table 6.3.1.1 and Figure 6. ä. I. 1. 
Catergorisation of responses was as follows: Things (e.,,. desk or table? (q. l . 
39; 
benches or chairs? (q. l5); clock? (q. 16,17,18)) People (e. g teachers? (q. ?, 4, 
10)). Names (e. g. names of teachers? (q. 2,4,7)). Visual (e. g. teachers apperance? 
(q. ;, 5,8); colour of floor? (q. 12)). Aural (e. g. sound of teachers voices (q. 6. 
9)). Topographical (e. g. seat in class? (q. II); position of clock? (q. 17); where 
youu 
lunched? (q. 19); where you hung your clothes? (q. 20)). 
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l uhle (. 3.1.1 I: rocic, n Of itIennrr; ý : "/ l. cr. ý. c 1'cýr ýnnrrnr 
Memory Agc Things Pcopic Visual Aural Namcs Topographical Mcan 
10-19 2.09 1.90 2.40 3.02 1.15 1.41 2.09 
20-29 1.10 1.04 1.40 2.90 1.20 1.12 1.54 
30-39 0.96 1.20 1.20 I. 85 0.91 0.91 1.17 
40-49 1.10 1.22 1.35 1.84 0.93 1.07 1.25 
50-59 0.77 1.20 1. ()g 1.47 1.02 0.73 1.05 
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6.3.2 C alegoiy hiffcýrcýnccý"c hi hie Rule Of I i»%ºcýlling 
It will be seen from Table 6.3.2.1 and Fig 6.3.2.1 that there is a general trend for 
the rate of forgetting to be greater in the earlier years of memory and that aller 
around age 40 forgetting levels off at a lower rate. The fact that erosion is highest 
t for the aural, (i. e. sound of teacher's voices) category is in accord with the trend in 
Study I that recall of voice declined with subject age. There may also be a more 
specific reason. It will be seen from Table 6.3.2.1 and Fig 6.3.2.1 that retention of 
the aural category declines at a faster rate than other categories until the memory 
age of 30 - 39 and then remains more or less in step with other categories. 
However, a Chi square test comparing Visual and Aural categories for memory 
ages 10 - 39 versus 40 - 60+ showed no significant differences (X2 = 0.7 n. s. ). 
Unlike in Study 1, the sound here is of a particular teacher's voice and not voices 
or sounds in general. Most people between the ages of 20 and 40 hear more 
different voices, to cloud and confuse the memory of one particular, than they do 
in later life. But if the memory of a specific voice survives the period of'maximal 
confusion' it will tend to join the other categories in the following the progressively 
slower rate of forgetting. 
The remaining categories in Table 6.3.2.1 are open to confusion through frequent 
categoric duplication. For example, the recall of a person's voice or colour of hair 
must also mean recall of the person. Similarly recall of a person's name, in a school 
context, will imply recall of the person named. Conversely, it is intuitively obvious 
that it is possible to recall a teacher without remembering either name, sound of 
voice or colour of hair. 
Table 6.3.2.1 therefore, takes account of each category, scored separately if 
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Scoring. Si slenm 
One nark for each remembered answer. 
x3 for "absolutely sure" or "vividly". 
I 
x2 for "fairly sure" or "fairly clearly". 
xI for "not very sure" or "vaguely". 
Differences in life-style meant not all questions were applicable to all respondents. 
Total scores were, therefore, percentaged on applicable questions only. Any 
subject for whom fewer than ten questions were applicable was not included in the 
sample. 
7c-rh/e6.3.2.1 Pc'rc'c'nlcr c' týf crnnrn11 /u. cs of c%rr'i/t' fr»' euch c'ulc'Kcrý ý' 
(averaged across years of retention) 








6.3.3 (; enclc'I" 1)irferc'nce. s Inn 1za lcc Of 1"*oi e! lin, Lº 
It will be seen from Table 6.3.3.1 that women retain clearer recall of their early 
schooling environment than nien. However, although the difference is greatest in 
visual recall all these differences are too small to be statistically significant. 
Categoric order of erosion, however, remains the same, but at a consistently lower 
level than for men. 






Aural 2.12 1. ')u 0.22 
Visual I. 60 1.11 0.41) 
Pcoplc 1.49 1.11 0.39 
Things 1.19 0.97 0.22 
Namcs I. 0S 0.94 4 0.2 
Topographical 1.04 0.87 0.17 
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6.3.4 Levels Of C onrclence 
Table 6.3.4.1 shows that, while there was slightly less confidence after the subject 
ade of 60, the majority of subjects, including those aged over 60, felt 'absolutely 
sure' about the details they did remember. For the sixty subjects aged under 60,50 
questions out of 1,200 (4.2%) were not applicable. Within this ae group 357 out 
of 1,150 applicable questions (31q'0) could not be answered. For the twenty-two 
subjects aged over 60,24 questions out of 440 (5.5%) were not applicable and 17.35 
out of 416 applicable questions (4 l . 6°'0) could not 
be answered. 
7cthlc 6.3.4.1 Levels Of ('ntificlence By S'tthjec. f Age 
Key: n= number of subjects in arge group 
a= absolutely sure 
b= fairly sure 
c= no very sure 
0= could not remember 
Subject No. of Memories % % % % 
Age iven confid. ratings a b c 0 
Under 60 11 50 50.6 11.3 7.1 31.0 
n=60 
Over 60 416 46.9 5.5 6.0 41 
.6 
n= 22 
By Chi square test the differences between the age groups are not significant, X2 _ 
3.36, dl), p<0.3. 
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6.4 Discussion 
This Study has been described as unique in probing memory for specific 
information concerning childhood experiences and assessing the effects of memory 
age, gender, etc. Results confirm that in old aý, e people can sometimes retain vivid 
and detailed memories of childhood environment to a surprisin`, degree. This is 
particularly notable in relation to schooling, since the choice of School as a 
memory topic among, the very elderly, both in free and cued recall, is very low, 
sug`esting a low level of personal interest. 
There is some slowing in the annual percentage rate of forgetting over the passing 
years. This is particularly the case after the arge of 40 (see fig, 6.3.1.1). Such a 
decrease in the rate of forgetting is consistent with the findings of Bahrick (1954) 
in relation to retention of Spanish over fifty years. Bahrick found a steep initial 
forgetting rate over the first five years after ceasing, to study the language, 
followed by a flat function. Rather earlier, Woodworth and Schlossberg (1954) 
had written: "The older of two associations of equal strength will decay more 
slowly. " 
From the data available here, it is not possible to define the precise nature of the 
curve of erosion over time. It could, conceivably, be parabolic, i. e. theoretically 
never showing a total loss of detail by constantly approaching but never actually 
reaching the X axis. Or, if the slope in Fig. 6.3.1. I is interpreted as a straight line 
regression, then it could be predicted that total erosion would occur long after 
normal life expectancy. In practical terms this need not concern us. What results 
clearly show is that the older the age of a memory, and in this study also of the 
rememberer, the slower the rate of erosion with each passing year. 
ý: / 
ý_. 
This does not imply that people forget less in their old age. On the contrary, they 
are more forgetful, particularly of arbitrary information and events. This has been 
confirmed in many studies, thowzh Cohen and Faulkner (1984) Found "No marked 
r 
difference between all (a`, e) groups in the recall of weanin; gful facts and personal 
information". Irene Hulicka (1967) and Cohen and Faulkner (1984) both report 
cases of `topic islands' of unimpaired memory in subjects who in most areas are 
greatly impaired. But even people who are free from any impairment will have 
areas of interest in which they will remember more. The forgetting curve can 
evidently be shaped largely by the topic area of recall and the amount of personal 
interest within it for the individual. 
Studies that permit free recall, like the word cue paradigm, used in Study 2 of the 
present research, enables subjects to choose memories from their richest topic 
areas. Such choice is denied in studies where recall is demanded of specified items 
within a given topic area (e. g. Whitten and Leonard, 1931; Williams and Hollan, 
1931 and the present study). So the Forgetting curve shown in Fig. 6.3.1. I. though 
probably correct for most early schooling, may not apply to other areas of 
autobiographical experience. Nor need the categoric rates of erosion shown in 
Table 6.3.2.1 be generally valid. Dil erent circumstances and activities can put very 
different degrees of attention, personal involvement, and consequent memorability 
upon constituent factors. 
it should be borne in mind that the remembering demanded of subjects in Study 3 
is not of temporally specific events, but of memories generalised over an undefined 
period of encoding between joining and leaving a particular school. Since this is 
limited by the questionnaire to not more than 5 years, scores are unlikely to make 
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much difference to the overall coefficient of annual erosion in a sample of mean 
arge 53. 
The rate of retention can be seen as remaining high in normal healthy old age, 
where erosion rate is at its lowest. But . 
just what causes it to be so is largely 
unknown. Furthermore, the retention ability does not apply to all types of 
information. Many studies, including those of Roger Chaffin (1983), and Cohen 
and Faulkner (1984) have found that the ability to retain rote learning usually 
commences to decline at around age 60. In the present study a positive response 
to most questions calls for sensory imaging. The ability to do this may not be 
impaired by a e. In Study I of the present research it was found that vividness of 
imaging does not appear to be affected by normal arge decline in the corresponding 
physical organs of the senses. The predominance of the visual sense in imagery, 
which was so very apparent in the free recall of Study 1, is evidently not adversly 
affected by the extent of erosion of visual details shown in Table 6.3.3.1. 
The trend in gender differences in the rate of forgetting shown in Table 6.3.3.1 
may well be related to the finding in Study I that in free recall. women chose the 
topic of Schooling more often than men. This would produce more frequent 
mental rehearsal, which, in turn, would assist the retention of details remembered 
by women more than men, as suggested in Table 6.3.3- 1 . 
Retrieval strategy, improved by years of practice, may help the aged to recall 
memories. But it certainly cannot play any part in the involuntary recall of 
childhood events described by Salaman (1982). We are left with an unanswered 
question: Do the aged in some way, consistent with adaptive advantage, preserve 
their memory capacity for matters of personal meaning and not for rote? Or is the 
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capacity for rote learning in some way destroyed by age? The difference reinforces 







What determines an adult's ability to recall images and events of distant childhood? 
Galton (1882) gave a succinct all-embracing answer. After much introspection he 
wrote (p. 192): "The subject (i. e. topic, or event) must have a continued kill', 
interest in order to retain an abiding place in memory. " In succeeding, years 
research has particularised various elements within Galton's portmanteau 
definition. 
But perhaps the point should be made here, that "an abiding place in memory" is 
not always the same as accessibility. Salaman (1982) cites several memories that 
seemed forgotten because they had not been accessed until, many years later, 
involuntary recall showed them to be -vividly retained. It is chiefly with 
accessibility that recent research has been concerned. 
For instance, as noted in earlier pages, Brown and Kulick (1977) Found surprise, 
consequentiality and strength of emotion felt at the event to be primary 
determinants of recall; Pillemer (1984) gives primacy to emotionality; Rubin and 
Kozin (1934) and Conway and Bekerian (1985) found the best predictor of 
accessibility is 'personal significance' i. e. perceived importance or relationship to 
one's self. It will be seen that these qualities are far from mutually exclusive, and 
indeed, are all constituents of the continued self-involvement implied in Galton's 
definition. 
A close synonym to self-involvement is 'personal meaning', often named as a 
determinant by researchers. It is, of course, inseparably linked to self-involvement 
for it is the self that perceives the meaning, and cannot feel involved in something 
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meaningless. William James (1390) and Bartlett (19 2) both draw attention to this 
point. In Bartlett's phrase: memory is "an ettort after nmeanin; _. " 
This effort can be of two kinds. The first involves a conscious, self-imposed 
X 
search, when trying to remember something,. The process consists of trying out a 
succession of self-generated cues until one triggers the targeted information. The 
second is an effort to understand and evaluate the personal meaning, of something 
brought to mind by external, internal or even subconscious cues. Cueing, 
effectiveness is central to both. 
Study 2 concerned itself with only two categories of cueing Real He provides an 
almost infinite variety to match the unlimited diversity of remembered experiences. 
This has precluded any narrow research into what is undoubtedly a major 
determinant of memory retrieval. Apart from the slicer unmanageable breadth of 
the field, for the most part, we pay attention to what is recalled but not to the cue 
that recalled it. However, certain common denominators of successful cueing; have 
been observed and recorded in the literature. For example. in a series of 
experiments on the recall of diary entries Wagenaar (1986) found that it is the 
specificity of cues that determines their effectiveness, and that understandably, 
specificity is greatly enhanced by additional cues. Conway (1090) proposes that if 
a cue is sufficiently specific retrieval will take place directly without any search 
process in the memory store. Specificity is also implied in Bartlett's (1932) 
contention that what we really remember is not just something but its relationship 
to something else. This 'something else' is crucial to the cueing, of the memory by 
its objective and affective relevance. 
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Thus it would seem that the answer to what is an effective cue, is perceived 
relevance to the personal meaning, of the targeted information. The relevance may 
or may not be immediately apparent. As with Wagenaar's multi-cueing, experiment, 
it can be progressively enhanced by the elaboration of cueing until a threshold of 
I 
recognition is reached sufficient to trier the recall. 
Factors such as vividness, surprise and unusualness should probably be regarded as 
descriptive attributes of what is remembered, rather than as primary , 
determinants 
W& of retrieval. In previous research these attributes have been noted in adult 
memories. The present research has confirmed that childhood memories are rated 
as high in vividness, clarity and realism. Moreover, Study 2 showed that factors 
such as vividness, importance, unusualness and frequency of recall are highly 
correlated with the emotionality of the memory. 
Factors as emotionality, self involvement and personal importance are attributes of 
a different kind. As Nelson (1991), Fivush (1951) and Bartlett (1932) affirm. 
autobiographical recall is impossible without them. By mhatever name, they are 
synonymous with experiential awareness of oneself. 
As was argued in the introduction to this thesis, in order to serve its adaptive 
purpose, one would expect the memory of'what I felt about it' to be long retained. 
Evidence of its retention even after 'what happened' is forgotten is classically 
provided by Claparede (I911) who concealed a drawing-pin in the palm of his 
hand and shook hands with an amnesiac patient. This patient never remembered 
what had happened, but remembered never to shake hands with Claparede again. 
A more recent example is provided by a subject in the present Study I. This 
subject vividly remembers his excitement as he rushed downstairs from his 
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bedroom to unwrap the present for his seventh birthday. which he knew he would 
find on the table. Yet he cannot recall what the present was. 
What sort of things 'retain an abiding place in memory? ' In Study I of the present 
research it was not unexpected to find that the 633 memories examined were as 
diverse as the 109 subjects who provided them. But it was not anticipated that so 
many of these memories would fall into so few topic categories. Nearly half (49° ö) 
of the events remembered in free recall fell into the top four categories, in rank 
order: (I) School, (2) Trivia, (3) Illness, Injury and Hospital and (4) Family and 
Family Occasions. Trivia describes any happening, that was evidently meaningful 
for the child but would probably not seem significant from an adult perspective, 
e. g. spilling a bottle of fruit juice in the pram. The recall of Trivia is markedly 
higher in younger encoding ages and plunges at an apparent watershed at around 
age 7. It is probable that to the 49% listed above should be added a good deal 
from the category: Births, Anniversaries, etc. since these are mostly within the 
family. The high overall incidence of school memories, which commence at age 3- 
5 is, no doubt, an inevitable consequence of confining encoding, ages to 18 and 
below. Regarding schooling, it is interesting that despite anecdotally frequent 
reports of strong impression made by first days at nursery, pre-prep and prep 
school, and later at colleges and universities, more than half (52%) of all school 
memories were encoded between ages 9- 14. 
The onset of puberty, 12 -14, also shows a watershed by a sudden plunge in the 
recall of family events and a corresponding, rise in the egocentric category of 
Achievements. This is compatible with attitudinal changes sometimes reported by 
developmental psychologists. (lnhelder and Piaget 1958, Flavel 1963, Beard 1969, 
Meadows 19839. 
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Gender differences are apparent in the topic incidence of recall. Women tend more 
often to remember schooling and family matters. Men recall more childhood 
adventures and trivia. This is in line with the discussion of `ender differences in 
parental attitude and upbringing discussed by Fivush and Reese (1991). They 
conclude that from the beginning of life, females are encouraged to engage more in 
social interests and social interaction. Early gender differences in up bringing are 
also confirmed by the findings of Rubin, Provenzano and Luria (1974). 
Altogether, the 633 memories in Study I were categorised, by consensus among 
three independent judges, into 20 topic areas. Study 2, Cued Recall, produced 676 
memories, but the same three judges found no new categories were needed to 
accommodate the larger number. Nor was the rank order of topic areas 
substantially different from that of the Free Recall in Study 1. Inexplicably, Illness, 
Injury, Hospitals slips down ten places in Study 2 (from 3rd to I3th) while 
Catastrophes, Fire, Accidents rises ten places from I 7th in Study I to 7th in Cued 
Recall. Otherwise, with the exception of Pet, which was an object cue word in 
Study 2, all other cate`ories stay within three places of rank order in both studies. 
Evidently, although speed of retrieval from the long-term memory store is 
dependent upon the type of cuein`l, the nature of the topics recalled is not. Of 
course, both studies imposed age of encoding constraints. But the three year age 
periods of Study I were much narrower. 
In both studies recall was required of discrete events. The ability of subjects 
readily to recall discrete events does not, at first sight, seem to accord with the 
findings of Barsalou (1988) who found that most autobiographical memories are of 
extended events rather than isolated experiences. Yet is there really a difference? 
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As Bartlett (1932) points out an autobiographical memory is not simply 
remembering something, but remembering its relationship to something else - to its 
meaningful part within a thematic hierarchy which must surely comprise an 
extended context of the single episode. 
j 
As would be expected, topic areas recalled are largely dependent upon the age of 
encoding reflecting changes in abilities, interests and activities. Studies I and 2 are 
both confined to childhood events, so Findings should not be generalised beyond 
the teens. Results cannot be compared to those of research based on the 
iýn 
distribution of memories across an adult life-span. For instance, in such a study 
carried out by Cohen and Faulkner (1987) it was Found that the category: Births, 
Deaths and Marriages easily topped the list of rank order at 22%. In the present 
studies, this category is not even separately listed. 
Subject age is also an important determinant of what is remembered. Here, the 
findings strongly reflect Galton's (1982) pre-requisite of "continued living, interest. " 
For example, in extreme old a e, the incidence of School memories plunges steeply 
to near-extinction. This is evidently a matter of choice rather than of ability, for in 
KI Study 3 subjects aged 80+ demonstrate that they can remember details of their 
schooling surprisingly well if asked to do so. On the other hand, family often plays 
an increasingly important role in the lives of the very old, both in. providing support 
and reminiscence. Accordingly, the category Family increases in the rank order of 
memories in old ade. This shift in topic incidence probably reflects a shift in the 
function of reminiscence. For an elderly person, concerned to maintain the self- 
concept, family is a more important aspect of personal identity than schooldays. 
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A prominent attribute of childhood memories is imagery (Brewer 1986). In Study 
I it was found that ima; ging is predominantly visual, though other senses are also 
frequently involved. Next to vision, sound is most often imaged. For the most 
part, the sound concerns the voices of other people Amon`; the other senses, 
J 
smell. though relatively seldom inined, is very powerful in evoking recall when it 
is contextually meaningful and individually specific. Thus it appears that sensory 
qualities are closely tied to childhood memories and can be seen as determinants of 
retention. 
Let us now turn to the question; what functions do autobiographical memories 
fulfil? At a personal level, our autobiographical memories help to develop a self- 
concept; an abiding recognition that, no matter how diverse the events of life may 
be, they all relate to one experiencing, ego - one's coherent Self. As Rubin (1986 
p. 7), has written: "Autobiographical memory is about the self, the source of 
information from which we make judgements of behaviour. " Autobiographical 
memories are the basis for what Fitzgerald (19SS) calls the self-narrative. These 
considerations suggest reasons why the subjects in Study 3 retained detailed 
memories of the school they attended from 6-II years of age. This period and 
these experiences, when a child begins to move out from the family into a wider 
society, must be crucial for formation of the self-concept. 
Inter-personally, by remembering how we ourselves felt in similar situations, we 
can infer the feelings of others, anticipate their reactions and formulate appropriate 
responses. In a competitive society, this is clearly an adaptively useful ability, 
made possible by the presence of an atl'ect component within personal memories, 
as hypothesised earlier. 
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At a social level, the sharing of autobiographical memories does more than provide 
material for conversations. It helps to develop intimacy and 
friendships (Cohen 
1995). It also fosters a feeling of protective security in belonging within a social 
group. The adaptive value of these attributes can be inferred from the fact that the 
same social functions are common to every species of gregarious animals. The 
only difference for mankind is that for us communication is not limited to sight, 
sound, smell and body language. We have evolved the articulated 
language 
required to cope with our sophisticated needs, as well as a more flexible internal 
'time clock' that enables us to escape from the present tense and use recall of the 
past to plan strategy for the future. Thus, both at the personal level of a single life 
span and at the phylogenetic level of survival, autobiographical memory provides 
adaptive advantages made possible by an affect Factor that aids behavioural 
discrimination. 
The present writer is far from being the first to focus on the essential presence of 
an affect factor in autobiographical memory. Bartlett (19 32) wrote: "Perception 
of an event is of two hinds; sensory and attitudinal. Both must be present to 
provide a meaningful nmenlory. " Fivush (1951 p. 831) expresses much the sane 
7,11 thou`ht: "A personal memory is a representation of the whole state of mind on the 
past occasion. Unless the feeling is reconstructed, fully appropriate cueing cannot 
occur. " Piaget (in Infielder and Pia et 1958 p. 347) finds: "Affect and cognition 
are indissociable in real life" and in 1969 lie added "An individual first experiences 
a situation affectively before he can comprehend it or use his understanding. " 
Piaget thus echoes the findings of Bartlett (19 32) in according, primacy to affect in 
the retrieval of personal memories. The duality of content and an inseparable link 
between self and affective consciousness has been more recently affirmed by 
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Nelson (1991): "All experience that involves awareness of the self will have two 
aspects of remembering, recall of 'what happened' and 'what I felt about it. "' 
Perception of this duality, then, is not new. But what is, perhaps, new in Study I 
F 
of the present research is empirical evidence for the existence of this duality and 
the powerful contribution that this affect component can make to the holistic 
impact of a memory. Thus, the behavioural guidance provided by affect to 
encourage what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful is clearly an adaptive 
function of this affect component. 
The best-known proponent of the duality of remembering, is, of course. Freud, 
whose psychiatric treatment was based upon it. The theory holds that neurotic 
states are frequently the result of suppressing the 'what happened' aspect of a 
traumatic experience, while vividly retaining the feelings about it. These then 
cause distress by their inexplicable persistence. Once the memory of 'what 
happened' is restored the cause of the subjective suffering can be rationally 
understood and is therefore likely to diminish. 
In the present research subjects, when asked, invariably reported feeling particular 
emotional qualities related to their memories. The level of emotionality is 
apparently unaffected by the age of encoding across the age spans 5- 18. There 
was, however, a decrease in the recall of separately named emotional qualities 
below the encoding age of S. This is especially so for encoding before the age of 3 
(Table 4.3.7.1). Gender differences, overall, are only marginal, though results do 
Su-jest that women may retain awareness of jealousy longer than men, while on 
the other hand, women harbour feelings of tilustration, fear and grief over the 
years, less than men. Subject arge (Table 4.3.7.4) shows no decline in the intensity 
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of the most frequently felt emotions over the years. Yet in old a`, e, the difference 
between subjects' ratings of 'then' and 'now' is seen to narrow. The number of 
subjects aged 80 and over is too small in the present sample to provide statistical 
significance. But it is interesting, that such a narrowing between feelings 'then and 
'now' agrees with the personal experience of Salaman (103? ) and of the several 
famous authors she quotes, observing that when the obscuring activities of 'now' 
are replaced by the tranquillity of old age, then vivid recall of 'then' returns, 
together with its emotional impact. 
In view of the usually evident importance of visual and other imaging to 
remembering, it was quite unexpected to find in Study I that I5% of the total 
sample claimed sometimes not to ima`, e at all, or not visLIally. Yet they asserted, 
even when challenged, that they recalled with high vividness or realism. This 
implied that for them there was some powerful factor other than the normally 
present element of imaging to give the memory its potency. The fact that, in every 
case the subject imaged normally in most of their recalls showed that this was not 
an esoteric subject 'quirk' and deserved investigation across the whole sample. 
To investigate the nature of the additional factor it was considered the clearest 
answer might be found where the dif erence is greatest, namely in those memories 
which were highly rated for vividness but where the subjects rated their sensory 
imaging as zero. The eight subjects concerned were asked: "In a nutshell, what 
does this memory mean to you? " Their answers were quoted verbatim in Chapter 
4.4. 
It will be seen that the 'no ima ing' examples are well spread across encoding ae 
periods and that each express what Nelson (1991) has defined as "What I felt 
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about it. " These examples are, of course, exceptional in that they ascribe the entire 
impact of the memory to affect alone, coupled to historic knowledge of the event. 
But Nelson, and the present writer, hold that all personal memories have two 
aspects of remembering. Besides affect there is recall of 'what happened' in 
concrete terms, which as Brewer (1986) points out is based on mental 
reconstruction by sensory imaging. Conjectural reasons why 'what happened' is 
remembered but not imaged in the above cases is offered in Section 4.4. Most are 
memories of autobiographical facts or of generic events. In the majority, of the 
memories analysed in this study Brewer's contention is, in fact, Substantially 
confirmed by findings in the present study. 85% of subjects imaged in each of their 
6 memories. The 15% who did not all imaged in 5 out of their 6. The 'no imaging' 
exceptions were only 1.3% of the 633 memories examined. Nevertheless, the 
existence of memories without imagery provides empirical evidence that 'imaging is 
not all'. Memories without imagery can still be rated as highly vivid and realistic. 
Being able to remember what to welcome and what to avoid is clearly useful 
during a person's life-time. But what, one might ask can be the philogenetic 
survival value of retaining a facility for autobiographical remembering, into old age, 
'fi well beyond the physical ability to reproduce the genetic trait. The short answer is, 
none - but it was not always so. When nature evolved homo sapiens, adult life 
expectancy was such that no-one was expected to reach old age as measured by 
the present standard. As a result, today the genetic ability to remember persists 
even after the philogenetic usefulness is past. Nature has even provided a kind of 
safety margin to ensure that the benefits of learning from experience can last a life- 
time. The rate of forgetting slows with the passing, years as can be seen in Study 3 
of the present research. 
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What enables the very old to recall childhood memories often better than during 
their middle years still remains a matter of conjecture. But if one heeds the 
growing consensus of opinion that autobiographical memory is about the self (e. g. 
Rubin 1986) then a plausible answer may centre round closer identification with 
the real self. In other words, while age distances the subject from the event, it 
brings him closer to the unaltered, original self that experienced the childhood 
event. This makes it possible for the self to recapture the alTective component of 
the experience, without which, as Fivush (1988) says proper cueing cannot occur. 
In terms of Johnson's MEM model discussed in Chapter I. the role of the 
Reflective component is greater in old age. 
This 'cleansing' of the self is needed because, as Shakespeare observes, in life we 
role-play many parts, first, the parentally dependent child, then the emerging 
teenager, asserting independence; in due course, the betrothed, the married 
partner, parent, bread-winner, exponent of occupational and possibly hobby skills, 
respected member of a particular social group, etc., etc. Each role demands its 
own perspective of attitude and behaviour to be properly played and meet its 
obligations. Usually it is only in old age that these role playing responsibilities can 
be put aside and a return can be made to unimpeded awareness of the underlying 
real self. This would explain the views quoted by Salaman (1982) about the 
dormancy of childhood memories until old age. The present studies provided 
ample confirmation that elderly people do indeed retain vivid memories of 
childhood experiences. This was evident both when they were allowed to choose 
freely what memories to report (Studies 1 and 2) and also when they were 
constrained to recall specific information (Study 3). 
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Salaman (1982) draws attention to the importance that the elderly may feel to 
pursue what Butler (1963) has called the life review, in order better to understand 
their selves in the light of life's long experience. Such motivation would encourage 
the frequent rehearsal of well-remembered events that is characteristic of the 
F 
elderly, as noted by Cohen, Conway and Maylor (1994). 
it is only to be expected, that for the most part, the findings in the present three 
studies provide confirmation for what other researchers have already found.. Yet in 
some respects, the present studies also extend previous research. They use more 
naturalistic methods than are usually possible in a clinical or experimental 
laboratory setting. They also illustrate the advantage of using both survey and 
experimental methodology to seek converging evidence. They study recall for 
specified life periods by a large sample of men and women of different ages and 
explore gender differences and subject age effects They provide analyses of the 
nature of the memories in more detail than most other studies. In Study 2, they 
look at determinants of the speed of retrieval, mdhile Study 1, at determinants of 
incidence and quality. In Study 3a way was devised to measure the rate of 
forgetting across the life span. It is hoped they may contribute something, to serve 
the need expressed by Brewer (1936 p. 35) in relation to the study of 
autobiographical memory for "much more empirical work on the basic descriptive 
aspects of this important form of human memory. " 
In several areas, the present research extends previous findings. For example, few 
researchers, as reported on previous pages, have produced evidence of the earliest 
memory people can recall before the age of 36 months. The evidence in Study I 
that 90 out of sample of 109 subjects (i. e. 83%) could produce memories from 
below the age of 3 without difficulty must throw a new light on how early 
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autobiographical memory normally starts. Two reasons come readily to mind as to 
why, in Study 1, memories younger than 3 were found to be more accessible than 
has been usually supposed. One concerns the experience of Salaman (1982) that if 
only one can relax and allow oneself to focus on a particular life-period, memories 
Cr 
come pouring in. In Study I. everything possible was done to facilitate this 
condition, to a greater degree than is usually possible in a laboratory setting The 
second reason is, that given the necessary relaxed atmosphere, the life-period on 
which to focus was specifically indicated, (i. e. Salai»an's second pre-requisite). 
Thus the present research pushes back the boundaries of childhood amnesia. 
Perhaps the most important finding, however, concerns the role of emotion in 
autobiographical memory. As originally hypothesised, the studies reported here 
provide strong evidence that childhood memories retain their emotionality and 
personal meaning across the life span and into old age (Study 1). And, 
fiºrthermore, that the emotionality of memories is linked to their vividness and 
importance (Study 2). 
The other primary assumption was that autobiographical memory, like its 
symbiotic twin, articulated langua e, has fundamentally adaptive value This is 
supported by the Darwinian truism that were it not for behavioural discrimination 
guided by learning from experience, we could not now exist in. our present form. 
Adaptive value applies inseparably both in the short-term sense of the living, 
generation and in the long-term sense of the survival of the species. Short-term, it 
depends upon the survival of enough members of the species, during their 
reproductive age-spans, to pass on their favourable genes to the next generation. 
As Aldous Huxley once cynically remarked: "We are only caskets for our 
chromosomes. " The ability of an individual to fulfil this role will clearly depend 
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upon the ability to survive within the relevant physical and social environment. 
Although from the birth, this must involve instinct and procedural memory. 
continued success Wulst depend upon learning, ti-oin experience, that is, by personal 
memory of the past and of what is pleasant and harmless, and what to avoid 
because of unpleasant or dangerous consequences. Study 3 provided evidence that 
detailed memories are retained from the childhood years with high levels of 
confidence. Hence the adaptive value to the individual of the basic function of 
autobiographical memory, and in particular, of its discriminating affect component. 
In the long-term, phylogenetic perspective, the cyclical transmission of favourable 
genes will occasionally be interrupted by mutations that modify genetic structure, 
and therefore, the attributes of individuals. But Darwin's principle of natural 
selection still applies. If those individuals wlio carry the genetic revision enjoy 
adaptive advantage, then it is they and their progeny who will take over and 
become the new norm. The process is usually slow. Richard Leakey (1992) and 
most anthropologists today, believe it has taken several millions of years to move 
us from our earliest recognisable forebears, the Australopithecines, through such 
successive mutations to our present human status. Conversely, if a mutation 
results in adaptive disadvantage, then it will not persist. Leakey proposes that this 
probably accounts for why many hominid species disappeared without trace. 
Turning now to the adaptive value of autobiographical memory within the fire-time 
of the individual, the importance of the adaptive function of remembering the past 
is widely recognised by researchers today. For instance, Nelson (199I) advocates 
that autobiographical memory should be regarded in an adaptive perspective. 
Tulving (1991) evidently endorses this view. fie writes (p. 25) that 
autobiographical memory consists of a "number of ditl'erent brain/ behaviour/ 
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cognitive systems and processes, that through co-operation and interaction, make 
it possible for their possessor to benefit from past experience and thereby promote 
Survival. " 
I 
The essential role of the affective component has still to be fully explored. The 
present studies have merely demonstrated its existence. It is hoped that future 
research will take this further. It would be good to find a way to quantify its 
contribution to the overall strength of a memory in various circumstances. For 








EARLY ' iMMEMMORY" QCUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction 
Thank you for your co-operation. The aim of this research is to examine and 
compare what kind of things people of different ages tend to recall as early 
childhood memories. 
Your name and address will not appear on this questionnaire, so your answers 
will be quite anonymous. The only particulars I'm filling in are: male/female 
and, for demographic classification, I'd be grateful if you'll tell me your age. 
ý; 
Male/Female Age: Age Group: 20/39 40/59 60 Plus 
abcdef 
I Thinking back to your own early childhood. what is the earliest memory 
you can recall? If you're not quite sure which is the earliest. make a 
sensible guess. Tell me briefly what happened. 
(record brief description on separate sheet) 
1.1 How old would you have been then? 
...:.::..:.. 
1.2 Would you say your memory of this event is; 
clouded and vague? (a) 
or fairly clear and definite? (b) 
or vivid and detailed? (c) 
. 
'. i: i: i::?... v..:::.:. 
: i:. `:.:;:;::? ".:::: i ":.:.: fh 




X ': ': ' 
": i.;; }i:: `'i`: ': T::::.::::::::. ': .:: : ':: i:.:? ý.:: ... ... "".:.. ': i, ":...:: `: ':: Y'. "i?: '::.: "::: "iý .: '::: 
?: `'. 'S':: "?::::;: .::: ý': :. 
X. ":::.:: i''::.:. ý::: ''i 
. 
i:: `::. ': ':::;:: ':; 
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1.3 Is the visual sense involved - do you picture it in your mind's eye? 
3.3 -4.3 
'. ':: YeslNo" es/\o ': 'esst ß Acs/No es/ o 
(If yes) Is it in black and white j (a) 
or colour? (b) 
Is it still like a snap (c) 
or moving like a film? (d) 
Do you see yourself in the picture as though 
looking, at the scene from outside? (e) 
or do you, as it were, see it through your own 
eyes, as you did when it happened, without seeing 
17 ltý 
yourself? (f) 
...;:..:. ::.:.::;:: 2.3 :: _:;::: ;. <: ::::::.:: 3.3 :> ':: > '';: '.. '; : ý#. 3.:: =:::::::: ": 5.3 :.::: "`; '::.: : 6.3: ° <:: 
... ...... ...... 
.. ;. ..:: ..:.. ::. . . .. : 
-: :. d d. 
1.4 And how about sound - do you hear any voices in this memory? 
I4 24' 3.1 44 64 
:....:...::. 
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1.5 Are there any other sounds? 
Yes/No 
(IF Yes) What are they' 
1.6 Does this memory bring back any particular smell (a) 
or taste (b) 
or sense oftouch (c) 
or cold (d) 
or heat (e) 
or pain (f) 
or none of these? (g) 
.... .ý".: ".:.: <.::; ý.:;;: : ý. ß:: -:: 
3"G': ` ': :ý ý"ý<'`"ý'. ýý°': '' : ý. ý 




..: .::..:.::. : 
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1.7 How vivid would you say the various senses are in this memory? 
Suppose you rated each of them on a scale where I meant not at all and 
5 meant as vivid as anything in real life, what mark between I and 5 
would you give to. 
Visual imagery (a) 
sound (b) 








1.8 Now I'll read you three ditlerent ways people sometimes say they 
remember events I'd like you to tell me which, it'any, describe best the 
way YOU recall this particular event. 
(a) "It's like a play-back. I can see and re-experience it again". 
(b) "I don't really remember it happening. But I remember that it 
happened. I know certain facts about this event". 
(c) "With an effort I can re-construct the event, building up the 
picture by drawing on what I know about it". 
(d) Or would you say you recall this particular event by some 
mixture of the three - if so, which ones? 
ýýý (e) None. 
n: "iy{p":: i.,.., . ;.:::: "n: "v v"::: x "x:::...: ::::: n.::.. v:. v "::::. v " vv: v:. v "...:::.;,.: ý: ,;...; ,...:: n; ry"}vv;. }v:; " }aý..:::...:: v....::: y n ý,: i::!: ; nvn.,........: v ". }": n: nvv,. v; ý;... ,:. v; p... v ý; ww. y 
T nun M .k ahoy W" xOnNN man :.::.. .:.:..:...:.:.... 
1.9 Can you remember what was happening, just before the event? 
% o.:: >.:.:: >';::::: kes! `: ö :: ``''' 'gis/No: '.., :: 1 csltio... °. Ycs1Nö :.. 
1.10 Can you remember what happened immediately alter? 
LID : ':: ýesINQ ::: '': >:: ':;;: ':; \'c, /ti 
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(If Yes to I. 9 or 1.10) 
1. I l How confident are you that you really remember the before and after 
scenes, as distinct from relyin`, on what you know must have been the 
case'' 
Quite certain (a) 
or fairly sure (b) 
or Not sure (c) 
3t1:.;::.; 
b 
1.12 Nov let's turn to the feelings or Happiness (a) 
emotions that the event aroused in you Unhappiness (b) 
at the time. I shall read You a list of Fear (c) 
possible feelings and I'd like you to tell Disappointment (d) 
me which ones were aroused by the Anger (e) 
event when it actually happened, and Excitement (t) 
how strongly you felt these emotions at Frustration 60 
that time. Please rate each of them on a Grief (h) 
one to five scale, where I means hardly Jealousy (i) 
at all and 5 means maximum strength. Physical pain (j) 
Surprise (k) 
Incidence and rating (zero rating i. e. I Anxiety (I) 
not entered) Other (m) 
lip, 







lI Those last ratings were about what VOL[ I (appiness (a) 
felt at the event. Now I'd like you to Unhappiness (b) 
rate what you feel about the memos of Fear (c) 
the event. In other words. mhich Disappointment (d) 
feelings are aroused today when You Anger (e) 
recall the memory, and how stron(ly do Excitement (t) 
you feel them? We'll use the sane list Frustration (atz) 
and the same scale: I means not at all f Grief (I1) 
and 5 means as strongly as possible. So Jealousy (i) 
to what extent does the memory today Physical pain (j) 
arouse: Surprise (k) 
Anxiety (I) 





k :.: k k k I. 
:...::.. 
1.14 How often would you say you recall this memory: 
Once or twice a month (a) 
or Once or twice a year (b) 
or Once every few years (c) 









1.15 How often have you talked about this event to others? 
Once or twice a month (a) 
or Once or twice a year (b) 
or Once every few years (c) 
or Less than once every ten years (d) 




1. l7 What sort of things bring this memory to your mind? 
Would it be something you see or hear? (a) 
(If Yes) Always the same one? (b) 
Do other senses like smell, taste, touch, heat, cold, 
pain, ever remind you of this event? (c) 
Does any particular action remind you of it - something 
you do or someone else does? (d) 
Does it come to mind with a particular kind of feeling 
which you recognise as belonging, to this event? (e) 
Or is it produced by a train of thought? (f) 
. 17: . (7....:;::: ý ,:; : ":;: .: ".: : ýý: ý<: <ý: ý:;:. 
2. ý 
":. " :G 
3. t'ß;:: >:: <:;. si::::.. ": ":; ::: ;: "":;:::.. 
ý: : ý: <ýýýý° > _: ý: : ý : ": : ý: ý: " ":: : : : " :.. .; .: :. . ". . : : :. :: . : :: . :: :. > . . : ..: " ::. . : . . 
: 'e' c 
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1.18 Suppose you had to store this memory in a file, labelled according to 
what it means to you, how could you label it? 
Nov let's turn to a different event. 
Please recall one of your clearest memories from the next 3-year period of your 





5: 12 - 15 
6: 15 - 18 





Of the 32 words used, 16 name objects and 16 specify emotions, 8 of which are 
happy and 8 unhappy. Both objects and emotions are chosen to be equally 
applicable to experience in either of the age groups 0-8 and 10-I S. 
The word list is divided into four sets ABCD as follows. One set of emotions 
and one of objects is used for each of the age groups. 
Emotions Objects Emotions Objects 
Group A Group B Group C Group D 
joyful table anxious train 
resentful pram caring cupboard 
belonging bed bewildered hat 
frustrated toy confident car 
excited shoes ; reedy pen 
sad pet friendly coat 
lucky chair selfish sofa 
frightened bath achieving, stairs 
Presentation is randomised by alternating group order as follows, and by 
drawing cards at random from within the 8 in each `roup. 
AB CD 
2 BA DC 
3 AD CB 
4 BC DA 
5 CD AB 
6 DC BA 
7 CB AD 
8 DA BC 
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Appelldur C 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CUED RECALL 
NOTE: These instructions are intended, for the sake of speed and legibility, to 
allow the experimenter to write in the spoken answers 
What we shall be looking into is how word associations can trigger memories. 
We shall measure how fast and how well different kinds of words can do this. 
Beside you is a little tray with 8 small cards, lying face down. Each card has a 
word printed on its face side. I shall ask you to pick up any card at random, 
turn it over, and without any hesitation, immediately read the word aloud. As 
you do so, I shall start this stopwatch. Just as soon as the word you've read 
suggests a memory to you, immediately say YES. I shall stop the watch and 
note how long it took. 
Then I shall jot down on this form just a few very brief details about the 
particular memory. Roughly how old were you when it happened" Who else 
was there? In a nutshell, what happened'? Where was it" When was it? 
Also, on a five-point scale I shall ask you to rate: how vividly do you recall this 
memory? How personally important to you do you feel the remembered event 
to be? Do you recall it seldom or often? How unusual was this event for You 
when it happened? And how emotional was it" 
Here's %\, hat the form looks like. (Hand subject a blank form) 
Let's run through an example. Suppose I picked up and read the word 
TERRIFIED. For me, perhaps it trigg ers the memory of how I upset my pram 
when I was left alone in it in the front garden and became terrified by the noise 
of a drum and fife band approaching. The instant the memory comes, I say 
"YES". The watch is stopped. The form gets filled in.: - 
CUE WORD ................................................ Terrified 
WHO WAS THERE? ................................... Self and drum aid fife band 
WHAT HAPPENED? .................................. Upset my pram 
in frenzied terror 
Where9 ......................................................... In 
front zarden 
WHEN? ................................. ...................... . 




S. No ................... 
CUED ýMErSIORIES 014 EVENTS 
Encoding age group: 0-8 Yeats (or 10-18) 
CUE WORD ............................................................. ...... ......... ...................... 
RESPONSE TIME (Seconds) .................................... ...... ......... ...................... 
WHAT WAS THE EVENT? (very briefly) 
................. ...... ......... ..... ................. 
.................................................................................. 







WHERE WAS THIS? ................................................ ...... ......... ...................... 
WHEN WAS THIS? .................................................. ...... ......... ...................... 
ABOUT HOW OLD WERE YOU? ............................ ...... ......... ...................... 
Please ring round the appropriate numbe r on each scale 
HOW VIVID IS THIS 12 3 4 5 
MEMORY? (not at all) (extremely) 
HOW IMPORTANT 12 3 4 5 
WAS THIS EVENT TO (not at all) (extremely) 
YOU AT THE TIME? 
HOW OFTEN DO YOU 12 3 4 5 
RECALL THIS (almost never) (very often) 
EVENT? 
HOW UNUSUAL WAS 12 3 4 5 
THIS EVENT FOR (often happened) (first time) 
YOU AT THE TIME? 
HOW EMOTIONALLY I2 3 4 5 
AROUSING WAS (not at all) (extremely) 
THIS EVENT? 
NOTE: The questionnaire was filled in on subjects' 
behalf from spoken answers 
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Please ring round the appropriate number on each scale 
HOW VIVID IS THIS 12; 45 
MEMORY" (not vivid) (very vivid) 
HOW IMPORTANT 12,45 
WAS THIS EVENT TO (not at all) (extremely) 
YOU AT THE TIME? CC 
(Note: l\ iy 'terrifying' event may seem trivial to others, but I still feel panic in 
the pit of my stomach if I hear a drum and fife hand, so TO IMME it seems very 
important -I shall ring 5. ) 
HOW OFTEN DO YOU I2; 4 5 
RECALL THIS (almost never) (very often) 
EVENT? 
HOW UNUSUAL WAS I2345 
THIS EVENT FOR (often happened) (first time) 
YOU AT THE TIME? 
HOW EMOTIONALLY 12; 45 
AROUSING WAS (not at all) (extremely) 
THIS EVENT? 
Each memory should take a minute at the most to complete. There's no need 
to strain for precision on the rating scales - your general impression is a good 
enough guide. 
And please - this is very important - don't think you're expected to remember 
all the who, what, where, when questions. (Perhaps you noticed in my example 
I left WHEN? blank because I didn't know. ) Tell me only what you actually 
remember - not what you now think, or know Must have been the case. 
Anything you don't actually remember, please be sure we leave blank, because 
for our purposes what you can't recall is just as important as what you can. 
We shall look at memories from two broad age groups. The first, from birth to 
8 years old. The second group will be from 10 to 18 years old. We shall leave 
9 years old blank as a division between the two groups. 
We shall try 16 words in each of the two age groups. If a word fails to trigger 
a memory in the right age group within 30 seconds (I'll tell you when) I shall 
just write NIL on the form and we'll go on to the next word 
Any questions? 
Right - then we'll start with memories between birth and 8 years old. (Or 10- 




Finally, I'd like you to think back again to when you were about 6-11 years old. 
I shall ask you some questions about your schooling, ` at that time. But I shan't 
expect you to remember all the answers. 
So please try not to guess. Don't tell me what you think was probably the case 
- only what you actually remember. If you don't remember, just say so. But if 
you do remember, I'd like to know how definite the memory is. So for each 
answer I shall ask you whether you're (a) absolutely sure, or (b) fairly sure, or 
(c) not very sure. 
1 What was the name of the school you went to when you were aged 
between 6 and 1 I? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 
(How old were you when you left this school? Age .......... 
Was your next school in an entirely ditlerent building,? Yes/No 
([f older than Il or if senior school was in salbe 
building, close) 




Can you recall the colour of his/her hair? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 
4 Can you name any other teacher at this school? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 
5 Can you picture him/her in your mind's eye? 
Answer Yes/No Vividly (d) fairly clearly (e) vaguely (f) 
6 Do you remember what his/her voice sounded like? 
Answer Yes/No Vividly (d) fairly clearly (e) vaguely (f) 




8 Can you picture him/her in your mind's eye? 
Answer Yes/No Vividly (d) fairly clearly (e) vaguely (f) 
9 Do you remember what his/her voice sounded like? 
Answer Yes/No Vividly (d) fairly clearly (e) vaguely (t) 
10 What was the name of the teacher who took you for singing? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 




12 Can you remember what was the colour of the floor? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 




14 Can you recall who sat next to you in this class? 
Answer ............................................................................................... . 
abc 
15 Were the seats benches or chairs? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 





17 Where was the clock in relation to where you sat? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 
18 Can you recall whether the clock had Roman or cirdinary numbers? 
................................................................................................ Answer 
abc 
19 During this last year at this school, where did you have lunch? 
Answer ................................................................................................ 
abc 





One mark for each remembered answer. 
x3 for absolutely sure (a) or for vividly (d) 
x2 for fairly sure (b) or for fairly clearly (e) 
NxI for not very sure (c) or for vaguely (f) 
Differences in life-styles will probably mean not all questions are applicable to 
all respondents. Total scores will, therefore, be percentaged on applicable 
questions only. Any subject for whom fewer than ten questions Are applicable 
would not be included in the sample. 
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Appendix F 
DATA FOR TABLES & FIGURES IN 6.3 
PERCENTAGE LOST 
M? %IORV. t(: F: THING% rl{c)rr. (c V-la' U. . U'RAL N. %NIES TO roC 14A I'll I(,. %[ 
11 46.7 22.2 40 3 13 20 33.3 
12 20 30 41) 50 33.3 t1 
13 60 40 60.7 ; (?. 3 16.7 57, 
13 6.7 7 20 16.7 O 1) 
1; 31.3 2)) 26.7 33, ; 20 I') 















14 73.3 63.? 71.3 100 38.9 76.2 
19 26.7 16.7 8. º 33.3 16.7 5.6 
19 26.7 36.7 16.7 20 11.1 
21 4.2 16.7 8.3 66.7 1) 5.5 
22 16.7 21.3 20 06.7 16.7 9.5 
28 33.3 76.7 41.7 11x0 66.7 46.7 
28 73.3 70 81) 1011 51) 76.2 
29 531.3 80 811 100 66.7 47.6 
29 O (1 1) O 1) O 
30 60 40.7 1(H) ;;. 3 71.4 
30 41) 5)) 16.7 66.7 iu z;, i 
;O 6>'. 4 83.3 86.7 1110 66 7 61.9 
30 0 03 1?.? 16.7 1) 1) 
31 0 48 40 100 211 O 
31 60 91) GO 10)1) II))) 57.1 
32 50 16.7 20 16.7 57.1 
32 43.3 21.3 i :.: i1) 16.7 33. i 
32 20 46.7 26.7 100 33.3 14.3 
31 10 16.7 6.7 16.7 16.7 14.3 
34 40 X6.7 4)) 83.3 16.7 4 2.8 
34 50 36.7 75 50 11.1 33,3 
35 331.3 33.3 31.3 061.7 22.2 331.3 
36 33.3 : 0.7 41.7 100 16.7 38.1 
36 30 46.7 51.3 iO 3.1 28.6 
37 3.3 36.7 20 66.7 31.3 I) 
37 46.7 11.1 21) 16.7 16.7 52.4 
37 3.3 0 6.7 1) Il () 
37 10 14.8 25 10.7 16.7 (1 
38 73.3 1(tt) 1()11 11)1) 83.3 76.2 
38 16.7 (ýI1 hO 66.7 5)) 4.8 
38 40 11.1 40.7 333 11 42.8 
38 8.3 60.7 5)) 83.3 iO 11.1 
39 4() 43.3 83.3 33.3 42.8 
40 23.3 26.7 4)) 50 16.7 14.3 
41) 66.7 80 11)(1 72.2 66.7 
40 713 53.: 86.7 100 16.7 72.2 
41 46.7 41) 66.7 100 25 38.1 
42 531.3 40 60 66.7 . 16.7 57.1 
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MEMORY AGE THINGS PN(1rr. r. V)sl". ýr. AURAL V. II s Toro G14.11111 . %1, 
43 itt 6.7 26.7 ;. i 0 52.4 
44 2_3 41.7 8.11.3 50) 5.5 
44 56.7 100 86.7 100 8?. 3 01.9 
41 0 00 06.7 100 27.8 28.6 
45 40 iO 46.7 ill 50) : R. 1 
46 30 26.7 26.7 h(,. 7 16.7 28.6 
47 81) 66.7 60 R3.: (, I I g(1.; 
47 46.7 85.2 R)º 8.11.3 83. ± 38.1 
8 56.7 56.7 60 100 %S. 9 57.1 
48 63.3 43.: 511.3 81.3 1) 57.1 
48 60 53.3 06.7 100 33.3 57.1 
49 53.3 80 66.7 811.3 R ;. 3 47.6 
50 91.3 1ntº 100 1)u) 9S. 9 1)u) 
1 20 20 50 16.7 31.3 
51 66.7 100 100 IOU 8:.: 66.7 
52 )) 2:.: n 66.7 16.7 n 
;_ 46.7 C,?. 3 60 1011 66.7 2X. 6 
;: 26.7 96.7 73.3, 100 R?. z 9,; 
i; 63.3 76.7 66.7 100 66.7 61.9 
54 50 86.7 93.11 100 06.7 42.8 
54 ;O 3. i 66.7 1(1)º 16.7 28.6 
55 30 4?.? 40 66.7 3. ; 28.6 
56 50 i7 il) 16.7 0) 57.1 
i8 40 100 80 1111) R;; 42.8 
58 () 2 :., 8.? 16.7 33.? (1 
60 100 100 100 100 100 100 
63 40 71.3 80 10)) 40 38.1 
64 t) 13.3 tº 16.7 16.7 11 
65 10 46.7 46.7 66.7 20 1) 
67 56.7 I(H) 100 IOU 83.: 52.4 
GR 7' .3 100 100 100 8 :.; 76.2 68 ;n .1 11.1 .1; 50 3.: 42.9 09 33.3 90) 80 1(tt) 83.3 19 
70 :O 40 20 100 33.3 29 6 
71 7;. i 81.5 86.7 11)1) 66.7 . 76.2 
81 26.7 4 tº 16.7 11.1 16.7 
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